



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Czechoslovakia

After his six-hour meeting with Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Chairman (HZDS) Vladimir Meciar, federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus expressed concern that his efforts to preserve a common state would fail. According to CSTK, Klaus told journalists that the "federation is lost" and said that the talks had "revealed deep and fundamental differences" in views between the leaders of the two republics on the future set-up of the Czechoslovak state. Meciar and Klaus, whose parties were the leading vote-getters in the 5-6 June parliamentary elections in Slovakia and the Czech lands, respectively, are scheduled to meet again on 11 June.

Romania

According to Bucharest radio, parliament "rejected by secret ballot" the proposal by the Assembly of Deputies to hold elections on 26 July. Discussions are to resume on 9 June when "people's minds are clear again." Before the vote, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, in a speech carried live by Bucharest radio, expressed his "concern" over the lack of fulfillment of the government plan to hold free elections. According to Stolojan, the failure to organize the parliamentary and presidential elections have given the appearance of "political instability." He suggested that the 26 July proposal be passed in order to end the "current state of confusion."

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Sarajevo radio reports that Prime Minister Jure Pelivan sent a letter to the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro demanding that "aggression and interference" in Bosnian domestic affairs "must unconditionally stop." The letter calls for a listing of the "extent of war damage" along with establishing "the obligations of Serbia and Montenegro in paying for it." "Information" on Serbian and Montenegrin "paramilitary organizations" "operating" in Bosnia accompanies the letter.

Croatia

President Franjo Tudjman, in a news conference broadcast by Zagreb radio, said that the "world" would undertake "military intervention" if the UN-imposed sanctions did not produce results. Asked about possible UN sanctions against Croatia, Tudjman answered that none were "expected" because, as Bosnian President Izetbegovic "admitted," the Croatian forces "set up in the Croatian areas are regular forces defending Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Yugoslavia

Serbia—The Serbian Government has invited "representatives of the political parties and movements of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija" to a "dialogue" in Belgrade on 11 June. The meeting will be "dedicated to present issues and problems in the province." TANJUG notes that "similar talks" scheduled for "9 May in Pristina" did not take place because none of the Albanian groups "showed up."

Hungary

According to MTI, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky told MAGYAR HIRLAP that, "the UN Security Council resolution on embargos against Serbia and Montenegro has created a precedent when it declared the need to respect minority rights and the unacceptability of attempts at forceful changes in ethnic structures." Since this was included at "Hungarian initiative," Hungary is the "co-author of...a document protecting the ethnic Hungarians of Vojvodina." Jeszenszky added that the sanctions are not aimed at "punishing" Serbia, but are designed to "deter" Belgrade from a policy which is "contrary" to Serbian national interests.

CSCE Officials Discuss Expulsion of FRY

Russia Opposes Expulsion

LD0806170292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1631 GMT 7 Jun 92

["Pool" item]

[Text] Helsinki, June 8 (TANJUG)—The demand for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as the "chief culprit" for the "continued aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina (former Yugoslav republic)," was renewed at a meeting of the committee of ranking CSCE officials which opened in Helsinki on Monday morning.

The demand was renewed by the group of countries which call themselves "Friends of Bosnia" and includes the U.S., Germany, Austria, Hungary, Albania and Turkey.

The representatives of the respective countries accused in particularly sharp terms the Republic of Serbia for the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, totally disregarding the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is made up of Serbia and Montenegro, has withdrawn its army from Bosnia-Herzegovina, has distanced itself from the actions of all sides involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and expressed the readiness to accept every solution found by the three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Muslims, Serbs and Croats—on the basis of a political accord.

The U.N. Security Council introduced stiff sanctions against Yugoslavia on May 30, accusing it of involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, the Security Council avoided taking into account a report of U.N. Secretary General Butrus Ghali which refutes the main accusation presented against Serbia and against Yugoslavia, as a whole.

The Butrus Ghali report said that the authorities in Belgrade no longer had control over the Serbian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina was controlled by Croatia's military units.

After the publication of the U.N. Secretary General's report, the Yugoslav Presidency urged the U.N. to reconsider its decision on sanctions against Yugoslavia.

The group "Friends of Bosnia," however, insists that U.N. Security Council Resolution 757 be implemented strictly and comprehensively and that it be possibly reinforced with additional measures.

Representatives of the group "Friends of Bosnia" continue to claim that Serbia does not deserve to remain in the CSCE, and call for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the CSCE.

They are, at the same time, suggesting that Serbia and Montenegro separately seek admission to the CSCE, just as the four former Yugoslav republics have.

The admission of Serbia and Montenegro is, however, conditioned on a change in their behaviour, in which context it is stressed that the two republics will be able to count on admission to the CSCE only after they show that they respect the CSCE provisions.

Representatives of the E.C. member-states unofficially indicated that they were for a "milder version,"—Yugoslavia's suspension from the CSCE for a time.

The Russian delegation adhered to its principled position that the expulsion of any country would be contrary to the spirit and principles of the CSCE and it opposed the expulsion of Yugoslavia.

Russian Ambassador Yevgeniy Gusarov stated to TANJUG that his delegation had proposed the setting up of a team of the committee of ranking CSCE officials to follow the developments in Yugoslavia over the next three weeks.

Under the Russian proposal, the committee of ranking CSCE officials would decide on the basis of the team's report on June 29 whether Yugoslavia fulfilled the conditions to remain in the CSCE and participate in the CSCE summit on July 9-10.

Meeting Adjourned

LD0806210792 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2029 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Helsinki, June 8 (TANJUG)—The CSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting on Yugoslavia was adjourned on Monday night following the decision "that the informal working group opened to all members" try to come harmonized views on the closing document. [sentence as received]

The decision was adopted at the proposal of Liechtenstein. This was opposed by the Austrian representative who demanded that the proposal of the document be "defined in informal consultations."

In view of the Yugoslav delegation member, Sladjana Prica, the so-called "friends of Bosnia" group wanted through this "transparent manoeuvre" to retain monopoly and remain the only ones submitting proposals at the CSCE.

Three proposals were put against each other at the session of which the most extreme was the one championed by the so-called "friends of Bosnia" (the U.S., Austria, Albania, Germany, Hungary and Turkey).

The representatives of these countries demanded that Yugoslavia be excluded from the CSCE as the chief culprit for the civil war in the BIH [Bosnia-Herzegovina].

The European Community countries propose, however, that Yugoslavia be excluded for a certain period. By the end of this period, it would have to meet the demands from the U.N. Resolution 757.

Russia opposed exclusion and insisted that a team made up of senior CSCE officials be formed which would over the next three weeks monitor events in Yugoslavia and at the next meeting on June 29 decide whether it fulfilled the conditions to remain in this international forum.

At the session, Russia was in a way tacitly joined also by Switzerland, whose representative passed over in silence the demand that Yugoslavia be expelled.

At the first meeting of the working group opened to all, however, only the representatives of Canada, Sweden, Russia and Yugoslavia turned up. This only confirmed that those who tried to dictate decisions to the CSCE had no mind at all to hear the opinions of others.

In the meantime, a date for a new meeting of the working group was set, but the group of countries with the most extreme demands also called a parallel meeting. They are expected to come up with a new paper.

CSCE Mission Reports on Problems in Kosovo

*LD0706160792 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1448 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Text] Helsinki, June 7 (TANJUG)—A report by a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE) mission which has recently visited the southern Serbian province of Kosovo-Metohija and Belgrade, denies the accusations presented at the May session of the CSCE committee of senior officials on an alleged militarization of Kosovo and that the ethnic Albanian minority was extremely threatened and Serbs were massively arming themselves.

The mission will submit the report to the CSCE committee of senior officials in Helsinki on Monday.

The mission, which stayed in Belgrade on May 27 and in Kosovo between May 28 and June 2, was sent by the Vienna-based Centre for Conflict Prevention, headed by Canadian Ambassador David Peel.

The mission met with representatives of the Federal and Serbian Governments in Belgrade, the Army and police, representatives of political parties and ethnic groups in Kosovo as well as a number of citizens.

"Now the problem in Kosovo is not the military but the political situation," the relation of the majority ethnic Albanian population and the existing Serbian administration, the mission said in its report.

Serreqi Conducts Talks With Swedish Delegation*AU0806144892 Tirana ATA in English 0758 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—On June 7, a Swedish Government delegation, headed by Alf Svensson, minister for the international development and cooperation and for the human rights issues as well as deputy minister for foreign affairs of Sweden, arrived in our country at the invitation of the minister for foreign affairs, Alfred Serreqi.

On the same day in the afternoon, official negotiations were conducted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between the two delegations, the Albanian delegation headed by Mr. Alfred Serreqi, and the Swedish one headed by Alf Svensson. The two ministers discussed on the development of the bilateral relations and the perspective of their further development. They likewise spoke of some problems of the international situation and especially of the situation in the Balkans, dwelling particularly on the problem of Kosovo and the solution of the Albanians' problem as a whole. The two parties found understanding for all the issues discussed.

Republican Party Chairman Addresses Congress*AU0806151192 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1330 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Sokol Terihati report]

[Text] The First Congress of the Albanian Republican Party [PRSh] began its proceedings in Tirana this morning. Party Chairman Sabri Godo delivered the main report to the congress.

He began the report by describing the abnormal conditions under which the PRSh was created and pointing out that the existence of the Democratic Party was a positive factor and a form of support for the creation of the PRSh as the second opposition party. Since the party's foundation, shortcomings and marked tactical errors have been evident at a time when the general strategy of a struggle against communism has been correct. The PRSh's long-term objective is to establish a Western-style republican system, while its economic goal is to establish a market economy. In the international field, the Republican Party has made it its objective to establish continual contacts and natural alliances with Republicans in Western countries and to support the causes of Kosovo and Cameria. The report pointed out that the PRSh has been consistent but not rigid in pursuit of its policies.

The report then analyzed the PRSh's defeat in the 22 March elections. This was because of the party's poor work and its inability to explain to the electorate that not only votes for the Democratic Party, but votes for the other opposition parties, too, were votes against communism. The coalition of three main opposition parties, the Democratic Party, the PRSh, and the Social Democratic Party was a very favorable step for the national cause

and the strategy of the struggle against communism. However, this alliance was tactically speaking not the most favorable for the PRSh.

Mr. Godo then described the morale and psychological mood of the party membership, concluding that there has been unity in the party throughout its existence, except for the case of the Valias group, which created the Rightist Republican Party.

Mr. Godo then spoke about current problems, the Land Law, and the economic reform, saying that the PRSh is against shock therapy. It supports the removal of the 80-percent wage payments, but believes that this should be done with as little pain as possible. We also favor the freeing of prices, but only after compensation through wages and after a minimum subsistence has been secured with guarantees of staple foods such as bread, sugar, oil, etc.

As for the national cause, the report pointed out that the situation in the Balkans is very tense because of Serbia's chauvinist policies. The PRSh supports the Republic of Kosovo and believes that the Albanians on their own territories must decide their own form of government.

The second session opened with greetings to the congress from Anton Kola on behalf of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance; Isuf Uka of the Peje-based Kosovo Republican Party; Party Chairman Eduart Selami of the Albanian Democratic Party; Iljaz Halili of the Tetovo-based Albanian Popular Democratic Party; Party Chairman Skender Gjinushi from of the Albanian Social Democratic Party; (?Paulo Lavaggio) of the Italian Republican Party; Skender Hoti of the Mitrovice-based Republican Party; and Party Chairman Sejdi Kondi of the Albanian Popular Alliance.

Delegates then asked questions about the report submitted at the first session. The congress will continue its proceedings this afternoon.

Article Rejects Reports of Economic Improvement*AU0806105492 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 24 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Article by Bashkim Koci: "RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE's Flower Garden"]

[Text] In its article yesterday, "The First Signs of a Turning Point," RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE emphasized the fact that the lines in front of the shops are growing shorter. It even put it as a subhead of its article to attract the reader's attention.

It is obvious that the Democratic Party has taken it upon itself to show that Albania started to "shine" after the 22 March elections.

What strikes us is how one can portray things differently from what everybody faces from dawn to dusk. You can deceive the reader with promises (as was done during the electoral campaigns), but to pretend that "the situation

in the bakeries and paraffin shops has normalized," as RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE does, mocks the poor and exhausted masses of the people. Have the gentlemen who publish such rubbish not really noted how the lines to buy five liters of paraffin are growing longer? Do they really mean it, or are they daydreaming when they say that the lines in front of the bakeries are growing shorter?

Let them tell us where the macaroni, sugar etc., are and where you can buy them because the people do not know that. The people know that the lines are growing shorter in the black market, where only those who have full pockets can buy.

All of us do not want to sniff at the "miracles" since 22 March. On the contrary, we would be happy if people could enjoy some more "turning points." But when they do not exist, why should one be forced to become enthusiastic, as RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE is? Indeed, it is ridiculous to say and write that "only a few communist-socialists do not want to accept the truth that shines on television screens and on the pages of the newspapers, in the port of Durres, at the airport, in the shops..." When you read these "sparkling" lines of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, you cannot fail to ask yourself, "What is going on?"

If the television screens and pages of newspapers (only RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and its sort) "shine," this does not happen in the port of Durres, at the airport (except for the delegations that come and go) and especially not in the shops. If you do not believe us, ask the people. Ask the people, not those who have taken it upon themselves to "brighten up" the television screens and the pages of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE.

Textile Combine Workers Strike in Tirana

AU0906083192 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 30 May 92 p 1

[Article by Sokol Gruda: "The Textile Combine's Troubles as Felt by its Workers"]

[Text] An encouraging feature broadcast some days ago on television spoke about the resumption of work at the Tirana Textile Combine. However, this was just a ray of hope that was dashed quickly before it could inspire other working collectives. Work has stopped again. After holding several discussions with the combine management, the trade unions sent a petition to the government. Their demands in general are for increased wages, urban transportation, and a supply of steam.

The management has joined the workers' demands. Combine managers explained to us that the steam issue has remained unsolved and the price of steam is 22 times higher. Their meetings with directors at the Ministry of Finances and Economy have still not come to any solution. They are expecting to discuss it again. A project by the combine management anticipated a contract with the bus fleet for the transportation of its workers, but the two sides have not yet reached an understanding. The

combine workers usually walk home or have to pay for what private transportation they can find.

The pressure for a wage increase appears more acute. The combine managers state that if everything went well with no technical interruptions, the workers would then be granted a wage increase of 70 percent. The trade unionists refused this proposal, because of the galloping inflation. They proposed another form of payment related to bonuses on the basis of machine loads. The Combine management has objected to this solution.

The combine workers are continuing their strike even after their meeting with Premier Meksi. The Weaving Shed, which "winds up" the combine, is not operating and the combine's "clock" is out of order because of the technological sequence. The strike is continuing, workers are waiting....

Construction Minister Ilir Minushi on Housing

AU0806094292 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 30 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Construction Minister Ilir Minushi by Genc Tirana; place and date not given: "I Am Optimistic About the Future of Construction"]

[Text] [Tirana] The ministry that you head is confronted with some major problems. It would be interesting to talk this time only about housing, this social blight that we have inherited from the previous system. We see that the first step will be to privatize apartments. How will this be done?

[Minushi] Even as we speak, our research project on this matter has reached a conclusion. A bill has been drawn up and will be submitted to the government; the government will submit it for parliamentary approval.

This law will be founded on the principle that all the state assets tied up in public housing will be distributed free of charge to citizens, who, wherever they were, contributed with their work. This housing will become private property. This will not only guarantee its proper maintenance in the future and significantly ease the work of the state, but will create freedom for citizens and will grant them property alongside the right to comfort within their property.

[Tirana] How will those who presently have no apartment or insufficient living space benefit from this law?

[Minushi] This bill in fact includes a complex range of measures, obligations, and technical solutions.

We, as a group of specialists and as a ministry, judged that all citizens have contributed to the assets of the state, whether these citizens do or do not have public housing or have private homes. Everybody has worked in this country and made a contribution through their work. We therefore had the idea of equally distributing these assets in the form of vouchers to all resident citizens of the Republic of Albania. We first assessed the

value of these assets, and then subtracted a sum for the depreciation of the value of housing since its year of construction. I would say that there is a similarity to the Land Law. These are our assets. Let us all therefore enjoy them.

Thus, every Albanian citizen will possess a voucher. However, I would like to cite three specific cases. In a family with normal living conditions, each member of the family will receive a voucher (whose value will be determined by calculations). The value of the apartment will be calculated on the basis of prices in its year of construction. Depreciation will be subtracted, and the result will be the current value of the apartment. If the value of the vouchers is less than the value of the apartment, the members of the family must pay the difference to enable the apartment to become their own. If the occupants' vouchers are worth more than the apartment, the case is different: The surplus may be used for repairs or to add to living space. We intend to give homeless citizens without a housing allocation vouchers of four to five times the normal value, because construction prices have also risen four to five times. This will enable them to use these vouchers to build or purchase apartments at current prices.

We intend to double the value of vouchers for people with insufficient living space. We also think that persons with private houses should also receive vouchers.

[Tirana] Your ministry has defined its strategy for solving the housing problem, but it is well known that this problem is tied to that of building private apartments. As far as we know, the distribution of building lots has been suspended. Why has this been done?

[Minushi] This is an equally large problem that the ministry is obliged to tackle. We are faced with the fact that the state is penniless, but faced with many demands for housing. I would say, to begin with, that I am optimistic, although we are taking our first steps on this road.

To justify this optimism, I would like to say that even in this short period of time, dozens of applications for building lots for large-scale housing construction have been filed by private citizens, private companies within Albania, one joint enterprise, and by foreign private enterprises. Despite the changes that have been made, we have inherited legislative obstacles to properly granting these applications from private persons who want to build. We are working on preparing the legislation we need. In this work, we will also bear in mind the need to prevent abuse and misappropriation. We decided to suspend the granting of building lots this month to avoid possible abuses. We have prepared the bill and have submitted it to the government for approval.

According to the draft decree that will be approved before the end of the month, construction councils will be created under the district executive committees. These will include both housing specialists and external

specialists. This forum will adjudicate construction plans and decide which will be accepted.

[Tirana] What will be done with building lots that used to be somebody's property?

[Minushi] It is up to the parliament to consider this problem. Another group is looking into this. We are talking about the grant of lots that are free and can be granted for building.

[Tirana] I have the impression that these problems are connected, because any lot that you grant for building must be ascertained not to have been somebody's property.

[Minushi] This phenomenon is apparent in the towns. We are faced with the fact that the law has not been produced yet. However, this must not obstruct us. In cooperation with the construction councils and the town planning sections in the districts, we must bear in mind that, for large-scale construction and especially for the building of apartments for citizens, we must select building lots that are free from the claims of former owners.

Families Protest Eviction From Apartments

*AU0806092892 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 30 May 92 p 1*

[Letter addressed to Pjeter Arbunori, chairman of the People's Assembly Presidium, by 17 families of the former leadership compound; place and date of issue not given: "The Culprits Accuse"]

[Text] Mr. Chairman, we citizens of the Republic of Albania covered by Decree No. 193 of the Council of Ministers of 18 May 1992, "On the Urgent Need To Use the Buildings of the Former Leadership Compound for State Purposes," are being forcibly evicted from the apartments that have up to this time been at our disposal and have been given apartments that are smaller than the legally stipulated norm. Some of these apartments belong to persons who are refugees abroad, but have not surrendered their apartments to the state because they are their own and because they are paying regular rent according to the law. They have even threatened that they will take vengeance against anybody occupying their apartments. Besides, this also violates Article 289 of the Civil Code, which gives us the right to appeal to the courts within five days, and gives the final verdict to the court. In the year 1991-1992, the three governments that have been in power have issued three different decrees about our apartments, and we are even living in some of them by court order.

The decree of the Tirana District Executive Committee is now violating these verdicts of the courts. The decree states that these apartments are urgently needed for state purposes, and we have been served a 24-hour eviction notice. Meanwhile, the other families who now live in

these buildings have been served no eviction orders. It is therefore not a matter of urgency, but a problem of class politics.

Once again, we ask you to intervene as soon as possible to suspend this illegal decree.

With respect!

There are 17 families affected by the above decree of the Council of Ministers.

One can clearly read the signatures of the members of the Hoxha, Kapo, Koleka, and Marko families, while others are illegible. The letter concludes with the following note: "If measures are not taken, we will turn for help to the Albanian and foreign press and to international organizations for the defense of human rights, etc."

Note by Editor Petro Dhimitri

Every citizen has the right to complain. However, in this specific case, it is first of all the former owners of these houses who have a legitimate complaint. About 50 years ago, they were forcibly evicted from their property. Some of them were imprisoned or executed. Their families were interned and even today are not returning to the apartments they built themselves and that your parents, as the main leaders of the dictatorship, unjustly nationalized. They are not complaining because they are waiting for democracy to redress the wrong that was done to them and many other homeowners throughout Albania.

You call your eviction a problem of class politics, but what do you call the eviction of the original owners, and why do you not raise the problem of restoring these apartments to them? Why should you continue to live in the villas of others, when you are now ordinary citizens and must live like them? You are right when you lament that you may have been given less living space than is your legal right. However, do not forget that it is very rare to find any family in Tirana or any other town in possession of their full legal entitlement of living space. This social blight is the result of the dictatorship and of your management. When the majority of the population suffers from a shortage of living space, why should you have the maximum area allowed by law at your disposal? Where will we find it to give it to you, when we still have thousands of homeless former political prisoners and internees?

Do not forget that you have been housed in Tirana and in public housing, and you have not been sent to the countryside or to live in hovels in other towns and districts because of class policy, which was what you did to the former, legitimate owners of the apartments that you call yours.

As for the decrees of the earlier governments, do not forget that they and the courts they instructed were

communist-socialist and could not behave out of character to the extent of evicting you from the apartments you had unjustly occupied, when it was you who laid down the law.

As for appealing to international institutions, even if you do this, we think that they will ask for the apartments to be given to their real owners and not to those who caused their misfortunes.

Defendant Acquitted on Alleged Insult to Berisha

AU0806095792 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 22 May 92 pp 1,3

[Article signed by Maliq Eurosociatist Youth Forum: "A Law on Agitation and Propaganda Again?"]

[Text] Dear reader, do not be surprised. The law on agitation and propaganda still operates, and operates with the same force and savagery. It has only changed direction, veering increasingly toward the right. It operates by violating and persecuting the right to free speech that we have won during the last two years. It seems that today's excessively politicized wielders of power cannot get by without this law that guaranteed the longevity of the single-party system, and are forgetting that it did not give this system eternal rule.

On 19 May, a trial was held in the court of the town of Korce. The defendant was the 33-year-old Tomor Rozani, an inhabitant of the town of Maliq and a married man with three children. He was accused by the chairman of the Democratic Party's Maliq Branch of insulting President Berisha and both insulting and attempting to strike the party branch chairman himself. The charge was filed on 1 May. The following day, Tomor Rozani was in the hands of the police as if he were an uncontrollable danger to society at a time when everybody unfortunately knows that murderers and criminals are released by the courts on bail, to the extent that they even have time to flee abroad. The order for his arrest was issued by the party of "the party above everything," and thus by the law. Tomor Rozani was thrown in the slammer by the police for 20 days without even seeing his relatives!

When the trial was to be held on 19 May, a column of more than 10 cars and a bus full of young people from the town of Maliq "disembarked" in front of the building where the trial was to be held. The townspeople of Korce wondered, "What is going on?" They received the reply, "They have convicted a guy for agitation and propaganda, because he insulted Sali Berisha." Nobody organized or manipulated the young people who gathered outside the courtroom. They were young people with different political convictions, but who had come here as a sign of protest against the extreme stand being taken against their friend. They were united by their feelings for justice, freedom, and equality and by their respect for the human dimension that they know how to honor and appreciate better than the politicians with their propaganda statements. They know how to live

together and to understand each other better than today's wielders of power, who with their recent behavior have not been leading the people toward brotherhood and unity but toward division. Faced with such facts, the sensational television reports about the conciliation of blood feuds are a mere bluff.

Confronted with an absurdity of these dimensions, the court succeeded in acquitting this fellow, who was carried away in the arms of his friends. The column of cars then drove through the town of Korce, stopping in protest in front of the Executive Committee, where the young people shouted, "Down with monism."

Gentlemen, do not let your memories fade so soon. These people brought down the red one-party system. Their rage had accumulated for 45 years. They now know how to judge every monism of whatever hue.

Assembly Makes Amendments to Government Bill

*AU0906123392 Tirana ATA in English 0926 GMT
9 Jun 92*

[Text] Tirana, June 9 (ATA)—The People's Assembly examined again on June 8 the draft law on the organization and functioning of the local power which was interrupted last week. They examined about 20 articles, most of which were improved in comparison with the version presented by the government, due to the remarks and proposals by the Commission of Laws, the parliamentary groups, and the deputies. On June 9 before noon, it will continue to examine the rest of the articles.

In regard with this draft law, the chairman of the Commission of Laws of the People's Assembly, the deputy Zef Brozi declared to the ATA that this is a new way of conceiving the local power organs, both in form and content, a concept which should be extended up to the electors who will give their vote in the coming elections. The draft law creates legal conditions that the local power be efficient in the competent and independent solution of the questions in the administrative units where it exerts its function.

Bessarabian Bulgarians Warn About Conflict

*AU0806122292 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
29 May 92 p 1*

[Yanora Grigorova article: "Bulgarians Are Supposed To Shoot at Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova"]

[Text] Ivan Dundarov, chairman of the "General Danail Nikolov" Union of Bessarabian and Tauric Bulgarians, made the following statement to a DUMA reporter: A decree of the Moldovan president on the mobilization of young men from the age of 18 to the age of 40 is expected to also recruit the Bessarabian Bulgarians living in the former Soviet republic who are expected to join the ranks of the Moldovan Army, which is equipped and armed by Romania. The Bulgarian Government should prevent Bulgarians from becoming involved in the ethnic conflicts of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This is the appeal of the Union. "Bulgarians may be forced to fight against Ukrainians and Russians, perhaps even against some of the 38,000 Bulgarians who were deported during the era of the Stalinist repressions and are scattered throughout Russia," Mr. Dundarov further pointed out. All necessary measures for recognizing the Bulgarian citizenship of our compatriots in the former Soviet Union should be adopted as promptly and as easily as possible, the organization of Bessarabian Bulgarians demands. Over 8,000 applications for the recognition of Bulgarian citizenship have been collected in Moldova so far.

The Bessarabian Bulgarians, who would refuse to take an oath and thus accept the Moldavian citizenship, are threatened by the danger of remaining without passports. Over 120,000 Bulgarians and nearly 200,000 Gagauzes are in a similar situation. At the same time the staff of the "Bulgarian Citizenship" Department at the Ministry of Justice has been cut down and is hardly capable of processing the applications for restoring the citizenship of numerous compatriots who emigrated to Turkey.

Ganev's Athens Visit Evaluated as 'Successful'

*AU0806112092 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 28 May 92 p*

[Mikhayl Neykov commentary: "The Price Is High, But It Will Be Paid"]

[Text] The talks conducted by Stoyan Ganev, our minister of foreign affairs, in Athens and Saloniki were surprisingly successful. Bulgaria and Greece agreed on problems that were discussed over several years, but had remained unresolved. The Greek side unjustifiably postponed the agreement on opening border check points south of Gotse Delchev town and through the Makaza mountain pass. The Greeks also refused to facilitate the acceptance of monks at the "Sveti Georgi Zograf" Monastery. The Bulgarian side, on the other hand, postponed the signing of the agreement on the mutually advantageous use of the Mesa River waters. All this now belongs

to the past, while initiatives for the implementation of the already assumed commitments are expected. The main goal is to specify the price each side is supposed to pay for the concessions made and to assess whether the price is adequate to the advantages obtained. It seems that an official answer to this question will never be provided, all the more so, since the Foreign Ministry continues to observe total silence about the "minor" questions of international relations.

Recently, the prime ministers Filip Dimitrov and Konstandinos Mitsotakis stressed their unanimity on all questions discussed with the exception of the problem related to the independence of the southern Yugoslav republic. The Bulgarian prime minister refrained from pronouncing the official name of the state in question, but this did not satisfy the Greek side. Athens evidently remembered the early days of 1992, when the prime minister proposed and the National Assembly approved the decision on recognizing the sovereignty of the republic in question. On the occasion of his recent visit Stoyan Ganev, who distanced himself from the decision, tried to overcome the distrust of Greece and was successful in doing so. He declared himself for a closer coordination of bilateral initiatives in connection with eliminating the remnants of Titoism in former Yugoslavia, the myth about the Macedonian nation included. The Greek side was evidently satisfied by the fact that Sofia refrained from sending diplomats to Skopje as a form of distancing itself from the policy of the government on the shores of Vardar River. We wish that our minister had also pointed out and principally rejected the thesis launched by the Comintern one upon a time and stubbornly defended in Skopje today about the existence of some totally unknown Balkan nation which, along with the invented "glorious historical and cultural heritage" is supposed to have large minority groups in Greece and Bulgaria. On this point, precisely, our views with Athens are fully in agreement. It is on this basis that Stoyan Ganev tried to find a "common language" with Mitsotakis. The price we paid was high, but it was worth it. The asset at stake is the Bulgarian-Greek rapprochement. The Greek prime minister did not hesitate to define the "Zograf" Monastery as a Bulgarian institution and to describe Bulgaria as a friendly country.

It is a positive fact that the misunderstanding with the Greeks has already been removed. We have also drawn closer to the EC policy on that matter which imposed conditions on Skopje for the recognition of the Vardar Republic's independence. Diplomatic blunders are not easily forgotten. The dismissal of an incompetent deputy minister usually remains unnoticed. The main thing is that we should not be overly trusting regarding the promises of other countries. Italy and Germany, for example, reassured us that they would recognize Skopje, but subsequently failed to keep their promise.

Approval Expressed of Zhelev's Madrid Visit*AU0806111192 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 28 May 92 p 2*

[Maria Netsova article: "A Republican and a Monarchist Who Are Both Concerned About Bulgaria"]

[Text] In 1992, the year in which the world is celebrating the 500th anniversary of Columbus discovering an unknown continent—and while Seville is becoming the capital of the "exploratory era"—Bulgarians and Spaniards, following the example of Columbus, embarked upon the new path of discovering each other. For the first time in history, a Bulgarian head of state visited the Iberian peninsula to link the two most distant areas of Europe to each other by a friendship treaty (whose signing should be expected soon) and to convince the Spanish people that Bulgaria, with its thousand-year-old history and culture, is taking its rightful place in the community of nations and that our nascent democratic system is ready to adopt the criteria of civilization.

Zhelev described his meetings with King Juan Carlos and Felipe Gonzalez as the main events of his visit. Both statesmen, who have essentially contributed to their country's present prosperity, suggested in an unobtrusive manner that their example should serve as a model of behavior for the Bulgarian people and for their politicians who are so extremely emotional in their reactions caused by the unhealed wounds of the past, by mutual accusations of being informants, and by their unhealthy ambitions. The king of Spain contributed to his country's reconciliation in the post-Franco era; he put an end to division and alienation by convincing the living to abstain from cursing the generalissimo, after the fighters killed on both sides found peace under the common cross in the Valley of the Dead. On the other hand, the energetic and charismatic Prime Minister Gonzalez, who seems like the living embodiment of a dynamic and prospering nation, which with great elan joined the new European community, promised our president his full support for Bulgaria's cause in joining united Europe.

In Spain, the homeland of bullfights, Zhelev accomplished one of his strongest actions as a politician and president. He demonstrated, not only to his fellow citizens, but also to the whole of Europe, which we are striving to join, that Bulgarians, wherever they are and irrespective of their rank, are far from behaving like the bullfighter and the bull in the arena, because this is really not a show fit for the political scene. The meeting between the legally elected republican president and the ex-monarch (who, as everyone knows, has not renounced his claim to the throne) and their conversation that lasted 70 minutes precisely and was recorded by four tape recorders, will remain as a landmark in our young democracy and as a confirmation that the class-party approach is no longer valid, which applies to political and human relations alike. The event also confirmed that nothing is done behind the public's backs any longer. Zhelev accepted the risk of being exposed to the

attacks of the two opposite political camps, to be used as a hit by the monarchist propaganda and to serve as a major target for the ultra-republicans, because he is convinced that all Bulgarians are in a position of conducting a civilized dialogue and that they should do so. This applies to the case of "citizen" Simeon Coburg-Gotha, in particular, who although living far from our country is a strong presence in Bulgaria's political life and is willing to assist our country with his business contacts and on the basis of his connections with Europe's reigning dynasties to which he is related by centuries-old family ties and royal blood. As far as President Zhelev is concerned, he has not turned into a monarchist overnight. The opposite is true; he is still a convinced republican and has not betrayed the cause of his voters. In this context, the question of republic versus monarchy was not a topic at the Madrid meeting, considering that the discussion focused on the subject of Bulgaria, its economy, its place in Europe, and the world, and on the question of how to promote the country's further progress. Zhelev disavowed the monarchists' arguments that he is afraid of the ex-king or of a restoration. Bulgaria, its interests, and its survival are the most important issues for Zhelev and this is also the cause to which Simeon claims to be dedicated by explaining that the throne is not his immediate objective today. Under such circumstances, it is absurd to compare the present situation to the incident with the ex-prime minister in Vaduz, since much has happened in the meantime and two different events can never be the same, anyway.

The Bulgarian president can certainly not compete with Simeon's imposing physical presence, which was artfully emphasized by the television camera, thus confirming the impression of a well-groomed and fashionably dressed, modern gentleman driving his own Chrysler limousine (according to family tradition), and later on, standing upright and relaxed, to address the Bulgarian reporters in his native language. Despite sitting somewhat stiffly on the sofa throughout his interview, Zhelev still managed to project the image of a modern head of state who rises above the petty controversies and transitory events of our political life in order to reach for the European dimensions of civilized relations.

Ganev Plan on Treaty With Russia Denounced*AU0806132392 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
29 May 92 pp 1,2*

[Mitko Bozhkov report: "The 'Ganev' Draft on Bulgarian-Russian Treaty Is Described as Both Anti-Bulgarian and Anti-Russian"]

[Text] The draft of the Russian side on a new Bulgaria Russian Treaty was kept for three months in the drawer of the Foreign Ministry, after which the "Stoyan Ganev Draft" was produced. It is described as both anti-Russian and anti-Bulgarian and could be simply qualified as a lampoon. Russia would never sign such a treaty. This is what Mr. Ivan Genov stated at yesterday's news

conference, which was devoted to the visit of a Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] delegation to Kazakhstan and Russia.

Mr. Ivan Genov added that during the delegation's meetings with Russian politicians in Moscow the unsuccessful coup of 1991 was also discussed. The Union of Democratic Forces [UDF] propaganda tricks concerning the alleged participation of our Socialists in the coup were dismissed as inventions and insinuations. The hosts were puzzled by the Bulgarian reaction to the celebrations in honor of 24 May [Cyril and Methodius Day].

The BSP delegation held talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev. They expressed their serious concern about the development of the political situation in Eastern Europe where the former model of polarization and confrontation is replaced by a new one.

Trade Minister 'Pleased' With Visit to Russia

AU0806124892 Sofia BTA in English
1020 GMT 8 Jun 92

["Bulgaria-Russia: Optimistic Contacts"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, June 8 (BTA)—The minister of trade, Mr. Aleksandur Pramatarski, told the UDF's [Union of Democratic Forces] DEMOKRATIYA daily that he was quite pleased with the results of his visit to Russia.

According to him, the visit is to be viewed in two aspects: political and economic. "Very few people of the UDF's government have so far visited the former Soviet Union, and Russia in particular. This gave certain quarters in the Bulgarian Socialist (former Communist) Party the chance to monopolize these contacts," he says in the interview.

As to the economic aspect, the minister of trade says that the principal objective of this visit was to find the instruments and transport channels to secure markets for Bulgarian manufacturers. Despite the severe strain under which the Russian Government has to operate, the sides managed to reach some specific agreements. The socialist DUMA daily reports that a protocol on trade relations has been signed between Bulgaria and the Ekaterinburg Oblast with a tentative list of Russian and Bulgarian goods annexed to it.

According to Mr. Pramatarski, Bulgaria's trade surplus with the CIS amounting to 640 million transferable Rubles places a major obstacle to the promotion of bilateral trade and economic relations with the Commonwealth states. The debt of various CIS enterprises with their Bulgarian partners is estimated at 220 million dollars. The talks on the settlement of these issues are scheduled to begin by late June, Mr. Aleksandur Pramatarski says. Russia has promised to speed up the supply of the negotiated one million tonnes of oil, Trade Minister Aleksandur Pramatarski points out in his interview.

Economic Embargo Causes 'Serious Problems'

AU0806184892 Sofia BTA in English
1727 GMT 8 Jun 92

["What Will Bulgarian Tourism Lose?"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, June 8 (BTA)—The UN Security Council's sanctions against Yugoslavia will cause serious problems for Bulgarian tourism. 5 million transit passengers from the Middle East will not travel across Bulgaria. As a result, tourism will sustain a 20 million dollar loss, BTA learnt from the Committee for Tourism.

Transport along the Danube has been paralyzed by the closure of the Yugoslav part of the river. Passenger ships and cargo vessels have cast anchor in German and Austrian ports which means that Bulgaria stands to lose an estimated 46 million leva (2 million dollars), according to the source.

The embargo on flights over Yugoslavia will cause additional problems and heavy losses, according to Stanimir Tsvetkov, chief expert at the Committee for Tourism. Many foreign tourists (220,000 of them going to the Black Sea resorts alone) will travel via Romania. There is a danger of delays due to the heavy air traffic and poor quality of the services. It should not be forgotten that Romania is Bulgaria's rival in tourism, Mr. Tsvetkov added.

Until April, 1,319,000 foreigners (holiday-makers and transit passengers) have entered Bulgaria, which is about 30,000 more in comparison with 1991.

The Committee for Tourism is worried about the future. The inflow of German tourists is expected to be 15 to 20 percent bigger than in 1991, of Scandinavian tourists 6 to 7 percent bigger, and British tourists, who usually account for 75 percent of winter holiday-makers, have also made a large number of bookings. It will depend on the term of the embargo whether expectations will come true.

The Committee for Tourism has granted visa-free entry to organized foreign tourists to encourage travels to Bulgaria. It is valid for all CSCE member countries except the Commonwealth of Independent States and Albania. It is also valid for the members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand.

Cabinet Approves Turkish Treaty of Cooperation

AU0806192192 Sofia BTA in English
1853 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Sofia, June 8 (BTA)—At a regular meeting today the Council of Ministers approved and will propose to parliament to ratify the Treaty for Friendship, Good-neighbourliness, Cooperation and Security between Bulgaria and Turkey signed in May.

The cabinet approved the Bulgarian-Turkish Treaty for Repatriation of Convicts endorsed in April. The Council of Ministers proposes to President Zhelyu Zhelev to authorize Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Svetoslav Luchnikov to sign the treaty on Bulgaria's behalf.

The government approved a draft agreement on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of tax evasion endorsed by Bulgaria and the Republic of Korea in Seoul in May.

On the initiative of Sofia's mayor Prof. Aleksandur Yanchulev the cabinet decided to exempt from custom duties and import charges the companies participating in the Greece Visits Sofia Trade Exhibition which opened here yesterday. If an agreement on reciprocity is reached, companies from Turkey, Austria, Israel and Germany will also be exempted from customs duties for their participation in expositions scheduled for 1992.

The Council of Ministers officially appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Care Nikola Vasilev (who was recently appointed coordinator of contacts with the trade unions) as chairman of the National Council for Social Partnership. It is a body which will harmonize the interests of the government, the trade unions and employers at national level.

The government approved a memorandum of August 1991 on the avoidance of overlap of areas of exploration and the prevention of conflicts in the exploration and study of the deep sea bed. Parties to it are the governments of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and the former Soviet Union on the one hand, representing Interocanmetal, and the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain.

At a closed-door meeting today the cabinet discussed the losses sustained by this country due to the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. No details were given.

Leader of New Union for Bulgaria Views Scene

AU0806115792

[Editorial Report] The weekend edition of Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI in Bulgarian No. 103, 28 May-3 June, devotes the whole of page 4 to a 2,500-word interview with Petur Boyadzhiev, chairman of the Union for Bulgaria (Obedinenie za Bulgariya), by Margarita Vurbanova. The interview is entitled "In Expectation of a New Spin of the Political Concrete Mixer," and the place and date are not given.

According to an appended biographical note, Boyadzhiev was born in 1941 in Novi Pazar and is a mathematics graduate of Sofia University. He was imprisoned for illegal political activity in Bulgaria from 1968 to 1978, and emigrated a few years later to settle in Marseilles. He returned to Bulgaria in May 1990 and organized the campaign of Academician Blagovest Sendov in the October 1991 parliamentary elections.

At the start of the interview, Boyadzhiev explains that he decided to form the political force of Union for Bulgaria as a reaction to the "total split" in society that developed during and following the October 1991 elections. According to him, "the Bulgarian state, as represented by the institutions, is in a state of dissolution," and "our main aim as a political force is to halt this dissolution, effect a consolidation, and play a part in the real casting of the first foundations of a democratic Bulgaria." In his view, only after achieving this consolidation "should we allow fine ideological differences to divide us."

As for the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Boyadzhiev asserts: "Its role is played out. It stood against something, and had its place as long as this something existed. Now it should stand for something, but cannot do this. Accordingly, no one can now halt the processes of dissolution within the SDS." In Boyadzhiev's view, the SDS was held together by the personality of Zhelyu Zhelev until the spring of 1991, when Dr. Konstantin Trenchev took over as "the magnetic force that held the SDS together." After the 1991 elections, according to Boyadzhiev, "certain deputies in the Group of 39, including Aleksandur Yordanov, Georgi Markov, Mikhail Nedelchev,....and Ventseslav Dimitrov are the main ones who imagined that they could become the third leadership of the SDS," but they are incapable and incompetent of assuming leadership of the SDS.

Asked about the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), Boyadzhiev sees its main problem in that it lacks good politicians, most of its deputies remaining servants of the party apparatus. In his view, Andrey Lukanov is the only true BSP politician, but his connections with the totalitarian past make it impossible for him to continue. Asked about the prospects for the BSP, Boyadzhiev is rather uncertain. He says that "it will undergo internal changes," and "for the first time will have to defend itself politically." He does not rule out a split in the BSP, and points to the Alliance for Social Democracy, recently formed as a faction in the BSP, as one direction for the party's future development.

Boyadzhiev predicts new elections before the end of the year, prompted by high inflation and rising unemployment following the application of the Land Act and Privatization Act, and hopes that many members of the electorate, disillusioned by these developments, will vote for his political organization as a force that can pull the country together.

Minister Discusses Defense Industry Conversion

AU0806113292 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 28 May 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Bulgarian Defense Minister Aleksandur Staliyski by Nedko Petrov; place and date not given: "Is a Moratorium Possible on Privatizing the Military-Industrial Complex?"]

[Text] Recently passions have been aroused in the press and among government (and certain other) circles concerning the possible privatization of the military-industrial complex. Talk has even started of the purchase of the enterprises in the complex at rock-bottom prices by foreign firms and companies. We applied to new Defense Minister Mr. Aleksandur Staliyski for an authoritative view on this exceptionally important national issue, and he was kind enough to give his first interview to DEMOKRATSIYA.

[Staliyski] As a National Assembly deputy, I served for about six months in the National Security Commission, where many of the discussions centered on this issue. I was also included in the delegation that examined the problems of defense industry conversion in Copenhagen. I would immediately like to stress that, first, a great mistake is being made, because the Ministry of Defense controls about one-quarter of the military-industrial complex, while the remaining three-quarters come under the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

I very much doubt whether the military-industrial complex is making a loss. The enterprises are superb, and they have marvelous engineers and equipment. The trouble is that for many years this complex was within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, and it may be very difficult to convert it so that it can manufacture products for NATO, for example.... My viewpoint as defense minister is that the military-industrial complex should not be privatized now, because the state will be the loser.

For this reason, as early as tomorrow, I will be submitting a bill to the government for a five-year moratorium on privatizing the complex. Second, the complex does include production capacities that can be privatized. The question is what should be privatized, and what not.

Regarding conversion, it has several directions, but I place prime importance on the economic aspect. The question is whether we will gain or lose if we convert the plant equipment that is connected with the Warsaw Pact into the kind of plant that exists all over the world. Despite everything, we can find markets, though I immediately add the proviso that these should not be so-called "pirate" markets.

Another aspect of conversion is the social problem. As I mentioned at the beginning, highly qualified specialists are employed in these enterprises. They are able to find themselves jobs easily, because they are capable professionals. However, there are also the ordinary workers, who may be left on the street, and therefore we should not be in a hurry.

[Petrov] Mr. Staliyski, following what you said in the National Assembly people are speculating that you will rename your department "ministry of war." Is this true?

[Staliyski] I have used the term "ministry of war," but I have never made any commitment in writing or in a speech or interview that I will make such changes. You are well aware of which media have the habit of speculating with such phrases "let out of the bag," but I have faith in the objectivity of DEMOKRATSIYA and wish to use your newspaper to refute these rumors.

Klaus Pessimistic After First Meciar Meeting*LD0906083592 Prague CSTK in English 0609 GMT
9 Jun 92*

[Text] Brno, South Moravia, June 9 (CSTK)—“The federation is lost and according to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) even the common state is lost”, Czechoslovak Premier-designate Vaclav Klaus told reporters here early today.

Klaus was commenting to journalists on his six hours of talks with HZDS chairman Vladimir Meciar on a future federal coalition government.

Klaus said he and Meciar agreed the talks would continue in Prague on Thursday.

Klaus said the HZDS is evidently interested in creating an internationally recognised sovereign state, and stressed that the ODS “in no case has a mandate from voters for this”.

“The talks have revealed deep and fundamental differences in views on the future setup of Czechoslovakia”, he said.

The HZDS intends to settle the issue of Slovakia’s status as a sovereign state through a referendum, Klaus said. “In such a case the only possibility is to hold the same referendum with the same question also in the Czech Republic, within the shortest possible time”, he added.

He said one of the conclusions of the talks is that a federal parliament must be speedily formed so that a federal government can be named before the election of the president, scheduled for July 5.

ODS Deputy Chairman Petr Cermak acknowledged that the election of a Slovak president will precede the election of a Czechoslovak president. ODS Deputy Chairman Miroslav Macek said he expects the first meeting of the Slovak Parliament and the election of top Slovak bodies could take place on June 23.

Meciar made no comment on the talks, but HZDS deputy chairman Milan Knazko said the two sides agreed in principle on constituting federal bodies. Asked to characterise the agreed structure of federal bodies, Knazko replied: “sorry, it’s raining”, and left.

Klaus said the talks were held “in a very calm and businesslike atmosphere”.

Klaus, Meciar Agree To Reduce Size of Cabinet*LD0806163992 Prague CSTK in English 1550 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Prague June 8 (CSTK)—In spite of many contradictory stands, the winners of Czechoslovakia’s 1992 elections, the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the left-orientated Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), agree on the need to substantially reduce the Federal Government.

According to ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus, extensive decentralisation of powers and minimalisation of the state’s role is the only way to ease disputes about the powers of the federation and its two (Czech and Slovak) constituent republics.

At his party’s congress in April, Klaus said the ODS requires a marked shift of powers from the republic governments to lower-level bodies.

On May 7, Klaus told a press conference that the new Federal Government should have only six to eight members (against 16 at present). It should have just one deputy premier (compared to five at present), and preserve only the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance. The Ministries of Foreign Trade, Economics, Transport, Communications and the Federal Committee for the Environment are useless and should be abolished, Klaus said.

In talks with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel May 4, HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar said the priority issue to be solved after the June elections is the number of Slovaks holding top public posts, including the parliament chairman, premier, president and president of the Supreme Court.

In Meciar’s opinion, two of them should be Czechs and two Slovaks. If a Czech became the president, the HZDS would demand the establishment of the post of vice-president to be held by a Slovak who would be Slovakia’s president at the same time.

At a press conference on June 3, Meciar called for such coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks that would respect the existence of two state entities, while guaranteeing a common market, free movement of persons, human rights protection, external security and coordination of foreign policy. There would be one currency, but with two emission centres, Meciar said.

After the election victory of their parties, Klaus and Meciar agreed on the need to set up federal bodies as soon as possible. According to Meciar, they should all be formed by June 25, and also Klaus said that “we must start forming a federal government immediately”. He added that the cabinet’s composition might be known in the course of June.

In Klaus’ view, the federal government might be formed and approved by the parliament on the basis of its inaugural statement and a pledge to solve the key issue of the state setup by the end of October.

Klaus said there exists a chance for preserving the common state of Czechs and Slovaks, but added that if talks with the HZDS should fail, Czechoslovakia would break up.

Official Reads Havel Statement on Elections

*LD0806173392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio
Network in Czech 1600 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Report by Stanislav Benda on 8 June briefing for press by Michael Zantovsky in Prague on results of elections, including statement from President Havel on elections, read by Zantovsky at news briefing—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Stanislav Benda reports on additional information given at today's briefing by Michael Zantovsky, the president's spokesman.

[Benda] Vaclav Havel will monitor the coalition talks on the shape of the future Federal Government, and is ready to take part in the talks as soon as the interim conclusions are known.

Michael Zantovsky also read out President Havel's statement on the results of the parliamentary elections. Here is the full statement.

[Zantovsky] The president appreciates the fact that the election campaign ran without serious excesses, and the election itself took place in a calm and orderly spirit.

He is particularly pleased with the high turnout as an expression of political responsibility among Czechs and Slovaks. He would like to thank all those who voted. The president expects the new representative bodies to be constructive, and working bodies capable of resolving the important tasks which lay ahead of them, and do so with the interest of all citizens in mind.

The upcoming talks on the composition of the new coalition Federal Government will undoubtedly be tough and difficult, and their result is hard to predict at the moment. The president is, however, encouraged by the open and constructive attitude to these talks.

He has asked Vaclav Klaus to open these talks, both as a representative of the party having the highest number of seats in the new Federal Assembly, and as a politician who enjoys his full trust. Equal responsibility, however, rests on the shoulders of the representatives of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and other parties who are to attend the talks. The president believes that they too, like himself, have the future of all CSFR citizens in mind.

[Benda] The accord between President Havel and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar on the reduction of federal ministries was described by Mr. Zantovsky as being purely an outline agreement. He added that Vaclav Klaus, chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, also supports the idea of reducing the number of federal ministries. It will certainly be one of the main points on the coalition talks agenda, and so will the issues of future economic reform, foreign policy, and the formulation of the federal bodies.

In answer to a question of whether Vaclav Klaus has been asked to form a federal government, Michael

Zantovsky said that, if the president had assigned the task to Klaus, it would have been worded as such. So far, Mr. Klaus has only been asked to chair political consultations.

With regard to the election of the head of state, the presidential spokesman said that no large political party has officially rejected Vaclav Havel's candidacy as yet. The wide support and trust he has from the population must be taken into account, and the final decision will rest with the newly elected Federal Assembly. [passage omitted]

Havel To Wait To Enter Talks

*LD0806151192 Prague CSTK in English 1431 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Prague June 8 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel will enter talks on forming a federal coalition government only after it is known in what direction the talks will go, presidential spokesman Michael Zantovsky told journalists today.

Vaclav Klaus, whose Civic Democratic Party (ODS) came out on top in the Czech Republic in the elections last Friday and Saturday, said on Sunday that he and Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) which was victorious in Slovakia, "must start negotiating tomorrow or the day after tomorrow". On Sunday Havel asked Klaus to form a new government as the leader of the party which received the most votes throughout the country.

Zantovsky said Havel basically agrees with Meciar's demands that the number of federal ministries be reduced, adding that Klaus is also in favour of this.

Zantovsky said Havel believes the talks on forming a new government will be extremely difficult and that their result is currently impossible to predict.

He said Havel is encouraged, however, by statements from the leaders of the largest parties that they are taking a constructive approach to the talks. One of the subjects at the talks will be the creation of the post of Czechoslovak vice-president, he added.

Havel regrets the poor performance by the Civic Movement (OH) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) in the elections, Zantovsky said. The OH failed to gain any seats in either the Federal Assembly (parliament) or the Czech Parliament. The ODA, while failing to gain seats in the Federal Assembly, just squeezed into the Czech Parliament, where it will be one of the smallest parties.

The OH and the ODA are two of the three successor parties to the Civic Forum. The third is Klaus' ODS.

Zantovsky added that the political centre will not be adequately represented in the parliaments.

He said Havel believes that if Czechoslovakia is preserved as a unified state, its main foreign policy aims and priorities will remain the same. "The detailed direction

of foreign policy (will be), of course, the affair of the (new) government's programme declaration", he added.

Slovak Leaders Push To Abolish Security Law

*LD0806125192 Prague CSTK in English 1212 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Bratislava June 8 (CSTK)—The leaders of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Democratic Left Party (SDL), Vladimir Meciar and Peter Weiss respectively, today agreed they would push for the abolition of the October 1991 screening law and for making personnel changes in the Federal Interior Ministry.

Weiss told reporters after his meeting with Meciar that they also agreed on personnel changes in the Federal Security and Information Service (FBIS), and on ways of limiting federal television and radio.

The leaders of the two forces, which scored a major victory in the past weekend's elections to the Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak parliaments, agreed to set up expert groups to create conditions for reaching a broader political consensus on solving fundamental problems in Slovakia. [Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech at 1100 GMT on 8 June adds that Meciar is also holding talks with Jozef Prokes, chairman of the Slovak National Party]

Weiss Comments on Coalition Talks With Meciar

*LD0806144492 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[News conference with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, and unidentified reporters following talks with Vladimir Meciar, leader of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, on 8 June in Bratislava—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Weiss] I think nothing substantial has changed about the Party of the Democratic Left's [SDL] position. Mr. Meciar, representing the movement that won the election in Slovakia spoke to me, a representative of the second strongest party in Slovakia, in terms of votes received. The meeting was only the first, informative one. We consulted one another primarily on the possibilities of creating conditions for a broader political consensus that would then be reflected in an accord on the solution of basic problems that burden Slovak society.

We also agreed on setting up meetings of groups of experts who would analyze problems and suggest solutions in a matter-of-fact way.

Naturally, we exchanged views on how to proceed in putting together a federal government; however, that is the matter of an agreement between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Civic Democratic Party [ODS].

Of course, there has been immediate agreement on some specific points. Nobody had doubted that both the SDL and HZDS would press for the cancellation of the screening law, and probably also for quick personnel changes in the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security and Information Service. There is also a consensus on how to rationalize the federal television and radio activities.

[Reporter] Does the SDL have a chance, after these talks, to enter a government coalition? Or are you counting on your continuing role in the opposition?

[Weiss] Our conversation has not been along these lines. We will have to wait until the next talks and the meetings of the experts. The main issue is to set up prerequisites for a straightforward solution to the problems. We did not discuss a coalition today. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Are you a moderate optimist, or simply an optimist, as far as cooperation with the HZDS goes?

[Weiss] I think we are simply obliged to cooperate for the sake of resolving the Slovak Republic's problems. We respect the election results. I am not one of those politicians who would want to cast doubt on citizens' decision in any way. On the contrary, such a decision forms a certain obligation for all political parties and movements who did well in the election. [passage omitted]

To talk about what we agreed on, it was that the bodies of both the Slovak National Council and the Federal Assembly should be set up according to the principle of proportional representation. In this respect there were no doubts whatsoever, as it could not be any other way.

[Reporter] Have there been any controversies where you did not find common ground?

[Weiss] We have not met with any controversy. Of course, I will consult with SDL representatives on some of Mr. Meciar's suggestions. The Executive Committee meets tomorrow. It will also address the issues connected with the second scrutiny of election results. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Is it possible that the SDL and HZDS will also agree on the issues of the state set-up?

[Weiss] Again, the experts will discuss the issue. I think the differences between the HZDS and SDL in this respect are not so much in the content as in the fine points. We support a loose federation with confederative elements, while the HZDS backs a confederation with possibly federative elements. The consultations will primarily concern certain procedures.

Alexander Dubcek Defends HZDS Program

LD0806214192 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Report on Social Democratic Party meeting, including recorded interview with Alexander Dubcek, party leader and former Federal Parliament chief, by correspondent Magda Pospisilova in Slovakia on 8 June]

[Excerpts] Both the Czech lands and Slovakia are impatiently awaiting today's talks between the election winners—Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar. At stake is nothing less than the future of the CSFR. There are many, especially on the Czech political scene, who are skeptical. This is why following today's Social Democratic Party meeting in Slovakia Magda Pospisilova questioned Alexander Dubcek, party chairman and former Federal Parliament leader, about the meeting.

[Pospisilova] What do you see for the future of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, following the elections in Bohemia and Slovakia.

[Dubcek] [passage omitted] I personally think that we can reach a consensus. This is because the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] was either unobjectively or incorrectly placed under a nationalistic umbrella, irrespective of the fact that the HZDS policy includes the firm position of both the Slovak Republic and the joint Czechoslovak state. I might be wrong, but I think I am not, in saying that even after the Zilina congress it was stated that the HZDS would proceed from three possible variants. The list was topped by federation, followed by confederation, and then a Benelux-type arrangement, including other possible options.

Therefore, the HZDS approach describing it as one going for separatism and everything that is linked with it lacks objectivity. I know its policy and standpoints from the past and from different angles. My only regret is that the Slovak political system has become so radicalized. This is due to the failure of a certain section of the Czech political scene to meet Slovak proposals halfway, following the adoption of the constitutional law on power sharing, which was based on the agreement reached in Trencianske Teplice.

One of the reasons for this is that certain sections of the Czech political scene failed to meet properly justified and valid demands presented by Slovak political representatives; regardless of whether they were submitted by the coalition or the opposition.

My one serious reason for thinking along these lines is that they failed to meet halfway their coalition partners. This is why the Christian Democratic Movement ended up as it did. One reason is that coalition partners who pretended to be partners failed to help in addressing Slovak problems. I assume that in the new situation there will be a chance to reach this type of consensus. I feel some indication of this has been expressed.

At least this is what I understood from the standpoint expressed by MFDS chairman Meciar. Moreover, I put this picture together from the ideas and standpoints voiced Mr. Klaus. At least for now I think this is a good start. However, the key thing is how other political subjects try to get involved in this process. I would like to see this satisfactorily resolved for both nations and the national minorities in Bohemia and Slovakia. This would be beneficial for Central Europe as a whole. Moreover, it would be helpful for those measures we are trying to carry out in order to find our own place among the countries of the European Community. It would be a mistake if we did not do the necessary things to gain entry into that body.

Post-Election Political Timetable Reported

LD0806215192 Prague CSTK in English 2103 GMT
8 Jun 92

[Text] Prague June 8 (CSTK)—Separate constituent sessions of the House of the People and the House of Nations of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (Parliament) which emerged from the weekend elections will be held June 25, under a decision by the current Parliament.

The first joint session of the two houses will be held the same or next day to elect parliamentary officials, including the chairman and deputy chairmen. On June 29, deputies' groups will discuss candidacies for presidential election.

The presidential election will be started between July 3 and 5. Current President Vaclav Havel, whose term ends July 5, announced before the elections he intends to seek re-election. Another 18 Czechoslovak citizens have announced in writing to the federal Parliament they will seek election.

Immediately after the elections, candidacy was announced by Miroslav Sladek, chairman of the extremist "Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party" (SPR-RSC), which has surprisingly won seats in both the Czechoslovak and Czech Parliaments.

To be nominated for election, a candidate must be proposed by individual deputies, groups or parties represented in the Parliament.

The electoral law provides for a two-round presidential election. If no president is elected in the first round by a three-fifths majority of votes (90) in the 150-seat House of the People and in the 75-seat Czech and 75-seat Slovak parts of the House of Nations (45 votes in each), the election will be repeated within a fortnight. The deputies will choose from the two candidates who will win the biggest number of votes in the first round. The candidate who gains an absolute majority will be elected Czechoslovak president.

If no president is elected in the second round either, another two-round election will be held within a fortnight, but with other candidates running. Provided even this attempt fails, Havel will remain at the head of Czechoslovakia until October 5 at the latest. After this date, the duties of the president would be performed by the Federal Government.

The constituent session of the new Slovak National Council (Parliament) is scheduled to be held June 23. On the same day the Slovak Government is expected to resign.

The constituent session of the Czech National Council (Parliament) will probably be held between June 29 and July 2. The Czech Government is expected to resign July 8 and a new one should be appointed July 16.

Privatization Minister Warns Against Break-Up

LD0806143392 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Slovak 1330 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] In the view of Tomas Jezek, Czech Minister for Administration of National Property and Privatization, if the Czechoslovak state breaks up it will be necessary to completely redraft the coupon privatization. He is also concerned about the possible slowing down of the privatization process if the Civic Democratic Party demands the post of the Czech Minister of Privatization. In that case a number of the Ministry's employees will resign from their jobs.

Minister Jezek also said that the assessment of projects for the second privatization wave should start next week.

Left Bloc Remains in 'Constructive Opposition'

LD0806145892 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1200 gmt 8 jun 92

[Text] Talks between the Left Bloc and other political bodies on possible close post-election cooperation began long before the election, Jiri Svoboda, chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia said today, and certain preliminary agreements also exist.

As Jiri Svoboda went on to say, the Left Bloc has not been offered participation in the government. It is apparent from the rest of his statement that the Left Bloc is more inclined to expect to stay on as a constructive and well-qualified opposition.

Defense Official Outlines New Army Regulations

AU0806202392 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 30 May 92 p 2

[Interview with F. Greiner, head of the Defense Ministry Personnel Administration, by Anna Silova; place and date not given: "Service and Civil Rights"]

[Text] New regulations for the CSFR Armed Forces will come into effect on 1 June. They should combine the requirements of military service with civil rights in such

a way that a serviceman's rights are only restricted to the extent absolutely necessary for the Army's operation.

[Silova] In what way do the new regulations fundamentally differ from the old ones?

[Greiner] Principles proceeding from the Charter on Basic Human Rights permeate the new regulations and all their stipulations. Duty periods, a soldier's right to petition, and a number of appeal possibilities are precisely defined. A commander's authority—or rather, responsibility—is maintained, but a soldier always has an opportunity to appeal against a violation of his rights or his superior's arbitrariness. Punishment may be pronounced the day after a shortcoming is ascertained and must be passed by an order. These are just random examples. Army service must respect legal norms as much as possible and must restrict the citizen as little as possible.

[Silova] Soldiers will probably be most interested in the new concept for their free time.

[Greiner] This will, obviously, be the most radical change. For example, leave is no longer a reward, but a soldier's fundamental right. After fulfilling his duties, he is free and can do what he wants with his own time until taps. No one will organize his free time, we will only offer possibilities—sport and cultural events; in short, information, recommendations, and provision of tickets if there is a rich cultural or sporting life where the garrison is located. In garrisons where the possibilities are limited it will be necessary to organize more military activities. Leave is differentiated according to a soldier's rank, caliber, and needs. A commander may extend leave to two days—a weekend, and so on—until taps or a return to duty in the morning or the next day. It is probably generally known that civilian clothes can be worn on leave.

[Silova] A number of young people do not want to serve in the Army and are calling for its professionalization.

[Greiner] Apart from officers and warrant officers, professionals should hold certain functions carried out at the moment by soldiers undergoing basic service. This will involve service for a certain period of time—for two, three, four, up to 10 years. This is a chance for young people to have a look around before making a definitive decision about the course their life should take and a chance to learn something in the Army for civilian life. I think this practice will be advantageous for both sides. Conditions are being created for professionalizing the Army—legislation, salary classifications, and so on. At the moment, the Army's financial latitude—or rather, lack of it—is preventing a faster implementation.

I want to add that the new regulations we are discussing are interim regulations. They will be finalized after other laws, the constitution, and the law on the Army, are approved.

Jeszensky Says UN Sanctions Create 'Precedent'

LD0506140492 Budapest MTI in English 0901 GMT
5 Jun 92

[Text] Budapest, June 5 (MTI)—The UN Security Council resolution on embargos against Serbia and Montenegro has created a precedent when it declared the need to respect minority rights and the unacceptability of attempts at forceful changes in ethnic structures, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky said in an interview carried by Friday's "MAGYAR HIRLAP". Since the related clauses were incorporated into the document on a Hungarian initiative, Hungary became a co-author of what the foreign minister termed as a document protecting the ethnic Hungarians of Vojvodina, too.

In its policy towards the south Slav crisis, Hungary always had to consider plenty of factors, for instance the enforcement of human rights laid down in the CSCE documents, primarily the Paris Charter. Even if slowly, the international community came to realize that the crisis and the steps to be taken should be assessed in this spirit. Hungary took an active part in this process by calling the UN diplomats, attention to facts which they were unaware of. At the same time, Hungary, with regard to the Hungarian community of Vojvodina, took pains at keeping its relations with Serbia on an as acceptable level as possible. The situation of minorities is not the only factor Hungary considers in its policy towards its neighbours. Hungary used to have a considerable trade turnover with Serbia. In other words, relations between Budapest and Belgrade are not exclusively determined by the situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina. Of course, the latter factor cannot be ignored either.

The sanctions are not aimed at punishing Serbia or the Serbians, they are rather designed to deter Belgrade from a policy which is contrary to the Serbians, national interests, Jeszenszky said.

Officials View Possible Effects of UN Embargo

AU0906090292 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 4 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with Lajos Berenyi, state secretary at the Ministry of International Economic Relations; Interior Ministry State Secretary Imre Verebelyi; and Foreign Ministry Administrative State Secretary Janos Martonyi, by Tibor Eszes, in Budapest, on 3 June: "Ban on Transportation of Goods, With Days of Grace"]

[Text] [Eszes] What could be the extent of direct economic damage to Hungary in the wake of the recent sanctions against the FRY?

[Berenyi] Serbia has always been an important partner to Hungary. Our foreign trade turnover with Yugoslavia stood at \$250 million in 1991, including \$170-175 million in Hungarian exports. Half of this export went to Vojvodina. The trade turnover dropped in the first four months of 1992, but our exports reached \$70 million,

and our imports stood at \$20 million. The Ministry of International Economic Relations informed the enterprises about the uncertain situation in Serbia in due time, and the insurance companies stopped covering the political risks of our exports a year ago, and we also lacked any credit possibilities. Most of this Hungarian export can be redirected to other areas for the duration of the sanctions, but we must also consider the possibility of a small drop in production in some cases.

Losses will also derive from the halt in our incomes from railroad, public road, and pipeline natural gas transit fees. This loss could amount to a few tens of millions of dollars. Another source of losses is the possible drop in border area trade incomes, but we have not decided on any steps that would affect this trade! All in all, the Hungarian economy could suffer considerable losses from the sanctions; we will evaluate these losses precisely and will make them public as soon as possible.

[Eszes] In addition to the increased truck and tourist traffic at our borders with Romania, the upcoming invasion of Turkish guest workers returning home will make the situation even more difficult. How is the government trying to help?

[Verebelyi] We inform the foreigners as they enter on the best alternatives for border crossing. We have concrete Romanian promises that they will contribute to a quicker border crossing. However, we must prepare for considerable traffic jams. We will try to divide up the flow of traffic so that it does not destroy our settlements or hinder local Hungarian traffic. The Civil Defense has received the order to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance, basic supplies, and health care to the expected traffic convoys.

[Eszes] An expected increase in tension could even lead to action on the part of Serbian free troops across the border. Have the Hungarian authorities also been prepared for such a situation?

[Verebelyi] We have not seen any signs of such preparations and we hope that no force will try to violate our borders. We have strengthened our police and border police patrols in the region in order to defend the Hungarian population in case of need. In case of fighting spilling over the border, special Border Police units are ready.

[Eszes] The pressure on the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina could increase under the pretext of the recent sanctions. How did you take this possibility into consideration?

[Martonyi] We have not yet seen any sign of such an increase in tension. However, the reactions of the Serbian leadership are quite unpredictable. According to optimistic considerations, this leadership is slowing down its reactions and is changing its guidelines in the wake of the firm international position. The pessimists predict some kind of a "final struggle", something that would also seriously affect the Serbian people. The

question is how long such action could go on. I hope this will not take place. If so, the international community will have to decide on how to retaliate.

Official Views EFTA Trade Prospects

AU0806121592 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP
in Hungarian 29 May 92 p 9

[Interview with Agricultural Ministry State Secretary Gyorgy Rasko by Jozsef Rakos; place and date not given: "Gyorgy Rasko on Hungary's Trade Relations With EFTA Countries and Domestic Agricultural Supplies"]

[Text] [Rakos] As the Agricultural Ministry state secretary, you informed the press about the results of recent negotiations with the EFTA countries. In this regard, many people deplore the lack of an adequate domestic trade protective tariff system. To what extent were you able to assert these demands in preparing the new customs and tariff laws?

[Rasko] So far, our customs have been most inadequate in protecting our agricultural produce. Therefore, we succeeded in asserting our will in many areas. There was no need for this in the past, but to join the EC organizations, we had to abolish our licensing system, and customs were the only means left to protect our market. Consumer price subsidies have been abolished practically everywhere in Hungary, and therefore, we need clear and normative regulations. If this is not enough, like in the case of further drastic export subsidies of the EC countries, we will also have to introduce some sort of a "creaming off" system. The GATT stipulates certain expenses in this area, and we must also adhere to this. The Hungarian customs duty on agricultural produce stands about 13-14 percent, and we do not find it justified to increase this. The consumers would also be hurt by such an increase because domestic prices would automatically increase to the level of import produce.

[Rakos] According to latest statistics, there is a considerable amount of uncultivated agricultural land in Hungary, and our stock of live animals decreased by 25-30 percent. According to experts, satisfying the domestic demand will already be an achievement, so we cannot talk about exports.

[Rasko] I can refute every point in this statement. Our exports have been exceeding all records. We exported \$900 million worth of agricultural and food products in the first quarter of 1992, \$200 million more than the record exports of 1991. If this trend continues, the Hungarian food exports will exceed \$2 billion in 1992. Regarding our wheat production, there has been a fortunate decrease in the amount of agricultural land planted with wheat. Last autumn, one could not predict this year's drought, and even so, we are producing twice as much bread wheat as we need domestically. We will mostly have problems with marketing. If there is no need for state guarantees, everything will be all right. Otherwise, we might have problems. Our state budget had a big loss because of last year's government guarantees,

and we would like to avoid such a mistake this year. As for our stock of live animals, there is a danger of overkeeping pigs [tultartas]. We need a change in breed to produce meat adequate to the EC norms. A good example of this can be found in Denmark. Domestic consumption is decreasing tragically, mostly pork consumption. In addition to a change in our eating habits, this drop derives from the increasing unemployment and the considerable drop in the real income of our population.

Statistics on Influx of Foreign Capital Published

AU0906093292 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 30 May 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "\$500 Million Working Capital"]

[Text] According to preliminary data, a total of \$500 million working capital flowed into Hungary in the first quarter of 1992, including \$470 million in cash and \$30 million in goods and services. Out of this sum, the direct income of the State Property Agency stood at \$200 million. We received this information from Government Adviser Bertalan Diczhazi. According to him, an economic boom is absolutely necessary for foreign investors to participate in the privatization of Hungarian enterprises and in creating new production projects. It is particularly essential that multinational firms establish their Eastern-Central European headquarters in Hungary, and this needs preferential treatment.

Bonn Ambassador Declines Secret Service Offer

LD0906101292 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 0900 GMT 9 Jun 92

[Text] Without portfolio, Attila Csenger-Zalan did not accept the post of minister portfolio in charge of the secret service. The present ambassador to Bonn was recommended by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall for the post of minister for civil secret services to replace Andras Galcsecsy, who resigned earlier.

Attila Csenger-Zalan claimed personal reasons for withdrawing from the nomination and at the same time announced that he is asking to be relieved of his present post as Hungary's ambassador to Bonn.

The prime minister's press office stated that Prime Minister Jozsef Antall has taken note of this and has already taken the necessary measures.

Presidential Authority Not on Parliament's Agenda

LD0706190892 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1200 GMT 5 Jun 92

[Text] The National Assembly will not discuss the proposal of the government party faction regarding the scope of authority of the president of the Republic either next week or at the session following that. Everyone knows, the coalition parties wanted to call on Arpad

Gonczi in a statement to act in the matter of appointments in compliance with the Constitution. They formulated their draft statement after the head of state had declined to sign the dismissal of the president of the radio, which the premier wanted. At today's parliamentary briefing, Deputy Speaker Alajos Dornbach stated that the proposers, who postponed their motion on Monday due to the session of the Constitutional Court, have not indicated whether they want the motion to be put on the agenda again. Thus, it is possible that parliament will not discuss the statement aimed at criticizing the president of the Republic before the summer recess.

Court Rules President Acted Unconstitutionally

*LD0806112192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] At its public plenary session, the Constitutional Court pronounced a ruling on the 1974 government decision on Hungarian radio and Hungarian television, as well as on the prime minister's proposal to examine the sphere of authority of the president of the Republic. First we hear Laszlo Solyom, president of the Constitutional Court.

[Begin Solyom recording] The Constitutional Court establishes that the sixth point of the Council of Ministers' decision Number 1047 of 1974 [placing supervision of the media in the cabinet's sphere of authority] is unconstitutional.

In order to determine a time for the annulment of this unconstitutional legal provision, the Constitutional Court suspends the procedure until 30 November 1992.

The Constitutional Court establishes that the National Assembly has neglected its legislative task determined in Section 61, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution. For this reason, the Constitutional Court calls on the National Assembly to enact by 30 November 1992 the law or laws on the supervision of public service radio and television. These laws deal with the licensing of commercial radio and television, as well as the prevention of information monopolies connected with radio and television.

In the event that this deadline passes without result, the Constitutional Court will continue the suspension. [end recording]

Today's public session began with the pronouncement of this ruling and the lengthy justification of the decision, and after that came the presentation of the ruling that was awaited with even greater interest—the prime minister's request for a constitutional interpretation of the president of the Republic's sphere of authority in making appointments and dismissals.

The prestigious judicial forum has established that the provision cannot be removed from the Constitution that at the head of the executive power stands the Government and the president of the Republic, who, limiting and balancing each other, make decisions based on a

consensus. The legal basis for questioning the exercise of such power is removed by the fact that the president of the Republic is inviolable and for this reason he does not bear political responsibility vis-a-vis the National Assembly.

In matters of appointments, the president can cause serious disruption to the democratic operation of a state structure if the organ affected by the appointment becomes incapable of performing its basic tasks, including the protection of the basic rights connected with its operation, all the more so if this disruption poses an immediate and direct threat and cannot be averted in any other way. [sentence as heard]

The Constitutional Court laid it down that in a constitutional state the democratic operation of the state structure has legal and not personal guarantees. Unless the president of the Republic intervenes in an appointment, the president can only refuse a dismissal if the job of the dismissed person were taken over by someone who is also not suited for the job.

In connection with the ruling which has just been briefly outlined, constitutional judges Bela Kilenyi, Peter Schmidt, and Imre Voros pronounced a separate opinion. The justification of the body's ruling is continuing at this time.

Government Reaction

*LD0806175792 Budapest MTI in English 1722 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Budapest, June 8 (MTI)—“The Hungarian Government hopes Constitutional Court rulings about a 1974 Government decree on media supervision and covering the prime minister's questions about the extent of the president's authority will settle uncertainties that have emerged over the appointing and relieving of public media leaders recently,” says a prime minister's press office communique sent to MTI today.

“The Government does not have to revise its previous position and practice because they have been in keeping with constitutional regulations. The Government acknowledges the Constitutional Court rulings,” the communique says.

“The Government hopes Constitutional Court rulings passed earlier, together with today's ruling, will halt legal disputes about appointing and relieving public media officials.”

“The prime minister has repeatedly underlined that he will handle such matters as theoretical and legal issues instead of personal ones, and he hopes for continuing smooth cooperation with the president of the republic.”

“Concerning the Constitutional Court ruling on a 1974 Government decree on radio and television supervision, the Government agrees the decree fails to meet the requirements of modern media regulations.”

"The 1974 decree remained in force due to the lack of a media law and due to the need to have some kind of media regulation."

"The Government's stance is justified by the Constitutional Court setting a deadline to draw up a media law, instead of invalidating the 1974 decree. Up to the deadline, the Constitutional Court has suspended its proceedings concerning the issue," the communique says.

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Ruling coalition parliamentary faction leaders have no plans to withdraw a draft statement about the president's constitutional scope of authority, which the opposition has termed an attempt at condemning the president.

Asked by MTI today, Christian Democratic People's Party faction leader Tibor Fuzessy said the Constitutional Court ruling is fully in accordance with coalition parties' ideas.

Gonczi Welcomes Decision

LD0806193192 Budapest MTI in English 1825 GMT
8 Jun 92

[Text] Budapest, June 8 (MTI)—"I welcome today's Constitutional Court rulings. I am happy the Constitutional Court declared, for the first time, that information independence from the state, the government, the parties, political and other forces, is an integral part of freedom of opinion and press," Hungarian President Arpad Goncz said in a statement sent to MTI today.

"The lack of information independence is a serious danger and our democracy has to beware of it. In my decisions, I have always been guided by that awareness," the statement says.

According to Goncz, it is of great significance that the Constitutional Court stated there is no press freedom without full, balanced, and accurate information.

"Should the radio and the television become unable to fulfil these tasks, they would fail to meet their basic obligations," the statement says.

"All these dangers can be averted only by a law," says the statement.

The president has pressed for the drawing up of such a law several times.

Lacking a media law, political forces and various branches of power saw a guarantee for press freedom in appointing radio and television presidents on the basis of consensus.

"An attempt at eliminating this personal guarantee without replacing it with another one of similar weight would jeopardise conditions for providing full, balanced, and accurate information, directly posing a serious threat to democracy. For this reason, I refused to relieve the radio president."

"The Constitutional Court ruling gives an opportunity for responsible political forces to join hands in drawing up laws in keeping with constitutional regulations, and, by this process, contribute to social peace and the smooth operation of democracy. I wish them success and will do my best to support their efforts," Goncz's statement runs.

FIDESZ Expert on Agricultural Privatization

AU0806123192 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 29 May 92 p 11

[Interview with Bela Glattfelder, agricultural expert of the Alliance of Young Democrats, by Sara Pogany; place and date not given: "Small and Very Small Farms Would Replace the Medium-Sized Farms—Will the Land Provide Subsistence?"]

[Excerpts] Analyzing the expected effects of the compensation law and the law on agricultural cooperatives, the agricultural expert of the Alliance of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] says that ownership relations following 1947 are emerging in the Hungarian agriculture. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] What are the effects of the recent laws on the agricultural cooperatives and the producers?

[Glattfelder] As a result of the compensation law and of the law on agricultural cooperatives, most of the agricultural land in Hungary will be owned by about one million private individuals, except for the state-owned lands. This will have two essential consequences: First, mainly because of their small size, most of the new farms will be inadequate to provide full employment for the owners and their families. Subsequently, land ownership and the use of land will largely separate in Hungary, and the importance of land leasing will increase. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] Financing is the key issue of agricultural production. What is your opinion about this urgent problem today?

[Glattfelder] The expected increase in the number of farmers and the lack of funds needed for starting the new farms, along with the high risks involved in agricultural credits require state interference in creating a new agricultural credit system. [passage omitted]

[Pogany] Apart from a very few people, no one questions the need to reorganize the large-scale agricultural enterprises in Hungary. What does the implementation of the relevant laws mean in everyday life?

[Glattfelder] A total of 3,722,399 hectares of land were used for land distribution between 1945-1947. A total of 3,471,311 hectares are currently in the common cooperative ownership, and these lands will become privately

owned in the wake of the compensation law. Request have been submitted for almost 47.5 million gold crowns [Hungarian land measure] of agricultural land, or about 2 million hectares of agricultural land. This amount will be divided among close to 800,000 people. In addition, we have the request of 720,000 cooperative members and 150,000 employees for 20 gold crowns or 30 gold crowns of land, and this means a total of 1.42 million hectares of agricultural land. In view of all this, there is the possibility that a post-1947 ownership system will emerge in Hungary, namely a proliferation of very small farms. [passage omitted]

Government Agricultural Policy Criticized

*LD0706165292 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Text] The chairman of the Hungarian Agrarian-Economic Association blames not only the agrarian policy of the former but also of the present government for the many tensions accumulated in the Hungarian agrarian branch. According to Gyula Varga, the present leadership is responsible for the problem that in its decisions regarding agricultural matters, too many ideological considerations got mixed up. This problem also shows up in the over-emphasis on privatization, which the expert considers that the change of ownership should have been carried out gradually and not from one day to another.

Democratic Forum Assesses Government Work

*LD0106095192 Budapest MTI in English 0558 GMT
31 May 92*

[Text] Budapest, May 30 (MTI)—During its Saturday session in Budapest, the National Board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF], the leading party of the government coalition, reconfirmed that they continue to regard the written and unwritten principles and

rules of constitutional statehood and democracy as binding for themselves, and accept unbiased and public control.

Journalists were later told that on assessing the past two years of work by parliament and the government, the National Board stated that their performance can be evaluated in a just manner in the context of the requirements and the circumstances.

Notwithstanding the limited possibilities, the board considers it indispensable for the legislature, the government and the local authorities to take accelerated measures in order to increase the security of existence of citizens.

According to the statement adopted during the session of HDF's National Board, the prime minister's proposal to the president of the Republic concerning the exemption of the radio president from his post was in conformity with the Constitution and the law passed by parliament on the appointment of public service media leaders.

At the press conference that followed the meeting, it was stated that President Goncz's decision not to relieve Radio President Csaba Gombar of his post ran contrary to the law and the Constitution, as he ignored the law on appointments, the relevant government decree of 1974 and the two resolutions of the Constitutional Court.

Socialist Candidate Wins Kisber By-Election

*LD0806121392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 0900 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] Gyorgy Keleti, Hungarian Socialist Party candidate, received the most votes in the parliamentary by-election in Kisber this weekend. He obtained 62.4 percent of the votes. According to the final data of the election committee, second place was gained by the candidate of the Independent Smallholders' Party, with nearly 13.5 percent. Next, with nearly 12 percent, was the candidate of the Federation of Young Democrats. [passage omitted]

Pawlak In Coalition Talks With Other Parties*LD0906081592 Warsaw PAP in English 0006 GMT
9 Jun 92*

[Text] Warsaw, June 8—Premier Waldemar Pawlak on Monday evening said that "all potential partners are interested in cooperation."

Pawlak made the statement after holding an hour long meeting with Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the Democratic Union (UD), Donald Tusk of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), Tomasz Bankowski of the Polish Economic Programme (PPG) and Leszek Moczulski of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN).

The premier said that participants in the meeting exchanged views on presented programmatic documents adding that the sides agreed to smooth out differences and doubts on Tuesday. "We will look for such formulas which could be accepted by all parties," the premier added.

Donald Tusk said that differences as to the economy were especially visible in the stands of the KLD and the KPN, but he added that the premier is open to a far reaching programmatic compromise. The KLD leader expressed an opinion that the financial stabilization of the state and the free market should be subjected to a compromise.

KPN's leader Leszek Moczulski said that "we are all united in a deep conviction that the government must be strong." It must have a stable political base and exist for at least 24 months, said Moczulski.

However Moczulski declared that KPN is sticking to its earlier demand to increase the budget deficit by further 3 per cent, compared to the 5 per cent planned in the budget bill passed by the Sejm (Lower House) last week.

Earlier in the day, the premier was received by President Lech Walesa to discuss the current situation in the country. The meeting was also attended by Acting Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski.

Pawlak, leader of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), also met with staffers of the bureau of the main executive committee of his party. He thanked them for cooperation and devotion in their work and appealed for further support and intensive work.

The prime minister also travelled to Zyrardow, south of Warsaw, the site of a recent shoot-out between policemen and a group of terrorists. Pawlak inquired about the health of policemen wounded during the May action. Chief of the local police station Tadeusz Starzewski told the premier that the wounded are returning to health. Next, the premier arrived in Skierniewice where he attended a local PSL Congress.

Back in Warsaw, the prime minister, appearing in the main evening news bulletin referred to the controversy over the functioning of the office of the Council of Ministers by saying:

"State administration should not be taken advantage of for the benefit of a particular political party or for achieving private interests."

Asked about the haste in appointing new persons to top posts at the Interior and Defence Ministries the premier replied "these ministries should be first of all marked by professionalism and loyalty to the state, and for that reason it was necessary to undertake radical steps."

New Prime Minister Discusses Beginning of Term*LD0706090792 Warsaw TVP Television First
Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by unidentified announcer on "Tydzien (The Week)" program in the studio—live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] When I invited you, ladies and gentlemen, a week ago to watch a special edition of the "Tydzien" magazine this morning, the reasons for such a special edition were twofold: First, the Peasants' Day celebrations, and second, Pentecost. Today it turned out that there was a third reason to make this edition special, to make it unusual. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, during the last few days, stormy debates in the Sejm have brought about the fall of the Jan Olszewski government and the appointment of a new chairman of the Council of Ministers. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, this is the first peasants' prime minister since the war, Mr. Waldemar Pawlak.

Despite the avalanche—since the first day of his nomination—of work and of tasks, the prime minister has accepted our invitation and today, live, he is here with us in our studio. Once again, I congratulate you, Prime Minister, on your election. I say once again since I already had the opportunity to do this on Friday, and I wish to ask: On the threshold of this new road of yours and on Peasants' Day, what would you like—in a few words for the time being—to say to the farmers?

[Pawlak] I think that we have had to wait a long time for such a moment. A curious situation arose when the nomination was being given me: Mr. Speaker Chrzastowski showed us the act of nomination to the post of minister of trade and services given to his father and signed, in 1920, by Wincenty Witos [inter-war prime minister from the Peasant Party]. So history has, in a sense, come full circle. I would like, here and now, to say that—today—it is a great joy, but whether it will be a success—well, that will show only after much hard work. I think that, like all inhabitants of the countryside—irrespective of the times, history, and the system, which we were not always allowed to choose—who worked for themselves, for their community, and for Poland, so now too, we will try to bring about such a situation in which everybody will be able to fully demonstrate their abilities, and only then will we be able to make a strong stand as a country.

[Announcer] For the time being I thank you, sir. Ladies and gentlemen, we actually want—to tell the awful truth—to take advantage of the prime minister to the fullest extent in this program, and make it possible for you, ladies and gentlemen, to speak on the telephone with him. So I would ask you, sir, to please sit at the telephone.

[Pawlak, laughing] This time [words indistinct] but I won't be taken advantage of. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Prime Minister, have people begun phoning immediately? What were the calls about?

[Pawlak] Well, one was with good wishes and another with anxiety that it was not the right time to go to the forefront; the gentleman was anxious about whether this was the right moment.

[Announcer] Are you not anxious yourself?

[Pawlak] If one participates in politics, one has to be prepared for any situation.

[Announcer] One part of your party's program says agriculture is the most important branch of industry, of the national economy, and that if one gives priority to agriculture it will lead the country out of the crisis. Farmers are not only producers but also consumers. So, thanks to agriculture, one can push forward the whole national economy and overcome the recession. Do you still think so?

[Pawlak] Yes, I do, but now I have to take more facts into consideration, and I have to look at matters as a whole. Besides, I have always had the view that the economic success of the whole country can give reassurance to agriculture and provide the possibility for developing agriculture and the processing industry. Here we can, relatively quickly, reach a competitive level in the world economy.

[Announcer] But one has to start somewhere. What are you going to begin with?

[Pawlak] First of all, with creating such conditions that every man, even in a remote village, will be able to work in peace and will have profit and satisfaction.

[Announcer] Farmers expect that because there is a peasants' prime minister, they will live well now. Is that not a great simplification?

[Pawlak] I think that it certainly is a favorable circumstance, but it does not depend on nominations and posts alone. Now it can be satisfaction in the beginning, and it depends on me and my colleagues and everybody whether we will be able to shape the work so that things will indeed be better.

[Announcer] The PSL [Polish Peasant Party] is not the only peasant party in the Sejm. What about cooperation with other parties?

[Pawlak] I think that as regards concrete matters, the matters concerning a program and activities, economic activities in particular, there will be no problems and we will cooperate irrespective of whether we are on the same or opposite sides.

[Announcer] Prime Minister, many times you declared that you were against ruling by decree. You said that the Sejm holds the most important power in the state and is the highest authority. Have you changed your view now, or do you still consider the Sejm as the highest authority in the state?

[Pawlak] This has been stated in the Constitution, so...

[Announcer, interrupting] But, for the moment, what about decrees?

[Pawlak, continuing]...so I would not like to expose the Constitution to a clash. I believe that the strength of the government does not come from decrees or from legal regulations, for there have been such entries about the leading forces in the previous Constitution and they did not manage much. It all depends on whether the government knows how to act effectively and to solve the problems of the state, the problems of society, or not. No formal and legal regulations are going to help here. I hope that we will be allowed, in a realistic and effective way, to conduct state matters in such a way that we manage to achieve success.

[Announcer] At your news conference immediately after your election, your nomination to the post of prime minister, you said, sir, that for the time being the government would not be seeking special powers, but you did not exclude the possibility that if it did not succeed it would. So, are you expecting another set-back?

[Pawlak] I believe that we shall concentrate not on seeking skeleton keys [wytrych], but we shall begin to open doors and quickly get down to specific solutions that will change the situation in the economy—and especially in industry—and also the situation in agriculture.

[Announcer] Polish agriculture is poor, lacks investments, is fragmented, behind the times, and now we are entering the EEC, we are associated with the EEC. In a few years' time, we shall probably become a member of this Community. Do you see a chance, sir, for our agriculture to survive this 10-year period?

[Pawlak] I believe that agriculture has many more chances than our industry because agriculture in Europe also is in the hands of the farmers, and all we need here is good technology, good ways of packing products, and we could quite quickly reach a European standard. It is not by chance that the French farmers protested against this agreement on association—particularly French farmers.

[Pawlak] Prime Minister, your latest nominations show close cooperation with the president; however, which

ministries will you be staffing yourself—that is those that are closest [passage indistinct].

[Pawlak] I am staffing all the ministries on my own.

[Announcer] Of course, but which are closest to your heart, which ministries would you like...?

[Pawlak, interrupting] I believe that this is going to be the outcome of coalition agreements. For now it has been necessary to undertake swift and decisive action to ensure that the situation became calm and that we would not drag on this atmosphere of mutual bartering, mutual accusations, and I believe that this has worked effectively, especially as far as the public services sector is concerned.

[Announcer] What is your attitude toward the matter of portfolios?

[Pawlak] I agree as far as principles are concerned, but procedures must be as follows: On the one hand, the interests of the state cannot suffer, and on the other, those people against whom there is no fully conclusive proof should not become the victims of political battles, barbers, or blackmail.

[Announcer] If I may return to the previous question. Was it really such a dangerous situation on Friday, or on Thursday night, that everything had to move so rapidly? The rumors have now been denied by two sources, by the government and by the president.

[Pawlak] Perhaps we have a calm situation at the moment because such rapid moves followed.

[Announcer] I would like to come back to agricultural matters. You said yesterday that before you proposed the cabinet you would hold a number of meetings with various social groups, including farmers. Is it known where the meeting will be held, and what is most important to you, what do you want to hear from farmers before appointing, I believe, the minister of agriculture?

[Pawlak] I would like to talk to various social groups and strata, first of all to seek their opinion on how they see the affairs of the state and what actions are necessary. It probably will make discussions with politicians easier, because lately they have been devoting too much energy to political games, often forgetting that there is an economy, there is the society.

[Announcer] You said in the Sejm that the situation was dramatic. This, indeed, is true. What are your plans to calm the situation, to make it less dramatic?

[Pawlak] As far as the political atmosphere is concerned, a little time is needed for the excitement to cool. But, as regards the economic situation, I would like to undertake such actions that will work, possibly soon, to free economic mechanisms from restrictions and allow for better use of human potential and energy of the people to manage the assets, and I believe that this concerns

industry to a large extent. There [word indistinct] payment, mutual obligations of enterprises, lead to situations that could threaten a great collapse of the whole economy. In agriculture, stabilization is needed, and the creation of such conditions that farming production could be purchased in full at favorable prices. At the moment we primarily have possibilities to expand our cooperation with the East. I believe that I will be concentrating on these actions.

[Announcer] Prime Minister, I know that you are going to meet farmers soon. You can get a flavor of this meeting now, talking to people on the phone. We will return to our conversation later. [passage omitted; the announcer reads out congratulatory telegrams from listeners, including an excerpt from a fax from the voivodship council and strike committee in the Kielce region ending with the words: "We declare our readiness for loyal cooperation and help."] Well, I believe that coming from those who carry out protest actions such a fax is heartening, isn't it?

[Pawlak] I believe that we should make an effort to ensure that there will be as few occasions as possible, as few reasons as possible, for very dramatic actions. We should be looking for such types of agreements and organize the cooperation of the government with the trade unions in such a way that these problems are solved even earlier by way of negotiation, by way of seeking agreement, so that, sometimes, there will be concessions on principles from both sides, and that both sides will seek effective solutions.

[Announcer] Sir, in a moment you will be listening to questions from listeners. I can't resist asking you one more question: I know it is too early to be talking about personnel appointments in the various ministries, but—in a general sort of way—do you expect changes in the Ministry of Agriculture? Because this is what interests farmers most, and they probably would not forgive us if we did not ask the question.

[Pawlak] This does not depend exclusively on me because what is needed here is goodwill on both sides, and if agreement proves to be possible, then we shall see. [passage omitted]

Well, we have a certain problem here because this policy line has not fully been given shape. This came about because the agency that for the sake of simplicity we might call Land Ownership did not have enough time to fully define its program assumptions as far as state farms were concerned. Mostly urgent actions were undertaken to ensure the functioning of these farms so that the land would not lie fallow. I would like to repeat something that I have said many times before: Before the war, 17 percent of the land belonged to the state and nobody made a tragedy out of that. It is certain that state enterprises are needed in animal husbandry or in seed production, because in these cases no individual farmer is able to conduct experiments on his own account. But, where it is possible to enlarge farms from state land, we

should try to seek out such opportunities and move toward land-cultivation by farmers, by family-owned farms. But, solutions must be subject above all to the criterion of efficiency. This should not be concerned with ideological principles, but with solutions that bring benefits.

[Announcer] So, practicality will be the deciding factor. The next question concerns preferential credits for farmers.

[Pawlak] Above all, I would like to bring about a situation in which there would be a clear and stable policy for a period of many years—so that it would not be another situation in which, in spring time, when these credits should be available, battles are waged as to whether or not they will, on such terms or on others. I believe that we shall be able to agree on conditions, and even if sometimes the state will not be able to give significant support to agriculture, at least the situation will be stable because the credits will be available at specified times; perhaps sometimes not enough to satisfy the farmers, but on time and in the right proportions from the point of view of interest rates.

[Announcer] How do you see the situation in education? Do you plan to continue the school policy, the education policy, that was being implemented by the government of Prime Minister Olszewski?

[Pawlak] Just as one cannot implement an agricultural policy against the will of the farmers, so one cannot have an education policy against the will of the teachers. We need here to have solutions that take into account the specific nature of this area; even in difficult conditions, one must seek solutions that do not destroy, but rather allow one to find all the reserves existing both within people and within the whole structure of the educational system. Certainly changes and actions are needed here, but done in such a way that they harmonize with the expectations. These changes cannot be very abrupt—even if we agree on principles, we must still think deeply about a procedure that will not create antagonism, but will draw everybody into an atmosphere (?of law).

[Announcer] A question, or rather an appeal: Will the prime minister fight against corruption and financial scandals, and will he forget the corruptions, financial scandals, and bribes that have taken place heretofore?

[Pawlak] I would like to say the following: I would prefer not to talk about it, but to do something about it.

[Announcer] And these are, I believe, all the questions we have. I propose that the prime minister should use the last minutes of his stay with us in talking to listeners.

[Pawlak] Well, just one more sentence if you....

[Announcer, interrupting] Oh yes, the final words.

[Pawlak] Good. Good. Well, today is Peasants' Day and I would like to call on all farmers—please forgive me this exclusivity—on all members of the PSL, with a request

for their active participation in the celebrations of this Peasants' Day. We have had to wait a long time for this day, and today let us calmly look to the future, let us meet with friends and acquaintances to exchange views and experiences, and even in these hard times, to hearten ourselves with this atmosphere of mutual cooperation and friendship. [passage omitted]

Pawlak Assesses Prospects for Broad Coalition

*LD0706124892 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1005 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by Marek Kassa in the studio on 7 June—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kassa] Prime Minister, when you took on this post it was a surprise to everyone; it seemed that it was also a surprise to you. Have you got over it?

[Pawlak] Well, I am slowly getting used to it. Despite the fact that it is a very difficult situation it means that, on the one hand, it is a problem, but on the other, it gives one a good chance to swiftly, through decisive action, achieve some results, practical ones that are not in the realm of propaganda, intentions, or prognoses, but are concrete (?achievements).

[Kassa] Many people are pleased that you are prime minister; you are a young man. But many ask: Will you cope? Is this not too heavy a burden for your shoulders?

[Pawlak] I think I have a great opportunity, and now everything depends on whether—through hard and honest work—I will be able to manage all this. That is the way it usually is in life: At the beginning there is great joy and then everything depends on whether one manages to work effectively and well.

[Kassa] President Lech Walesa was counting on you managing to join together two coalitions: the so-called Small Coalition of the Democratic Union [UD], the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD], and the Polish Economic Program [PPG], and the coalition to which the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] already belonged, that is, the Christian National Union [ZChN] and the Peasant Accord [PL]. At the moment it looks as if you are not going to manage it. ZChN is decidedly distancing itself from any links with your government.

[Pawlak] I think that one must point out that nothing is impossible in politics. I would not exclude such an eventuality. One must (?look) clearly forward and not have a symbolic or emotional viewpoint that stems from a given situation when, perhaps in a week or two, we will have forgotten what we were quarreling about and, yet, we will perhaps still be bearing a grudge.

[Kassa] Gabriel Janowski, who in the Jan Olszewski government was minister of agriculture, abstained during the voting on your candidacy. This is surely some sort of symptom that everything is certainly not cut and

dried as to whether such a minister or such a grouping will want to collaborate with you.

[Pawlak] I think that as Boy [famous Polish poet and man of letters, killed during last war] said a long time ago: The whole problem lies in both sides wanting the same thing at the same time. Here I do not exclude such a possibility. Anyway, heretofore practice, despite various hiccups that sometimes stem from a sort of emotional approach, showed that in the cases close to our hearts, in particular in economic cases, we were capable of working together.

[Kassa] In the past, one could often hear accusations from the UD and the KLD concerning irrationality in the PSL, saying that the program of the PSL had almost led us to economic catastrophe, that your interest was exclusively centered on the farmers' interest and so this was a program that was not good for the rest of the country. Now that you are to create a government together with these groupings, do you see a chance that these differences, these critical assessments, will change.

[Pawlak] Perhaps I should repeat the formula used in the speech that followed my election, when people spoke about the fact that this was a sort of coming together of fire and water—and this fusion gives steam. Let us hope that this steam will not be wasted as a whistle. We should take care that it should fuel the mechanisms of the state, and it is possible that from just such a fusion we shall get quite a good machine.

[Kassa] We felt great emotion at the moment when you were elected, when the government of Jan Olszewski was being recalled. That was a very dramatic situation, the political excitement was great—not just in the Sejm, it had been passed on to people in general. Was there really a threat of some sort; was this excitement brought about artificially, or were there some actions behind it?

[Pawlak] I think that the emotional temperature was much higher than the situation warranted. Today, one can look at it slightly differently. But then the anxiety was great, indeed.

[Kassa] You have already undertaken your initial actions. They concerned the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense. What is going to be next?

[Pawlak] I think there is no reason at the moment to take any radical steps. The first were necessary to calm the situation and to give the assurance that there will be no irresponsible actions in a certain sector of public service.

[Kassa] Today you have meetings on the occasion of Peasants Day, you are going to Tarnow to take part in the celebrations. This is a very important day for farmers, and non-farmers alike. Prime Minister, why do you smile so rarely?

[Pawlak] When the situation is as difficult as it is at the moment it is difficult to smile. But I think I shall try. If we work efficiently together there will be more reasons

for satisfaction and for smiling. Finally, I would like to ask all who hold the peasants movement ideals dearly, PSL members in particular, for active participation in the festivities. We can meet on the day to exchange experiences, and to meet friends and colleagues. The situation is difficult, but we can think together of how to get out of even the most difficult situation.

Prime Minister Pawlak Views Political Scene

LD0806194292 Warsaw TVP Television First
Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by station correspondent Jaroslaw Gugala in the Warsaw TVP studios in Warsaw 8 June; no video available—live]

[Text] Prime Minister, why the rush in appointing the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and Television?

[Pawlak] First of all, because there was a considerable amount of excitement in these institutions of late and one had to cool the situation. Professionalism and loyalty toward the state should prevail in these department; therefore, radical steps were required.

[Gugala] What are your next steps?

[Pawlak] I would like to concentrate on the more practical steps the public expects. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, I asked its members to begin inter-ministerial talks on pay hikes for the public sector, in connection with the adoption of the budget by the Sejm. Second is the undertaking of actions aimed at a quick clearing of enterprise debts and at adopting procedures to unblock economic reforms.

[Gugala] What will the coalition look like. How are your talks with other parties going.

[Pawlak] There are discussions going on now, concerned with above all programmatic decisions, that is, agreeing on those elements of the program that according to possible coalition members should have priority.

[Gugala] An alarming rumor has reached us from the Council of Ministers Office. PAP noted it as well. The rumor is that Aleksander Luczak [newly-appointed head of the Council of Ministers Office] has yet to appear for work.

[Pawlak] More importantly, I have been there. I went this morning at 0830 to the Council of Ministers' Office. I can tell you that I was not met there with much enthusiasm. However, I believe it will calm down, and I have already taken appropriate steps to put things in order so that the work of the state administration is efficient. I would like to say that the state administration is, above all, for service to the state and it should not be used for one political grouping or for private interests.

[Gugala] Do you think this is the case at the moment?

[Pawlak] I think there are still attempts to stir emotions. We should be able to enter the stage and leave with style.

[Gugala] Does this mean that Aleksander Luczak will report for work?

[Pawlak] I sent Aleksander Luczak to Lomza today, to acquaint himself with the situation in the state administration of a typical farming region. He met voivoda there and representatives of voivodship office departments. We want to know the situation not only from Warsaw but also from the country. I too went to Skierniewice today and met heads of voivodship office departments. According to voivoda information I am the first prime minister to visit the Skierniewice voivodship since its creation.

[Gugala] Thank you very much.

Peasant Group Vows To 'Obstruct' New Government

*LD0806113592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1005 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] We have received a statement from the Polish Peasant Alliance-Peasant Accord [PSL-PL] which expresses deep concern over recent political events. According to the PSL-PL, these events smack of a coup d'etat assisted by the postcommunist parliamentary groups and the president of the Polish Republic. It is not a coincidence that the new premier, the PSL-PL statement reads, has concentrated his efforts on immediately assuming control of the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the mass media without submitting a proposal for changes in the economy.

The statement reads: In our view, the only thing that unites the political forces attempting to take over power is the will to regain lost privileges for some, and fear of disclosure of the documents on cooperation with the Security Office and the Security Services for others. The PSL-PL declares: We will not participate in this government and we will do everything to obstruct it.

Walesa Examines His Secret Police Documents

*LD0806192392 Warsaw PAP in English 1837 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Warsaw, June 8—President Lech Walesa on Monday studied his files kept by the former secret police but failed to find a single document with his own signature after going through several hundred pages of records related to him.

Walesa visited the State Protection Office (UOP) on Monday for the first time ever to find out how it operates and especially to see the archives of the former secret police now kept by the UOP.

His personal file in the archives covers the period from December 1970 to the beginning of 1973 and is composed of reports by Security Service (SB) agents summarizing his hearings plus reports by such agents and people who knew him personally at that time and used to denounce him.

No document, however, has been singled out as bearing Lech Walesa's authentic signature, the Presidential Press Office announced after the visit.

"The Polish president once again wants to underline that he could find out on his own example how easy it was to get into the Interior Ministry's files," reads a communique issued by the Presidential Office.

After his visit to UOP Walesa signed a document confirming that he had seen his files.

Luczak To Head Council of Ministers Office

*LD0806114692 Warsaw PAP in English 1052 GMT
8 Jun 92*

[Text] Warsaw, June 8—Premier Waldemar Pawlak appointed Aleksander Luczak undersecretary of state and acting head of the office of the Council of Ministers, the government press office reported on Monday.

Luczak, historian, professor of political sciences and lecturer at the Institute of Journalism of Warsaw University, has been linked with the Peasant Movement since the 60's.

Vice-chairman of the Supreme Council of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and vice-chairman of the PSL floor group in the Sejm (lower house), Luczak has long been Pawlak's adviser.

Prime Minister Addresses Parliament on Elections

*AU0806162392 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1452 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Speech by Romanian Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan at a joint session of the Senate and Assembly of Deputies in Bucharest —live]

[Text] Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, and Messrs. Senators and Deputies:

In connection with the subject submitted for discussion by the joint session of the two chambers of the Parliament, allow me to make the following statement:

1. I express my concern over the fact that one of the political goals of the government program, namely the holding of free and correct parliamentary and presidential elections, has not yet been fulfilled, although the government made strenuous efforts along these lines and proved that it is also capable of ensuring free and correct elections. The attainment of this target depended exclusively on us and primarily on the political forces represented in the Parliament. It is hard to explain this delay, particularly as there was a consensus among all the political parties to hold parliamentary elections two to three months after the local elections. Unfortunately, what we have lacked so far is the necessary will to concretize this political consensus by adopting appropriate laws.

2. The failure to organize parliamentary and presidential elections has created a new situation in the country, a situation that is mainly characterized by:

a. The appearance of political instability created by the expectant and unsettled state that prevailed after the local elections, which have undoubtedly shown that important changes have occurred in the political choice of the Romanian electorate. The political clarifications that have occurred within certain parties and alliances of political parties raise questions about the current relationship between the Romanian electorate and its representation in the Parliament through the current senators and deputies. A direct consequence of this development is that the Parliament has become the main arena of political struggle, which increasingly absorbs the energies of parliamentarians and increases the prevailing political uncertainty in the country.

b. The actual extension of the activity of this government, whose sole credo is to reestablish the political, social, and economic balance on the new basis of democracy and market economy. To this end, the current government is determined to continue the reform process in accordance with its announced program. Naturally, the main political parties and figures, since they are in the midst of their preparations for the ongoing—declared or undeclared—electoral campaign, claim that they have better solutions for the goals of the reform or better ways to implement them. The Romanian electorate should be given the opportunity to express its

choice as soon as possible. The delay leads to greater confusion in Romanian society and weakens the government's action.

c. The appearance of additional social tensions, as shown by recent events.

d. The visible delay in the start of certain foreign activities regarding: Romania's admission to certain European bodies; the conclusion of certain important trade agreements at the government level; and the promotion of foreign investments and foreign financing at the envisaged level.

The foreseeable consequence of all this for the upcoming period is the accentuation of the inherent difficulties of the transition process due to internal and external factors.

3. In order to cope with the newly created situation, I believe it is necessary to take the following steps:

a. To immediately fix the date of the parliamentary and presidential elections [applause]. The date of 26 July 1992 [applause, commotion] is still feasible. Therefore, today and tomorrow, we should adopt and promulgate the two laws on the parliamentary and presidential elections. [applause, commotion] These two laws should be published in the MONITORUL OFICIAL on 10 June. After that on Thursday, 11 June, we should proceed to set up the electoral commissions. [applause, commotion] If this goal is not attained, I beg the Parliament, regardless of the result of the debates on the two draft bills, to fix the date of the elections, so as to end the current state of confusion in this respect. [commotion]

b. To authorize the government to issue governmental rulings in those spheres that are strictly mandatory for the continuation of the reform process in the pre-election period. A draft bill on this has already been submitted for the Parliament's approval.

c. To urgently adopt the draft bills on foreign financing in 1992 that were submitted to the Parliament. If the government is to continue its activity in the pre-election period, it must enjoy the political support of the Parliament and the political parties. This is all the more necessary because, taking this week as a reference point—on the assumption that elections will be held on 26 July 1992, as is desirable—a new government would only be able to start its activity three to four months later. Thank you. [applause]

Parliament Rejects 26 July Election Date

*AU0806203292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1900 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] [Announcer] Esteemed listeners, 11 minutes ago we asked Dionisie Sincan to return to the microphone in

order to report on the end of the joint meeting of the two parliament chambers, which was still in progress when we started our program.

[Sincan] Exactly. The meeting has ended now. It was a dramatic end. As you may have learned, esteemed listeners, the result of the vote was negative and therefore the proposal by the Assembly of Deputies to hold elections on 26 July—both parliamentary and presidential elections with a campaign no shorter than 45 days—was rejected by secret ballot.

A number of discussions followed the voting. Several speakers took the floor in the big hall. The parliamentary group of the National Salvation Front left the meeting obviously angry. There were attempts to clarify the situation, but, of course, everybody was very tired.

Prime Minister Stolojan proposed that the parliamentary group leaders meet with President Ion Iliescu to discuss this problem before he leaves for Rio de Janeiro. It was proposed to interrupt the meeting and to resume discussing all these problems tomorrow morning, 9 June, when people's minds are clear again.

Iliescu, Russian Ambassador Discuss Moldova

AU0806184992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1508 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 8/6/1992—On Monday, June 8, President Ion Iliescu of Romania received Feliks Petrovich Bogdanov, ambassador of the Russian Federation in Bucharest, upon the latter's request.

Underscoring that such meetings were a regular practice in diplomatic relations, the Russian ambassador told journalists at the end of the interview that his presence at the Cotroceni Palace had been an opportunity to review bilateral relations and find solutions for them to become more active in the future. "We approached the question of Moldova, but we did not give it special attention," the ambassador said.

Asked by the representatives of the press to comment on a recent statement made by the Russian foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, to the French newspaper LE MONDE according to which the Republic of Moldova should not necessarily be a unitary state as long as it includes the Dniester region and the Gagauz region—with a completely different history and demographic composition—the Russian ambassador said he did not know the content of that statement. "I think the way in which sovereign Moldova is to be built is an internal problem of sovereign Moldova. It alone should find the road that secures its development as it wishes," he said.

Government To Boost Moldovan Medical Assistance

AU0506194192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1755 GMT 5 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 5/6/1992—Romania's Government decided to raise 10 percent, that is by 200

million lei, the technical credit for a higher safety in financing urgent export of medicines and medical instruments for the Republic of Moldova, reported the government's press office.

The measure was taken because the commercial companies manufacturing medicines and medical equipment are apt to provide most of these products which are requested by the Republic of Moldova.

Moldova's Druc Granted Romanian Citizenship

AU0806131692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1233 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/6/1992—Mircea Druc, president of the Christian and Democratic Front of the Republic of Moldova, acquired Romanian citizenship on June 4, sources in the leadership of the Ecology Movement of Romania (MER) inform.

The MER congress of May 3-4 nominated Mircea Druc for the Presidency of Romania.

Iliescu's Attitude Toward Bessarabia Criticized

AU0806115492 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian
29 May 92 p 1

[Ilie Paunescu article: "Solidarity in Adventure"]

[Text] Romania is granting military aid to Moldova because there are political forces attempting to dismember that small state. This is how one could describe the essence of an interview granted by Mr. Ion Iliescu to ITAR-TASS on Wednesday, 27 May.

Saying this, Mr. Iliescu admits—implicitly—that his attitude toward Bessarabia risks pushing us into a most dangerous position. Unfortunately, the emergence from this deadlock—if it happens—cannot be expected from Bucharest, but from elsewhere. Maybe the latest statements by Mr. Yeltsin justify the hope that there is someone influential enough in Moscow to differentiate, in time, between adventure and politics, to avert a disaster.

Romania's president does not seem able to make that distinction.

His confusion of criteria is proved by the name he used when referring to the artificially created state with its capital in Chisinau, which he defends not only with words.

There is no Republic of Moldova for Romanians. This name is that of our province between the Prut River and the Carpathian range. If Stalin attributed it to the areas on the right and left bank of the Dniester River to open up additional imperial prospects, we should not fall into the trap of using it. For us there is nothing else but—on the one hand—Bessarabia, the Romanian province

between Prut and Dniester stretching from Hotin and Soroca to Chilia and Cetatea Alba, and—on the other hand—the Dniester region.

Chisinau is the capital of the whole of Bessarabia and not of a state that lacks the south and north of the province, but is satisfied with the area across the Dniester River. We cannot defend the integrity of that state, but only the integrity of Bessarabia and Romania's right to reunification with its former province that was robbed by Stalin.

Certainly, there are Romanians across the Dniester River, too, and it is Romania's duty to protect them like blood brothers. In today's civilized world, the protection of conationals is not achieved by pushing borders beyond the traditional limits, but on the basis of the instruments of international law. Romania is not an imperialist state that wants to expand its territory, but a victim of Russian imperialism that requests the reparation of the consequences of an act of banditry committed by the Kremlin.

Mr. Ion Iliescu, the government, the press, and Romanian politicians on the whole have to bear in mind the law and the correctly understood national interests, the only means to triumph at any negotiating table. A deviation from this way of broaching things may cost us dearly.

For the time being, we admit that we are granting military assistance to Mr. Snegur, who is opposing Romania's reunification. It is hard to imagine where this act of solidarity in adventure may take us.

The time has come to properly weigh the consequences and to, finally, adopt a policy worthy of Romania's name.

Iliescu 'Prudence' Examined, Criticized

*AU0806130292 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 29 May 92 pp 1, 2*

[Dan Stanca article: "The Two Facets of Presidential Prudence"]

[Excerpts] Romania's president seems to have a contradictory personality. [passage omitted] Maybe the most important point that has been said about Mr. Iliescu is that had he taken over power 10 years ago, that is in 1980, Romania would have been spared a lot of suffering and would have established a perestroika atmosphere in our country, which, in the meantime, would have been cleansed of the whole policy of hesitations and Marxist nostalgia that would have left the country's scene definitively at the beginning of this new decade to make room for a genuinely free society. However, as history sometimes decides, Mr. Iliescu got to the helm of our country 10 years too late. Aware and even marked by this delay, Mr. Iliescu has decided to follow the road of prudence. [passage omitted]

I am not necessarily one of those who believe that every wrong in the Romanian postrevolutionary society can be exclusively blamed on President Iliescu. Therefore, I am trying to understand the two facets of this obvious prudence that Mr. Iliescu has acquired with perfect skill. [passage omitted] They are the foreign policy and domestic policy. Mr. Iliescu has proved to be prudent in both of them. It is a strange prudence ensconced in many words, which many people interpret as fear. [passage omitted]

At home, the president's prudence has led to dramatic effects. Had he been determined and explicit, had he appreciated the positive sense of Point 8 in the Timisoara Declaration, and had he conducted a dialogue with the University Square people, then the 13-15 June tragedy would have been avoided, and Mr. Iliescu would have staved off the most violent miners' incursion. The prudence and confusion that characterized him in the first six months of 1990 finally turned into an attitude with serious consequences. Thus his image is irreparably compromised. Likewise, his confused and indecisive attitude during the period that preceded the Tirgu Mures events in March the same year favored the bloody conflicts with undercurrents that have not been clarified to this very day. [passage omitted] In fact, Mr. Iliescu has hampered the Romanian society in learning the truth, and this proves a great deal.

What about the foreign level? Radical opposition voices accuse the president of the same policy of hesitation and false wisdom which, at this point, consists of abandoning Bessarabia and leaving it in the hands of separatists. This is not exactly what the situation is like. The president's lack of determination was proved during the communist putsch in Moscow last year. However, paradoxically and unconsciously, there is also a positive aspect in this lack of determination in the case of Bessarabia. Undoubtedly, Romanian military interference—no matter whether morally justified—would be a mistake from a rational and political point of view.

Probably, had we had a president at this time who was not burdened by the miners' incursions, the volatile terrorists, nor by the bloody Tirgu Mures events, then such a clean president probably—I repeat—would have gotten himself and us engaged in the Dniester conflict. [passage omitted]

The paradox of Bessarabia, a province that cannot yet unite with the country, symbolizes the tragedy of a world in which international law is nonexistent, while historic documents are mere pieces of paper trampled on by the new masters. Someone said that the miracle of interbellum Romania will no longer be repeated, meaning that only once were we able to have both Transylvania and Bessarabia within the same state. In other words, we have to renounce one to have the other. [passage omitted]

Knowing all this, will Mr. Iliescu run for president? Or will he run for the seat of prudence?

FSN-Roman Viewed as 'Inconsistent' Partner

AU0806093192 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 2 Jun 92 p 3

[Daniel Cocoru article: "FSN-Roman Disoriented?"]

[Excerpts] For several weeks, the feud between the National Salvation Front [FSN]-Roman and the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] blocked the parliamentary activity of the Assembly of Deputies regarding the parliamentary and presidential elections. The reason is not only Mr. Iliescu's presidential candidacy, but the fact that the FSN, which was victorious in the 20 May 1990 elections and therefore is the ruling party today, is more and more inconsistent as a political partner but also as far as the number of its members are concerned. The FSN has halved its number of deputies: down from 263, it now hardly exceeds 100! In the Senate, the FSN's voting strength is below one-third or even lower. [passage omitted]

The most recent escape from the FSN (which has now turned into FSN-Roman) is, as is known, that of Mr. Dan Martian [president of the Assembly of Deputies]. Presumably for the following reasons: 1) for abandoning the social-democratic goals initially affirmed by the FSN and moving them to the "center-right"; 2) the deterioration of the democratic life within the FSN ("a party whose actions are orchestrated by a single man is a party that takes great risks") and the existence of a certain "nostalgia" for a certain type of discipline—an "iron" one—viewed by Mr. Dan Martian "not only as a notion, but a Stalinist-type of practice." [passage omitted]

However, it seems to me that the emergence of pro-monarchist tendencies within this party and the lack of due response is the main reason for Mr. Dan Martian's anger with the FSN. In this respect, he mentioned the "statement made by that party's leader regarding the king's visit. [passage omitted]

There is nothing surprising in Mr. Dan Martian's move, while the attitude of the FSN parliamentary group in the Assembly of Deputies surprised me. In a (highfalutin) statement and an (agreeable!) news conference, the president of the Assembly of Deputies was accused that he had "completely resumed the methods of the years during which he was first secretary of the Union of Communist Youth." Finally, President Ion Iliescu was also asked to resign. Thus, "the parliament is led by communists" and "down with Iliescu!" After a moment of confusion, the reporters realized that they were not at a meeting of the opposition but at a meeting of the deputies of the ruling party, the pillar of support for the structures of the communist Mafia. [passage omitted]

The aim of the FSN statement was to "dismantle," one by one, the accusations by the president of the Assembly of Deputies. [passage omitted]

The accusation of pro-monarchism was not denied but was assessed by the statement as being based on "facts

without any political significance" and "interpreted according to desire." Then what is the truth? In this sense, the FSN statement actually contains sensational revelations. Here is the fragment in question: "Only facts are decisive. The Roman government defended legality and the Constitution the moment the former sovereign tried to return to the country in December 1990. Contacts during 1991 were designed to clarify the democratic and legal position of the government and FSN which made it possible for the former monarch to visit Romania." If this is how things stand, what is the FSN waiting for? A national consensus can be reached and history can be resumed from where the communists broke it off on 30 December 1947...

Could it be, however, that, because of a clearly obvious lack of electoral support, the FSN-Roman once more tries to improvise and to look for new and sufficiently naive political partners to help it cross the bridge of elections?

Vatra Romaneasca Official Discusses UDMR

AU0806125592 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 29 May 92 p 8

[Interview with Petru Burca, first deputy president of the Romanian National Unity Party, by Gyorgy Andras Lengyel in Marosvasarhely, Romania; date not given: "The Romanian National Unity Party Is Counting on New Deputy and Senator Places in Parliament—Vatra Romaneasca Is Trying To Become European"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Lengyel] Mr. Burca! Your party gained valuable positions in many places at the municipal elections held in February 1992, including Kolozsvár [Cluj]. What is the secret of your success?

[Burca] The proposals and initiatives of our nine parliamentary deputies and three senators made our party well-known all over the country and led to the confidence of a large number of voters. Therefore, we count on further deputy and senator positions at the next parliamentary elections, through voters in Moldova, Oltenia, Muntenia, and Dobrogea. [passage omitted]

[Lengyel] Has the conflict between your party and the Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] eased somewhat in the course of the joint activity in Parliament?

[Burca] Yes. Naturally, there are people in the RMDSZ who are too hot-blooded and assertive. I must honestly admit that our party also has extremists among its members. Fortunately, the number of moderates continues to increase in both parties, and this gives us hope that we will be able to start a dialogue soon. I am convinced that these people will have an advantage in the next parliamentary elections.

[Lengyel] What will your position be regarding the Hungarians in Romania during that dialogue?

[Burca] We would like to treat this subject at the highest European level. We agree and support the efforts aimed at preserving and developing ethnic identity. Obviously, we regard the freedom of conscience, the use of one's mother tongue, education in one's mother tongue, and the training of Hungarian teachers as major issues. [passage omitted]

[Lengyel] Mr. Burca! Certain statements made by Hungarian politicians often cause an uproar in Romania. It is possible that this uproar—or sham uproar—is due to an exaggerated sensitivity or could it also be the strategic or tactical interest of some political forces?

[Burca] I am a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Romanian Parliament, and as such, I had the opportunity to travel to Budapest with a parliamentary delegation. At this level, I experienced goodwill there, and I think the results of our talks are favorable. I wrote in one of my reports that we should increase the frequency of such exchanges between parliamentary deputies, and we should also increase the contacts between our parliamentary factions and committees. [passage omitted]

[Burca] The contacts between the defense ministries of the two countries are closer than the contacts between the two governments or the two presidents or parliament presidents. I would welcome an improvement in these relations. Nothing can replace the direct personal contacts, and personal visits could greatly reduce the effects of irresponsible opinions that sometimes appear in the Hungarian press.

[Lengyel] Does this also apply to the chauvinistic daily ROMANIA MARE published in Bucharest in 400,000 copies?

[Burca] This daily has often attacked the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], Mr. Ceotea, the Vatra Romaneasca, the party chairman, and myself, too. According to this newspaper, our historical mission is to unite with the Romania Mare Party. I can assure you that this cannot happen as long as I am a leader of this party. Mr. Ceotea also thinks so. We cannot agree with extremist views and antihumanitarian methods. [passage omitted]

PNL's Campeanu Interviewed on Role of Press

AU0806095292 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 3 Jun 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Radu Campeanu, president of the National Liberal Party [PNL], by Rodica Avram in Costinesti; date not given: "The Role of the Press Is Very Important"]

[Text] [Avram] You were pleased with the fact that the [journalists'] meeting at the Costinesti resort was organized at this point. Would you comment on this statement at greater length than you did during the speech you delivered at the proceedings of the international colloquium [in Costinesti]?

[Campeanu] I think that this is the right time not because it means a break between the past and the future, but because of the experience we have gained both from what is good, bad, and very bad. I think that this experience, which has almost risen to a sort of tension, to an intensity of what is good and bad, needs to be synthesized, reflected on, and examined. The fact that reporters from various publications met here to conduct honest discussions is a positive thing, especially since we will soon start the electoral campaign, which is very important because tomorrow's parliament will be the one to establish the development guidelines of the Romanian society at the economic, political, and social level for the next 10-15 years. This is why I think that the press plays an important role, especially if it plays this role better than it has so far—more graciously, more objectively, with less petty emotions, and, I should say, less suburban militancy as some of the newspapers have done of late—even as far as I am concerned, and I am not the only one. I think that an honest revision of such attitudes is welcome. I am thinking of a free discussion among reporters. I can hardly believe that everybody would agree with such a level.

[Avram] During the discussions you asked the participants two questions to reflect on: "What is the role of the press?" and "What is the role of a reporter?" What are your answers to these questions?

[Campeanu] For me, the main role of the press is to provide correct and widely objective information. And, I agree, to comment, but the commentary has to refer to the information. I think that this is the main duty of the press and not the manipulation of public opinion, as is the tendency in our country by some of the press, not all of it. As far as the position of the press is concerned, the role of the press in a democracy that is trying to find its way has begun to exist. The very fact that you are able to talk with me, while I am able to tell you exactly what I think and you are able to say exactly what you think, proves that there is a serious beginning for democracy in Romania. I think that at this stage the press also plays an educational role—although this term was completely vulgarized—in the elevated sense of the word. I mean a civilized discussion of varying points of view, a discussion that implies respect for the opinion of others and respect for the person expressing a different opinion. So far, the press has not fulfilled this role; maybe after the Costinesti talks such a conclusion will be reached, and this would make me very happy. This would mean that that colloquium achieved an extraordinary concept.

[Avram] There were heated discussions about the press law, whether this law is needed or not. What is your position in this respect?

[Campeanu] I am among the ranks of those who form the minority; I am talking of the parliament where the majority favors a press law to stop this wave of lies and slanders, and biased interpretation in some of the press creating some sort of dirty waves. The reaction by the majority in parliament is: "You see, if we had a press law, if some of them were sanctioned, they would calm down." I myself think that peace and quiet should not be achieved through coercive measures, although I do not agree with what Mr. Ilie Paunescu said, namely that it would mean a sort of general anarchy to be told that freedom needs no regulations. Freedom needs regulations, and it exists when regulations exist. Contrary to anarchy, democracy is a political regime in which freedom is regulated and guaranteed by law. What some reporters and journalists, and Mr. Ilie Paunescu, who speaks about the responsibility of other people, do not say is what the journalist's moral responsibility and intellectual duty is. He has to talk only about the concepts he is familiar with, meaning that he should have a minimum of competence, that is professionalism.

[Avram] Although this interview is taking place in Costinesti, with your permission I will return to Bucharest, because I cannot resist the temptation to ask you—hoping that you will reply—what you have discussed with the American Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger.

[Campeanu] I had a personal meeting of some 35 minutes during which he asked me what I thought about the political situation. I told him exactly what my opinion is about the economic situation, the position of the National Liberal Party on major domestic economic problems and international relations, and about the situation of organizing the elections. This was an opportunity for me to provide lengthy explanations about the stage of the laws needed for holding the elections, about the conditions required for honest elections, and why I thought that the 60-day term [for the election campaign] stipulated by law should not be reduced. I noted that he agreed with what I said and that he understood everything very well. Without his asking me, I told him why we are no longer part of the Democratic Convention, and again I can say that I noted he understood this very well, because he nodded in assent and finally complemented me, saying that I had provided an objective picture, that

he liked my logic in presenting things, and that I had presented a complete picture of the political situation.

[Avram] It has been said that Mr. Eagleburger's visit will hasten the date of general elections...

[Campeanu] I could not sense any signs of pressure in this respect in the affirmations by the American deputy secretary of state. I think that he visited our country mainly to conclude the treaty on mutually encouraging and protecting investments, a treaty that is very useful for Romania and to which we contributed not only through I.V. Sandulescu's and Mr. Danielescu's good services, but which also contributes to a better understanding of the political phenomenon in Romania. He did not insist on a date for the elections. I believe—and I would have said so had the opportunity arisen, but he did not raise such a problem—that we are the only ones entitled to decide on what is good and what we should do, without any pressure from outside.

Gionea Elected President of Constitutional Court

AU0806124092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1036 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 8/6/1992—On Monday, June 8 the members of the Constitutional Court elected Professor Vasile Gionea as its president.

According to legal provisions, the judges elected by the Senate, the Assembly of Deputies and appointed by Romania's president made proposals for the president of the Constitutional Court. The Senate's group proposed Vasile Gionea, a known personality in the juridical field, appreciated as a factor of equilibrium in the activity; the other two groups joined that proposal. By secret ballot Vasile Gionea was unanimously elected president of the Constitutional Court for three years.

Vasile Gionea is deputy on behalf of the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party [PNTCD]. He was member in the commission for the elaboration of Romania's Constitution.

In his address on the occasion, Vasile Gionea mentioned that he saw in that election an appreciation of his experience and age as well as a reparatory measure for the persecutions he had suffered during the communist dictatorship years.

Government Letter Urges End To Aggression*AU0806173992 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina sent a letter today to the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro in reply to a letter that was sent on behalf of the Federal Executive Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Under Secretary Jovo Mandic. In the letter from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prime Minister Jure Pelivan stresses that insistence by Serbia and Montenegro on using the name of Yugoslavia is unacceptable until all relations among the former Yugoslav republics are resolved within the framework of the international conference on Yugoslavia.

In line with this, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina thinks that Serbia and Montenegro must unconditionally stop aggression and all interference in the domestic affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This aggression and interference are reflected in support for the extremist part of the Serbian Democratic Party and logistic support for terrorist organizations, as well as acceptance of looted property from Bosnia-Herzegovina being transported to Serbia and Montenegro and so on.

In the letter from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina sent to the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro, it is stressed among other things that the humanitarian aid that has been stopped in Belgrade must be made available to our republic so that it can be sent to those who need it the most and not, as has been the case so far thanks to Belgrade, so that it ends up in the hands of terrorists.

The end of the letter from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro says that the extent of war damage must be urgently established, as well as the obligations of Serbia and Montenegro in paying for it. This letter is accompanied by information on paramilitary organizations from Serbia and Montenegro that are operating on the territory of our republic.

UNPROFOR Mandate Extended to Republic*LD0906054992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0440 GMT 9 Jun 92*

[Text] United Nations, June 9 (TANJUG)—The U.N. Security Council decided Monday evening that the world organization's peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) mandate be enlarged to cover its one-time Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The council directed that U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Ghali start deploying military observers as he provided in his latest report on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the matter of opening the airport in Sarajevo to uses for humanitarian purposes.

Further, the Council reserves its right to approve, at the secretary-general's proposal, that UNPROFOR members be deployed for securing 'a safety zone' around the Sarajevo Airport.

In his report, Butrus Ghali planned military and civilian effectives of about 1,100 persons. The above provisions are to be found in the U.N. Resolution 758 passed unanimously by the Council after two closed consultative meetings.

During the consultations heard were several doubts about whether the U.N. new peace-keeping force would make a success, to what contributed, too, the letter of Marack Goulding, undersecretary for the U.N. peace-keeping operations, his warning of a new flaring up of clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Security Council's new resolution sharply condemns "all those sides and the others responsible for violating the cease-fire agreement." This is for the first time that a U.N. document (?in a way) considers equally responsible all those involved in fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina after several resolutions in which only Serbia was found exclusively to blame.

The Security Council directs that Butrus Ghali within seven days report on what he has done on carrying out the agreement on raising the Sarajevo Airport blockade and enlarging the UNPROFOR mandate.

Addressing the press in the name of the Council members, French Ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee said that "now is needed to act quickly, but everything is up to establishing a real armistice."

EC Observer Mission Team To Visit Trebinje*LD0806125992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1212 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Herceg-Novi, June 8 (TANJUG)—The European Community (E.C.) monitor mission has decided to send an observer team on Monday to tour Trebinje, the political centre of the Serb Autonomous Region (SAO) of Herzegovina, without waiting for guarantees from the Croatian authorities in Dubrovnik.

Representatives of the observer mission and SAO Herzegovina, which is part of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will meet again on Monday afternoon in Herceg-Novi, a town on the Adriatic Sea coast in neighbouring Montenegro, to discuss the observers' trip to Trebinje.

The E.C. observers, who have expressed a wish to see for themselves what is happening in Trebinje and its vicinity, were unable to do so on Sunday after the Croatian authorities in Dubrovnik declined to issue guarantees for their safety.

The Croatian Army on Sunday for the fourth time shelled Trebinje from the direction of Dubrovnik, hitting dozens of civilian targets and injuring an unspecified number of people.

Red Cross Demands Safety Guarantees

*LD0806193392 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1824 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Belgrade, June 8 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the International Red Cross Committee [ICRC] will return to the war-affected former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina only after the international humanitarian organization receives additional guarantees for the [word indistinct] from all parties for the security of its teams involved [words indistinct], as TANJUG learned at the international organization's Belgrade office on Monday.

International Red Cross Committee representatives withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina on May 20, after an International Red Cross delegate was killed in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

International Red Cross representatives will in the coming days confer with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims, Croats and Serbs on the additional guarantees, as International Red Cross spokeswoman Judith Hushagen said.

The representatives of the three national communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted in Geneva on Saturday an operational plan which is to ensure the return of the International Red Cross to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The talks will resume on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, spokeswoman Hushagen said.

Serb 'Government' Sends Protest to Croatia

*LD0806175892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1626 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Pale, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The "government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" today sent a note to the Government of the Republic of Croatia, demanding that the Croatian Government immediately halt and prevent aggressive operations against the territory of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" launched from Croatian territory, the Serb SRNA News Agency says.

The note stresses that the government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has irrefutable proof that "border areas of our ethnic and historical territories in Herzegovina and the River Sava basin" are being attacked from the territories of the Republic of Croatia.

"Members of your military and paramilitary formations are more frequently and less scrupulously taking part in war and genocidal actions carried out against the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," the note from the government of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" to the Government of the Republic of Croatia says.

The note recalls that the undertaking and approval of such operations is completely contrary to international obligations undertaken by the Republic of Croatia.

The government of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" will inform the world public and international groupings about the war activities being carried out from the territory of the Republic of Croatia and about the involvement of the Croatian Army, the note sent to the Government of the Republic of Croatia concludes.

Serbs Complain of Influx of Albanians, Muslims

*LD0806172392 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1615 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] SRNA has been authorized to publicize the following note sent to the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the office of the government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

We have reliable and corroborated information about an increasing influx of members of the Albanian and Muslim minorities from the territory of the FRY, especially from the Sandzak region, into the territory of our republic, where they are immediately joining the Muslim forces and taking the initiative to fight, and commit genocidal actions against, the Serb nation.

In the light of a tradition of mutual respect and understanding, we hope that you will do your utmost to put an end to this influx of your citizens, and stop their participation in the combat and genocide actions against our people.

Sarajevo Fighting 8 June Said 'Fiercest' of War

*LD0806125892 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1056 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Sarajevo, June 8 (TANJUG)—Fighting in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina Sarajevo on Monday is the fiercest since the outbreak of civil war in this former Yugoslav republic.

Moslem-Croat forces are using the weapons left behind by the former Yugoslav People's Army, reports the Serb news agency in Bosnia-Herzegovina, SRNA.

According to SRNA, Moslem extremists are attacking the Serb-controlled territories in Sarajevo - Ilidza, the airport, Dobrnja, Hadzici, Rajlovac and other communities.

Last night, the conflict between the territorial defence force loyal to the rump Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency which is functioning without the legally elected Serb forces, and the Serb territorial defence transformed into a real war in which both sides are using all weapons at their disposal.

The fiercest fighting is taking place in new Sarajevo settlements which the Bosnia-Herzegovina territorial defence is trying to recapture from the Serb forces.

The Serb territorial defence is shelling facilities in the city from which members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territorial defence are firing.

The battle for Sarajevo and the vital facilities in the city and its surroundings have been going on for the past two months.

The latest truce agreed upon last week at the initiative of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has not been honoured.

It is more than obvious that peace is not in the interest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic, who is doing everything to prolong the U.N. sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the chief condition for lifting the sanctions.

The fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted in early April, when the European Community granted the request for the republic's independence filed by the Moslem-Croat coalition against the will of the Serb people.

The fighting has escalated since the remaining Yugoslav Army troops late last week withdrew from their Marshal Tito barracks in Sarajevo after a two-month blockade. The army left all heavy weapons behind as the major condition for its unhindered withdrawal.

Izetbegovic, the president of the rump Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, has walked out of the E.C.-sponsored peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for a continuation of the war.

He has on several occasions urged a foreign military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and aid from the Islamic countries, which is in line with his concept of transforming Bosnia-Herzegovina into an Islamic state in the centre of Europe.

Recently, he has also stated that he will not accept any division of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines between the republic's three constitutive nations - Moslems, who account for 43 per cent of the overall population, Serbs (34 per cent) and Croats (17 per cent).

Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said late last week that Serbs "wholeheartedly urge peace" but that they would continue to fight if the other side did not want peace. The boundaries of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are final, he said and added that only some "details" had to be ironed out.

The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina formed their own republic in the territories where they constitute the majority population to check attempts by the Moslem-Croat coalition to downgrade the Serb people to a national minority status.

According to the Bosnia-Herzegovina register of assessment, Serbs own over 65 per cent of land in this republic.

Serbian Leader Said 'On the Run'

LD0806131592 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Report by correspondent Slavko Rako from Sarajevo]

[Excerpts] The war criminal Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb terrorist party, and the broader leadership of that criminal organization are on the run, the regional staff of the Sarajevo territorial defense has reported. It has been learned from the same source that Radovan Karadzic's son, Sasha Karadzic, has joined the city's defenders. [passage omitted]

Shortly before noon, the population of Sarajevo was addressed by Dragan Marjanovic, spokesman for the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces, who said that a decisive battle for Sarajevo began at 0530 this morning. The defenders' artillery has been successfully taking over notorious Chetnik strongholds which were used over the last few months to sow destruction. Dragan Marjanovic appealed to the people of Sarajevo to remain in their shelters for just another hour, another night, but no longer than another day, because good news is to be expected very shortly.

The counterattack by the defenders of Sarajevo is a reaction to a plan, devised at Pale yesterday by Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic, to launch a fierce attack on the city in order to conquer new territories within the city. Instead of new territories, at Grbavica the Chetniks have been fighting among themselves for trucks and have been fleeing. Their strongholds at Mojimilo, which is soon to be taken over, are in flames. In their desperation and powerlessness, the Chetniks from the distant hills have been destroying Sarajevo with long-range artillery. Projectiles have been hitting all important buildings in the city—the presidency, hospitals, many residential and commercial buildings, the headquarters of the Croatian Democratic Community and of the Party for Democratic Action, private houses, the sport center at Kosevo—in brief, all parts of the city. In many parts of the city the defenders have launched decisive infantry attacks and have been joined spontaneously by many citizens of Sarajevo.

Karadzic Denies Leaving Sarajevo

AU0806170792 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Risto Djogo report from Sarajevo]

[Text] A general offensive by Muslim forces against all Serbian positions in Sarajevo started this morning at 0500. This was announced by the censored official Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio. That is to say, the Headquarters of the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina announced that the decisive battle for Sarajevo had begun. Lies and disinformation are spreading in the media because the Muslim forces have not advanced one single millimeter at any important

position. The Serbian army has even extended its portion of Novo Sarajevo, covering the area from Ivan Krndelj Street, which has been totally mopped up, toward Novo Sarajevo and even Novi Grad.

The attack by the Muslim forces, which started yesterday from the territory of Pofalici, Hum, Velesici, and the remaining positions, was carried out with mortar fire from 82 mm and 120 mm mortar launchers. The districts of Vrace and Grbavica were hit, and an attack was attempted from Vrbanja Most via the Jewish cemetery toward Zlatiste; however, the Serbian forces managed to repel all the attacks so that, at this moment, the Serbian army is well on the way to maintaining its positions and even liberating what Izetbegovic managed to capture in the despicable attack of 4 April.

So many lies are being spread today, including the lie that Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has left the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dr. Radovan Karadzic is in our office and will tell all News of the Day listeners about the present situation in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Begin Karadzic recording] The situation in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is excellent, except on the battlefields—because there is fighting on the battlefields—but, in the military sense, the situation is also excellent. There have been artillery duels around Sarajevo, because the weapons that the Muslim side has acquired are beginning to be used against our positions. The Serbian artillery reacted after only an hour, however, and is certainly in a better position in these duels.

This morning's massive offensive against all positions was in fact an action by desperate people, because they are trapped in Sarajevo like rats in a cage and they have been trapped there entirely at the will of the militant part of the Muslim leadership.

We are in any case ready to negotiate, but all our offers of talks are considered a sign of weakness, and then they attack. Of course they are wrong every time. We are not offering talks because we are weak, but actually because we are strong. The enemy cannot accept them, because he is weak, as he has so far lost everything that he promised the Muslim people. Of course everything that was promised was unrealistic and was given with a hope that did not take reality into consideration.

The Serbian people cannot be beaten. One can only talk to the Serbian people. If there is war, the Serbian people will have to accept this war against their will and will have to respond.

Apart from these desperate attempts and attacks that the militant Muslim leadership are forcing on the young Muslim men who are dropping like flies and whose losses amount to more than 100 a day, apart from this desperate behavior, this behavior shows their propaganda by the television and radio of Sarajevo, the radio of so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has reported that

the Serbian leadership has left Pale. Unfortunately for them, it just so happens that no one is away on business today, apart from Foreign Minister Buha, who is in Belgrade for official reasons. We are all here, and, if we go somewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a third of the leadership goes officially. We visited Krajina and Herzegovina and the battlefields recently, as well as the civilian authorities in these areas of ours. So two-thirds of the leadership is always in Pale. [end recording]

Otherwise, the situation was fierce in Sarajevo itself last night. Since receiving weapons, as Radovan Karadzic said, from the ranks of the Army, Muslim forces have been carrying out crazed attacks. But all the attacks have been repelled.

The Marshal Tito Barracks are still on fire, and Serbian soldiers managed to hit the infantry ammunition and gas stores in it. Several more buildings were hit. As the Muslim side has announced, the decisive battle for Sarajevo could have started, but in any case the Muslim side is responsible for this. It is the side that is pushing young Muslim men to their deaths with their lies.

Roundup of Battles

*AU0906074492 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 9 Jun 92*

[Duska Rakunja report from the Sarajevo Security Center]

[Excerpts] The town has generally been quiet this morning. Last night was the same. However, the report on the situation between 2100 8 June until this morning has now been completed.

As is known, a general danger alarm was sounded at 0530 yesterday. This marked the beginning of yet another fierce attack by the aggressor on the town. The aggressor attacked the entire town with all available heavy weapons. Predicting the aggressor's intentions, the defenders of the town readily proceeded to defend it. Shortly after, they launched a counterattack.

We select some more important events. In the Stari Grad District, fighting took place near the castle at Sedrenik, where the defenders of the town are holding their positions. The aggressor carried out an attack on Hladivode in the same district. The attack was repelled successfully. Members of the public security organization of Stari Grad and the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina have reached Vidikovac and (?Osmica) at Trebevic. At Vidikovac, one of the most dominant points in the city area, the flag of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is flying.

In the Centar District, the aggressor attacked all the more vital facilities in Marin Dvor. Magro's business premises were destroyed by fire. St. Josip Church and several residential buildings in Kralj Tvrtko Street were hit. In this commune, fighting took place in Kromolje, Poljine, [word indistinct], Zlatiste, the Jewish cemetery,

and Vrbanja Most. The aggressor has been pushed back from positions in all these places.

The defenders, members of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia- Hercegovina and the Centar Security Service, are reinforcing the positions that they took.

In Novo Sarajevo, fierce fighting took place throughout the day. [passage omitted]

In Novi Grad, the fiercest fighting took place on the Zuc Hill. This hill has also been completely taken. Fighting also took place in Ozrenska Street, from which Serbian terrorists were pushed out.

There was also fierce fighting in Mojnilo, near the water reservoir, until very late in the night. The aggressors had been pounding Dobrinja and Alipasa Polje with bombs all day yesterday. In this commune, fighting also took place in Nedjarici, particularly around the barracks. It lasted until late in the night when the aggressor was pushed out. [passage omitted]

Let us repeat, the defenders are firmly holding all the positions that they took. Among them is the very important point of the Zuc Hill. The flag of Bosnia-Hercegovina is flying at Vidikovac. The general danger alarm is still in force in the town. We appeal to the citizens to be careful because one should never trust the aggressor.

This is the message from the employees of the Security Center.

Casualties Reported

*LD0906015192 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] The result of the operations carried out by the defenders of the city on 8 June is: more than 100 enemy soldiers killed, 10 APCs captured, six tanks, one howitzer, one Praga gun, numerous mortars and other military material captured on the hill of Zuc which has been liberated. A large number of rifles and machine guns as well as a large quantity of ammunition has been captured. A number of strategically important enemy strongholds have been captured. After fierce battles aggressor chetnik units have been completely routed on Zuc hill. This stronghold is now under the control of the units of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

All of these operations were carried out by the defenders with a casualty toll of 20 killed and 344 wounded on their side. State flags of Bosnia-Hercegovina have been hoisted at Vidikovac on Trebevic hill, Vrace, and Mojnilo. Some operations of the defenders are still in process. On a number of locations the enemy forces are surrounded as we have been informed by Bosnia-Hercegovina Territorial Defense headquarters.

President Tudjman Discusses Possible Sanctions

LD0806223292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1001 GMT 8 Jun 92

[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at Villa Zagorje in Zagreb with foreign and domestic reporters; live]

[Excerpts] [Branimir Bilic, Croatian TV] Mr. President, my first question: The latest information we have is that all of Sarajevo is on fire. What reports are you receiving? Is the world going to intervene militarily and if so, when? What is your estimate? My second question: Are UN sanctions against Croatia possible, in view of the fact that Milosevic's regime has been trying to force this through? Finally, is the Croatian defense council an integral part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces, given that Croatia has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that in his latest interview Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic paid tribute to the Croatian defense council, for the first time correctly naming Serbia and the former Serbian army as the aggressor? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Yes, Sarajevo is on fire to our horror and amazement, and that of the entire Croatian public and the entire democratic world. Let me remind you that this shows what might have happened to Zagreb and other Croatian towns.

If over the next few days indications are that the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council are not producing results, it is to be expected that the world will, after all, take other steps, in other words, military intervention. Unfortunately, at this point I cannot foresee any more than you how and in what way.

As you noted, Mr. Izetbegovic has named the aggressor, clearly stating that the defense forces in Croat-populated areas under the command of the Croatian defense council are fighting against the aggressor. These defense forces are even protecting Croatian areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing this they are contributing to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the aggressor, from remnants of the Yugoslav Army—which has become the Serbian army—and from aggression from Serbia and Montenegro.

In Mr. Izetbegovic's statement, you will find the answer to your question regarding the possibility of sanctions against Croatia. We reiterate that those who have left Croatia to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina are soldiers who served in the Croatian army as volunteers and defended Croatia when it was under threat. These soldiers defended Croatia when their territories and homes were threatened. They went and formed, in their own way, the core of the Croatian defense forces in Croatian areas under the command of the Croatian defense council. Regular Croatian units were defending Croatian areas, the areas of the Republic of Croatia—in Metkovic and in Dubrovnik.

This was accidentally confirmed by Serbia's representative at one of the CSCE sessions when he referred to four Croatian brigades in Metkovic. Accordingly, no sanctions are to be expected against Croatia for two reasons: First, because there are no regular Croatian army units within Bosnia-Herzegovina except along the border, and second, because Mr. Izetbegovic, acting in his capacity as president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency admitted that in his view Croatian forces set up in the Croatian areas are regular forces defending Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Perhaps, I should add here that the world, including those who drew up a report to the UN Security Council, understood the situation. The world spoke out about elements of the Croatian army; therefore, it is clear who is the aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear who is destroying and who is defending Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not only its integrity, but also who is defending it from a genocidal barbaric policy aimed at the extermination of the Croatian and Muslim nations in their entirety.

[Unidentified VJESNIK correspondent] Mr. Tudjman, regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, can you tell us when a meeting with Izetbegovic will take place and what political platform you will advocate then? My second question is in connection with Croatia: The Supreme State Council agreed with a proposal by the chairman of the Assembly's Commission for War Victims that the remains of all World War II victims be buried in Jasenovac, in the memorial center, which for many years served the Serbian propaganda machine as a symbol of Croatia's genocidal nature. Would you comment on the justifiability of the proposal for the creation of a central memorial complex in Jasenovac? Finally, can you tell us who will be the minister of foreign affairs given some of the current public rumors, and what is the role of ministers without portfolio in the government? Thank you. I apologize for the three questions.

[Tudjman] These are four questions. [laughter] A meeting with Mr. Izetbetovic should take place this week, according to a previous agreement. We already decided a meeting was possible earlier this week, but due to my other duties it looks like it will be midweek before we can meet.

I cannot tell you today who the Croatian foreign minister will be. Hopefully you will learn about this in a day or two, perhaps even earlier. There will also be additional appointments. You know that decrees [words indistinct].

Your third question referred to the government: What is the role of ministers without portfolio, as we would say in Croatian, ministers without lisnica? Perhaps you are not sure of the translation.[chuckles]

They know what to do. The government of national accord included ministers without portfolio, simply because they were representatives of their parties. We have such ministers in the present government. There are also ministers who are not in charge of a particular

department, but who are in charge of preparing changes in the legal and economic system in advance of elections and with the view to the end of the war.

So that we may fully devote ourselves to future tasks we have completely established a sovereign, independent, and internationally recognized Croatia. With the evident end of the war in Croatia—with the final deployment of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] on 15 June—we are facing a task to prepare ourselves for the implementation of those economic reform measures that we opted for in coming to power, and through the adoption of our constitution, which we were largely forced to abandon because of the war which was imposed on us.

The present government includes Ministers Vedris and Cnric, charged with preparing the legal basis for changes in the legal system and all proposals for the economic transformation, not only in transformation but also in plans for establishing a free market economy in Croatia. They are to oversee the development of private entrepreneurship and global cooperation. [passage omitted]

[Racic, German Radio] Mr. President, I have read a report—perhaps it is only a rumor—that allegedly the Serbian government has asked Croatia to allow safe passage for a humanitarian convoy carrying supplies for the so-called Krajinas in the occupied territories of Croatia. If this is true, will such a convoy be allowed to pass? Or is the entire report false?

[Tudjman] I have not been informed about that request. If such demands and needs arise, Croatian authorities will be guided by their principled policy of establishing peace and constitutional order in those areas, now with the help of UNPROFOR and later, after the departure of the forces of [word indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent, Slovene TV] My colleague has already asked about your meetings with Mr. Izetbegovic. Now we know the date, but you have not told us on the basis of which political platform the meeting will proceed.

[Tudjman] The meeting will obviously take place and we shall discuss issues of common interest, primarily the issue of ending the war. It will include the issue of current cooperation efforts to bring the war to an end. There is also a whole series of economic and interstate issues to be considered. One of the major questions is the issue of a quarter of a million refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia. This is an enormous burden for exhausted Croatia. There is also the issue of what future these refugees will have.

Furthermore, from the Croat-populated areas of western Herzegovina, western Bosnia, and from the territories that constitute the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia up in Bosnian Posavina [Sava River basin] we are receiving requests not only to accept refugees but also for economic aid. The population there is prevented from living a normal life unless it is directly involved on the

front. In other words, there is a whole range of economic, financial, and transportation issues we must discuss.

We have also had inquiries from our missions abroad. We have already set up missions in many European and other countries. Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been contacting Croatian missions requesting that their problems, which ordinarily would be solved by their own consular missions, be addressed. We likely will suggest that Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina missions help each other in looking after their respective citizens.

Of course, the main issues within the framework of relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which you probably had in mind when you asked me this question, will be the issues stemming from the Split Agreement on forming a possible confederation with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before the outset of this horrific and barbaric war, we offered something similar. The situation is different now. Like us, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign, internationally recognized state but with a war terror still on its territory.

We must dwell on the issue of our future relations. In other words, all these issues will be on the agenda of my talks with Mr. Izetbegovic. I will, of course, propose that a meeting be convened to resolve all possible ambiguous issues which exist. You have already said that Mr. Izetbegovic had for the first time clearly identified the aggressor and had for the first time recognized the forces of the Croatian defense council as an integral part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina defense and future armed forces.

In the past, some ambiguities existed. In this context, I must admit that I was surprised to hear—and I hope this will be on the agenda of our talks—Doko [Bosnia-Herzegovina defense minister], a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government stating, in contrast to Mr. Izetbegovic's statement, that he welcomed the forces of the HOS [armed wing of the Croatian Party of Rights; Tudjman chuckles] as an integral part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territorial defense. This was not just surprising but also caused some amazement as to the purpose of this since, according to all information available to us—and which representatives of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who took part in talks first in Brussels and then Lisbon rejected by insisting that no such units were there [in Bosnia-Herzegovina]—that some alien persons are acting provocatively in that area. In other words, this statement had the same purpose. These issues will also have to be discussed.

[Unidentified correspondent, Independent Radio News, London] I have three questions. First, have you been offended by the three SLOBODNA DALMACIJA journalists? Second, what can you say about the death of the weekly DANAS? Third, when will the elections in Croatia be held?

[Tudjman] I am not familiar with the SLOBODNA DALMACIJA issue. I do not understand what kind of game these humorists played with the image of the

president of the Republic of Croatia and to what purpose. As I have not seen it I could not be offended. I am for satire, for humor, and am not bothered about what people think about me. However, in any democratic society, and I repeat, in any and I emphasize democratic society, one must be held accountable for one's words and deeds. As I know nothing about the death of DANAS I cannot give you an answer.

Any other questions? Oh, yes, the elections. As I have said, they will be (?very soon), as soon as conditions are ripe, following the departure of the occupying troops from Croatia. It is our obligation under the new Croatian Constitution. In other words, we would have called the elections a year after the Constitution had been promulgated but we have been prevented from doing this by the war. Our Assembly has been functioning through its chamber, as stipulated by the communist system based on socialist ownership. This assembly reflects the old communist authorities, and we are therefore obligated to call elections as soon conditions are ripe, or rather, following the departure of occupying forces.

[Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Some of my questions have already been addressed; I am left with just a footnote. Could you comment on the latest unfortunate event in Slovenia regarding Mr. Kramberger, whose pre-election speech turned out to be fatal? What influence will this have on the coming elections in Croatia? My second question pertains to the UNPROFOR obligation to assume full responsibility in its areas by the agreed deadline. This deadline has now been set for 15 June. In the meantime, the last Croats are still being expelled. Will there be procrastination over this deadline, given that in the past there were firm promises that this deadline would go in effect by the end of May? What will happen after 15 June if UNPROFOR does not manage to assume full responsibility?

[Tudjman] As for Kramberger, that is certainly a sad event and should be condemned. This shows that even in these [words indistinct] there are those who do not refrain from committing such crimes. This will not influence our political life, regardless of whether there will be such attempts. Anyhow, as far as Croatian political life is concerned there have already been attempts to take such actions, ranging from Benkovac [reference to attempted assassination by a Serb in Benkovac during his first election campaign] to the firing of rockets at Banski Dvor.

There have been all kinds of other attempts. We know of them and various intentions. However, we will adhere to our policy of consolidating the democratic and legal system in the interest of the Republic of Croatia while relying on our own people. As you know in every country in the world, even in countries with elite democratic traditions, there are such individuals with criminal intentions or professional terrorists.

As far as UNPROFOR is concerned, one should hope that they will indeed assume responsibility for the entire

area by 15 June. If and where this does not take place, we shall examine the reasons why, in light of the circumstances surrounding it and make decisions accordingly. We will assess the overall situation while our honorable aim is not to tolerate endless procrastination. Today Croatia is in a considerably more favorable position than it was when we were drawing up the agreements, when we agreed to the arrival of peace forces. Then the UN Security Council had to sign an agreement with the former SFRY, too.

Today, this [word indistinct] of history no longer exists. Croatia is internationally and legally recognized.

[Ingrid Badurina, LA STAMPA] Mr. President, yesterday Bosnian sources said, and today's OSLOBODJENJE published this news, that a military operation had already been set in motion in order to lift the blockade of Sarajevo airport and that the Command of the Sixth Fleet had established contact with General Mladic and given him an ultimatum to this effect to move his forces 10 km out of that area. Have you been informed about this and do you know any further details? It was said that if they failed to do so the Sixth Fleet, that is, its Command, would order its units to intervene.

[Tudjman] Even if I knew anything about this matter there is only so much that I can talk about at a public conference. It is however obvious that your colleagues have learned something, as I have too. NATO, where was it? In Oslo, as well as the fact that the Sixth Fleet Commander was made to stay on; they did not deal with these issues by sheer coincidence. All this warfare on the soil of the former Yugoslavia, and now Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been examined very thoroughly by them, not only via their diplomatic representatives but by all the other means at their disposal, including satellites.

Government Appeals for Toughened UN Stance

LD0906021192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 9 Jun 92

[Text] The Croatian Government again calls on the UN Security Council and other competent international institutions and organizations to demand, accompanied by a threat of military intervention, an immediate end to the aggression against the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of economic sanctions, the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro is becoming even more intense with a total destruction of Sarajevo and many other cities and towns. The lives of tens of thousands of people are directly endangered.

The Croatian Government has on many occasions last year insisted that heavy artillery and other weapons of the former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) should be put under international control. Looking back at earlier ultimative demands of the international community for Croatia to allow the evacuation of heavy weapons of the

former JNA from blocked barracks to Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were trying to explain that the concentration of arms and great military force under Serb control must lead to war and destruction in that state. This indeed happened so that the international community has even more responsibility to prevent further destruction and numerous casualties. There is no excuse for further hesitation in undertaking effective measures, including a military intervention, in order to save thousands of people in Sarajevo and other cities condemned to death by the criminal occupiers.

The government also states that the Republic of Croatia has accepted more than 270,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in two months and that it is still doing everything possible to help another tens of thousands of refugees. The government is of the opinion that the international community's aid is insufficient and that Croatia is not able to solve the problems of refugees and displaced persons. The government of the Republic of Croatia is ready to protect the lives of its citizens and the territorial integrity of the republic and to prevent further destruction of its cities and villages like Dubrovnik, Slavonski Brod, and many others.

The territory of the Republic of Croatia is being attacked from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro by the Serb and Montenegrin aggressors; thus it is necessary to reach an agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina on a joint defense. The government of the Republic of Croatia again stresses that it wants peace and an end to the war. It again calls on the rebel part of the Serb population in Croatia to lay down their arms in order to create conditions for the end of war destruction and for bringing peace, order, and work to the occupied territory of Croatia which should create conditions for a political solution of all problems in a peaceful way.

The government of the Republic of Croatia again stresses that it accepts all of the decisions of UN Security Council and it is expressing its readiness to help in ending the war and peaceful solution of all problems in accordance with the standpoints of the UN Security Council, CSCE, and the Brussels Conference. The Croatian Government is undertaking measures for full implementation of the decisions of the UN Security Council and it will soon inform the Council and the international public about this in a special report.

Serb Government Denies Dniester Recognition

LD0806153692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The government of the Republic of Serb Krajina categorically denies that it recognized independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Dniester, as reported by TANJUG on 3 June. The government stresses that Borivoj Rasuo, who released the original report to TANJUG, is not a member of the government of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

Today's denial by the Krajina Foreign Affairs Ministry says that self-styled minister Borivoj Rasuo was trying to manipulate and deceive the public.

Kosovo Reporter Interviewed on Situation

92BA0987D Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 92 pp 18-19

[Interview with Azem Vllasi by Gojko Marinkovic in Zagreb; date not given: "I Agree With Milosevic"]

[Text] Azem Vllasi turned up unexpectedly in Zagreb the other day with his wife Nadira, a reporter for VJESNIK. Getting out of occupied Kosovo was quite an adventure, but for understandable reasons we will not reveal all the details except the fact that he traveled more than 1,700 km by way of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Vllasi's biography is so intriguing that in and of itself it is eloquent about the career of an individual, but also about the life of an entire people who in Serbia continue to be referred to as an ethnic or national minority. Who is Azem Vllasi today, what is he doing, how does he live, and how is he surviving?

[Vllasi] To spite my pursuers, who arrested and tried me, who wanted to destroy me, to drive me out of Kosovo, to separate me from my people, I am still in Pristina. In spite of my troubles and difficulties, my place is among my people, in my native region. In the general poverty in Kosovo, I live somewhat above the average. I write a few articles for the newspapers, I work in a law office, and then there is also my wife's salary. We somehow support ourselves and two children. In Kosovo, like a majority of my fellow countrymen, I am a man outside the law. Although I left prison more than two years ago, because that well-known Stalinist trial came to nothing, I have actually exchanged solitary for a large collective camp known as Kosovo. Under political pressure, the verdict acquitting me has been overturned, and this monstrous indictment still stands in the court archives.

[Marinkovic] Does that mean that the trial was never completed in a formal legal sense?

[Vllasi] Yes, precisely that. If, for instance, I want to open a law office, register some other business, apply for a passport or anything else, they ask for a certificate to the effect that I am not under investigation, and I cannot get that, and I am thus blocked at every turn. If I want to travel only to Skopje, it is a virtual odyssey. Not to mention the fact that they would like to keep me constantly on pins and needles and under threat.

[Marinkovic] Aside from those regular elections, the so-called official elections, parallel secret elections of Albanians for the Assembly and president of the republic have also been announced in Kosovo. What might these elections bring?

[Vllasi] These elections will above all be a political and moral act, one expression of persistence along the road

which we Albanians have chosen—achieving independent statehood for Kosovo. Because they are being held under the conditions of occupation, they can only be as free as Kosovo is. Improvisations because of the pressures of the Serbian authority and the intention of preventing them are not therefore excluded. But whatever the results, as a political act they will be both a great challenge and provocation to the authorities, but also a large step toward the final resolution of the Kosovo agony. If after that the repression and violence are stepped up, Albanians will give up illusions that freedom and independence will be attained through "Gandhian resistance." But if the government proves helpless, if it attempts to ignore all of this taken together, Albanians will confirm once again their persistence and vitality in an effort to create a parallel government, even under the conditions of the occupation.

[Marinkovic] In any case, nothing will ever be the way it was?

[Vllasi] We still have to see how the Serbian authority will behave, but however that may be, everything supports the thesis that a serious conflict will inevitably occur. The Serbian regime has already shown that it is not retreating at any point, it is not withdrawing without blood and destruction. In any case, the position is that the future parliament, the government, and the president of the republic will remain in Kosovo, will not go into exile, which is an additional challenge.

[Marinkovic] Is your name one of those on the ballot?

[Vllasi] No, because that would force me to choose between flight or once again daily meetings with the authorities and the rest. And something worse than that is also possible. I do not think it would be useful to what we are fighting for in Kosovo.

[Marinkovic] And are you a member of any party?

[Vllasi] Like the great majority of Albanians, I accept the option that in this phase our question is resolved through the statehood of Kosovo as a sovereign democratic republic. Following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, we have nothing more to look for in this Serbian-Montenegrin Yugoslavia either. I do not advocate war as a principal means of achieving our objective, but I do not agree with the strategy of passive resistance, which so far has made it possible for the occupation authorities to do what they like and to achieve many occupation objectives quickly and without great effort. Our economy has been devastated, in two years more than 80,000 Albanians have been driven from their jobs, our schools and universities have been shut down, and instruction is improvised in private homes and commercial establishments, everything we had has been destroyed, yet we have not raised the people in any way or organized ourselves in order to resist this. Our lads in the political parties are traveling all over the world and telling the people in Kosovo that Europe and America will bring us a republic and everything we have imagined, more or less on a silver platter. But that is an

illusion. That strategy of Gandhian resistance has won us certain sympathy and support in the world, but the world is supporting us only in the area of human rights. Yet under Serbia we cannot achieve even human rights, much less ethnic rights. We have let many opportunities slip to impose ourselves more aggressively on the world and make our problem more acutely relevant.

[Marinkovic] You obviously do not agree with the policy being conducted by the strongest Kosovo party.

[Vllasi] Those who think that we will exercise our rights and avoid conflict by not provoking the Serbian regime are still dominant on the political scene of Kosovo. That is what I do not agree with. But had I established some party of my own, there objectively would have been a split between us, which we do not need at this point. So I continued to pursue my political commitment in another way, operating as a man outside parties. Even though there are several parties, we actually do not have a true multiparty life and real democracy. That is yet to come. Our situation now requires the organization and activity of a broad national liberation movement.

[Marinkovic] In Croatia, one often hears the opinion that the Albanians have not done enough to help, the reference being to opening a so-called southern front.

[Vllasi] An opportunity to create a broad defense coalition against Serbia was let slip back in the time when Kosovo was occupied. We paid for that in 1989 and 1990 with several hundred casualties and a great deal of repression. Others looked on peacefully and thought that this would be enough for the Serbian regime. The Albanians at that time were deeply disappointed in all others, and at the same time they were also completely unprepared for war. Then came the aggression against Slovenia, and even Croatia, aside from the fact that it was not ready for war, was still thinking that it would not extend to its territory. While Croatia was taking the heaviest burden of the war, while they were destroying it, devastating it, and occupying it, in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was being said that this was not their war. That is how it is now in Kosovo, which aside from being unprepared for war, is conducting a policy of peacemaking and passive resistance and nonprovocation of Serbia.

[Marinkovic] Does that mean that the parallel Kosovo leadership thinks that war can be avoided and that someone will give you freedom as a gift?

[Vllasi] The question of war and peace in Kosovo does not depend on us Albanians, but exclusively on Serbia. Whatever we do not to provoke war, when Serbia needs it, it will provoke it and wage it when it finds it suitable. The other solution is for us to look on calmly and without resistance as Serbia realizes all of its objectives in Kosovo, and its ultimate objective to literally Serbianize Kosovo. That is, to essentially alter the demographic structure. Albanians now constitute 90 percent of Kosovo's population, Serbs about 8 percent. We need,

then, to prevent that, to organize ourselves and face that danger with the fewest possible casualties and the least possible destruction.

[Marinkovic] It is obvious that the disintegration of Yugoslavia has not yet been completed, because even you talk about establishing a Kosovo republic, and then there are also the Sandzak, Vojvodina, and even Montenegro.

[Vllasi] No, the disintegration is not over. That will come when Serbia, the only aggressor in the Balkans and in Europe, which has assaulted the territory of others with force, is driven into the natural boundaries of its original sovereignty. And those are the boundaries of Serbian autonomy laid down at the Berlin Congress in 1878 or under the 1974 Constitution, what we called Serbia proper, or Serbia without the provinces. Outside those limits, Serbia never existed as a state. We need, then, to liberate the temporarily occupied territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then it is the turn of Kosovo, and the problem of Vojvodina and Montenegro is raised. I agree with Milosevic's program that all the Serbs should live in one state, and a beginning has already been made toward achieving that, but not as he imagined it. That is, I am referring to Serbia within the limits of which I speak. Those Serbs who have not bloodied their hands on territory outside Serbia and who have also been victims of aggression must have all the human rights and ethnic rights under international conventions. But those who have supported the Chetnik aggression will have to go to Serbia. Thus, the percentage of those Serbs who will be living outside that state of Serbia will be lower than it has been for centuries.

[Marinkovic] When will the disintegration of Yugoslavia be completed, and how will that occur? It seems that you are also an advocate of the opinion that this will be definitively accomplished by military rather than diplomatic or political methods.

[Vllasi] The process of Yugoslavia's disintegration will be at an end when this war is over. But I think it is still not too late for a broad defense coalition as I have described. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina should be its backbone. The Slovenes, primarily for economic reasons, must become appropriately involved, because they cannot do without a market and source of raw materials extremely important to them. Albanians on this side of the Albanian border will rely more and more on the parent country, but they should also carefully build good relations with Macedonia and the Macedonians. Montenegro and Vojvodina will soon be the internal front within the limits of the present Serbian-Montenegrin creation, they will have to become independent, but they will naturally maintain quite strong ties with Serbia confined to its natural borders. There remains the painful and sensitive issue of the Sandzak, but with the help of others autonomy must be ensured in that region as well, some kind of special status or perhaps annexation to Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this will take some time, and creation of that coalition will not occur easily

without the help of Europe and the world, which should block Serbia with their mechanisms, above all its military force which it has seized from the former Yugoslavia. Only in this way is it possible to halt the mass suffering which we now see in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

We are only at the end of the first phase of the definitive denouement of the Yugoslav drama. The main phase of the complete dispersal of Yugoslavia and removal of what has been chronic crisis since the Balkan wars in 1918 is actually only beginning.

[Marinkovic] You left Kosovo illegally, you have appeared on Croatian television, now you have given an interview to DANAS, are you not afraid of going back and of a possible new arrest and activation of that indictment which has been lodged and now has also been expanded?

[Vllasi] I have already said that my place is in Kosovo, and I will certainly go back. And if they want to arrest me, let them arrest me, they cannot frighten me. I am not one of those who thinks that someone will offer us our freedom and present it on a platter.

Former Osijek Commander Denies Accusations

92BA0987A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 May 92 p 31

[Unattributed interview with General Karlo Gorinsek; place and date not given: "I Did Not Betray Osijek"]

[Text] In Osijek, one hears quite a few grave accusations against General Karlo Gorinsek, until recently commanding officer of the 1st Zone of Operations. Gorinsek answers some of them.

[DANAS] They say in Osijek that you are to blame for the fall of 28 Croatian villages in that region. What is your comment?

[Gorinsek] This would be the same as blaming President Tudjman, for example, for the fall of Banija because he was commander in chief of the Croatian Army. Those are actually notorious stupidities, because those who start such stories do not have the broad picture. At the time when those villages were falling, we still did not have an army, but were still establishing one. We should be happy that under those conditions we managed to stop them where we did, because what was achieved in eastern Slavonia was a great success. So I cannot accept accusations, and I think that they are mainly malicious.

[DANAS] It is said that Osijek was supposed to suffer the same fate as Vukovar and for that reason plans were made to move the Supreme Command of the zone of operations behind the line Sabac—Valpovo—Donji Miholjac.

[Gorinsek] Those are outright lies as well. It is natural that there should be regular and backup command positions. I was thus given the task by the Supreme

Command to plan a backup location for the command. We should not forget that this was at the time of Vukovar's fall. Osijek's defense forces were under my command, and I personally nominated Glavas to be commander of the city's defense, the purpose being to strengthen defense. So, preparation of a backup command position was part of the implementation of regular plans, and the city of Osijek was not defended by the act of leaving Glavas in the position of commander, but rather it was defended by the sacrifice and courage of all the fighting men who fought. I am referring here to the 135th Baranja Brigade, the 106th Brigade, the 130th and the 160th Brigades.

[DANAS] In the Osijek Secretariat for National Defense, they say that you did not have the right to demobilize an automobile, and this was the occasion for recent serious words between Zagreb and Osijek, because that task was exclusively in the jurisdiction of the secretariat. This is also used to justify prohibiting the return of that automobile, which was signed by Branimir Glavas, your subordinate in the zone of operations, but at the same time the secretary for national defense at that time.

[Gorinsek] The mobilization of that vehicle was completely unjustified and demonstrated Vrselja's arbitrariness, but also that of someone in the Osijek secretariat. They deliberately impeded the return of that automobile, whose return the owners had requested with very good reason. Moves were made behind the scene to do damage to that family unlawfully. That needed to be brought within the law, and I issued the order for demobilization of that automobile. Mr. Glavas rescinded my command, and because all that took place at a time when I was leaving the 1st Zone of Operations, I was no longer able to influence that entire case. Nevertheless, so I have heard, the automobile was ultimately returned to the owners. As the commander, I had the right to demobilize the vehicle, because those who carry out mobilization and demobilization do so at the request of the zone of operations. But when it comes to the two posts which Glavas held at that time, I think that two posts cannot be held and that he should long since have left the position of secretary. That is why I intervened several times even with President Tudjman, because it is utterly incompatible for someone to work as a regular officer and as secretary of national defense, that is, in the civilian service.

Reasons for Destruction of Zadar Discussed

92BA0987C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 May 92 p 11

[Article by Ante Barisic, M.A.: "Why Is Zadar Being Destroyed?"]

[Text] On the one hand, they would like to demonstrate the resolve and boldness to open fire, kill people, and destroy the largest city in northern Dalmatia in spite of UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] and the obligations to the international community. This is a territory which

is the epicenter of Serbian armed rebellion and rebels who have clearly demonstrated that they have no intention to recognize Croatian authority ever or in any respect. If the destruction continues, and Croatian defense forces, hampered by scruples about obligations assumed at the international level, do not respond, a continuation of collective frustration is possible. If it takes on aggressive forms, it could be directed toward destabilization of Croatian authority at the local and republic level. Also, the Serbian rebels hope that there might be an uncontrolled response of the Croatian side, which would then offer an excuse to escalate the war and completely eliminate the possibility that the forces of UNPROFOR would assume responsibility in the southern zone. In that case, responsibility would, of course, fall on the Croatian side.

The Serbian side usually charges that the Croatian side has caused an incident by attempting offensive action, and so in the case of Zadar they would like to create the impression that formations of the Croatian police started it, for example, taking back the dominant elevation of Kriz above Bibinje and pressing the enemy toward the air base and threatening the air base itself. The Serbian side is therefore trying to justify its terrorist activity against Zadar as reprisal with a "fierce counterblow."

At the same time, the Zadar land corridor is the jugular vein of Croatian defense in Dalmatia and Hercegovina and a portion of Bosnia. In severing land connections around Zadar, the Serbian militants hope to weaken pressure on the battlefields of southern Croatia and Herceg-Bosnia. Uninterrupted cannon fire against Zadar and the Adriatic Highway can actually impede land communications with Dalmatia quite a bit. Also, there is no question of any tourist success in that part of Dalmatia in the coming season, and this is another indirect reason for the horrible destruction of Zadar and the suffering of its inhabitants during the last month.

Verbal Crime 'Disservice' to Democratic Society

92BA0987B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 May 92 p 28

[Article by Slobodan Budak: "Words Cannot Bring Down the Regime"]

[Text] Even in the time of Yugoslavia, it was a crime to circulate false reports under Article 197 of the Croatian Criminal Code [KZH]. However, since establishment of the Republic of Croatia Law on Amendments and Supplements to the KZH, dated 28 February 1991 (NARODNE NOVINE, No. 9, 1991), that crime has been altered in its legal description, and the penalty envisaged for that crime has been essentially stiffened. Whereas before a prison sentence of not more than three years was envisaged for the crime in the first paragraph, now imprisonment of not less than three months and not more than five years is envisaged. In Tito's Yugoslavia, the penalty for the crime described in Paragraph 2 of the same article was not less than one and not more than five

years, while now it is not less than one and not more than 10 years. So, it has been doubled. While before the change that crime could be committed only maliciously, that is, with the objective and purpose of making citizens uneasy, now it is sufficient merely to carry or spread reports "which are KNOWN" to be false and thereby to cause a feeling of insecurity or threat. It does not take many words to demonstrate that it is unfeasible and unprovable to assert of something that "it is KNOWN" that the particular report is false, while at the same time, then, even though it is known that it is false, it has aroused a sense of threat or uncertainty in the recipient of the report.

In spite of the campaign slogans of the incumbent party and the verbal condemnations of verbal political crimes, law enforcement agencies are today instituting very widespread

criminal prosecutions against numerous distinguished individuals in Croatian public and political life, imputing to them the commission of a political verbal crime, the crime of thought, usually detrimental to the head of state. Words cannot bring down a regime. Fear of the spoken word is inherent in every totalitarian regime. Every democratic community makes it possible to be responsible in public for every word uttered, including what is false. This can take place only in an environment in which democracy has not authentically taken root. For instance, to prosecute Tanja Torbarina today because she said this or that about some person, even if that person was acting president of the republic, is truly not fitting for a democratic society and does a disservice to Croatia's reputation and its international prestige. Only enemies of the Republic of Croatia can rejoice at this reintroduction of the verbal crime by Vladimir Seks, public prosecutor of the Republic of Croatia.

International

Army Condemns Shelling of Sarajevo

LD0806191992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The Information Service of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army is authorized to issue the following statement:

Some information media have reported that Sarajevo was exposed to intensive activities of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina last night and today. If these reports are true, the Yugoslav Army General Staff most resolutely distances itself from this unnecessary destruction and most sharply condemns the shelling of civilian buildings and population.

On this occasion, too, the Yugoslav Army General Staff appeals to all participants in clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina to refrain from armed actions so that peace may be established and conditions finally created for the peace process to start, the statement says.

New York Consulate Staff Expelled

LD0606092192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0422 GMT 6 Jun 92

[Text] New York, June 5 (TANJUG)—All Yugoslav citizens from the Yugoslav Consulate General in New York and the cultural and information center in that city will have to leave the territory of the United States (U.S.) by June 7 this year, the State Department decided on Friday.

Yugoslav students have been allowed the possibility to return to their studies after they obtain visas. This is only a symbolic gesture, however, since travel costs are high and because of the economic and political isolation of Yugoslavia as a result of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Economists Worried By Impact of Sanctions

AU0506160092 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 June 92

[Lidija Medic report]

[Text] Good day! The situation in economy and society is more serious than even before in the last 70 years. The basic reasons for this lie in the sphere of politics and cannot be overcome by the measures that are within the scope of standard economic (re)structuring, is stated in the message adopted by economists at the recently completed consultations in Becici.

The current politics are generating expenses that the Yugoslav economy cannot withstand, not only in the long term but also in the short term. These politics are rapidly exhausting the resources and the strength of the economy, and this will lead into a situation in which

even the goals that have been inspiring these politics, could not be realized. The consequences of the blockade cannot be seen yet, but it is definite that they will be frightful and that they will bring the economy to a state of collapse. Therefore, we should not underestimate the sanctions regardless of the fact that they are not justified, the economists say.

The only right response to the blockade is to undertake all necessary steps to abolish it, the economists say. Macroeconomic final accounts must be drawn immediately to learn of the extent and structure of public expenditure, as there are enormous reserves hidden there. We must rigorously introduce order in public finances to stabilize the economy and establish financial discipline in companies and banks. The economists are seriously worried by the trends of statism, and if these trends continue regardless of the blockade they will exclude the Yugoslav economy from the international circles and prevent communications with the modern world, states the message by the economists that was adopted at the recently completed consultations on economic development in the FRY.

Activities, Morale of Yugoslav Army Analyzed

92BA0990A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
25 May 92 pp 6-7, 9

[Article by Milos Vasic: "Where the National Armed Forces Pass"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[Text] The armed forces have been divided: The JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] has remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], while the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia [VJ] have left for Serbia and Montenegro. The air force base at Bihac has been destroyed, General Vuk Obradovic has laid down his uniform, and there is nervousness on the southern borders. It is time to recall Serbian history from 1903 to 1912.

The unit about which it is already being jokingly said that it "is continuing the tradition of the Wehrmacht in retreat" destroyed the Zeljava Air Force Base at Bihac on 16 May 1992. At 0540, the general alarm sirens sounded; at 0555, a helicopter took off; and at precisely 0600, a series of explosions began that shook the earth, according to witnesses. Five runways, between 2,500 and 3,500 meters in length, were disabled by explosive depth charges planted every 50 meters (when the airfield was built, vertical steel pipes were buried in the runways, into which explosives could be later dropped, if necessary). Four large tunnels dug into the bowels of Mount Pljesevica; all the installations necessary for the support, maintenance, and combat use of a hundred jets; all the underground areas for personnel; all the installations necessary for perhaps the most strongly fortified air force base in this part of Europe and the systems for defending it—all of this was destroyed in a few minutes of hellish explosions. The direct damage is estimated to be a fantastic \$4 to \$6 billion; the indirect damage is put at around \$8 billion.

Construction on the Zeljava base began back in 1958, after a military meteorological station observed the climate at this site for a full two years. The road that went there was swept away, the people living in the towns of Veliki Boljevac, Mali Boljevac, Zeljava, and the village of Vucjak were resettled, and the pilots' leisure club was set up in Vucjak. The JNA paid all the expropriation expenses. Since the water supply was inadequate, a new one was installed; pipelines were run to the base from the enormous fuel reserves in the vicinity of Bihac; material for internal insulation was imported from Switzerland. The layout of the tunnels made it possible for planes to take off for their mission and return for refueling and rearming without interruption. At the peak of Mount Pljesevica was a radar station covering half of the Balkans, and arranged around the base were completely modern missile and artillery systems for anti-air defense. The base was—supposedly—impervious to a direct nuclear attack. All of this went to hell in the course of one morning. Naturally, the electronic systems and all the equipment, spare parts, weaponry, and anything else that could be saved had been removed before the base was destroyed. Nevertheless, the damage is inconceivably great.

Politics

By chance—or with malicious intent—a team from Martić's RSK [Republic of Serbian Krajina] Militia happened to be at the outside entrance to the Zeljava base that same morning. They had come, under the terms of a prior agreement, to take control of the base and all its buildings. They had the pleasure of seeing everything being blown to hell, even though three days earlier they had been promised that the base would belong to the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In the already strained relations between the armed forces and the local Serbs, the destruction of the Zeljava base was interpreted—as usual—as “betrayal.” Judging from everything, the JNA, or the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (as it is apparently being called now) came to the conclusion that the Zeljava base is too important and that Martić's militia would not hold onto it if someone else wanted it. The base is located too near to Croatia (the majority of it is in the administrative territory of that republic), while on the other hand there is the Cazinska Krajina, “Wild Serhat,” with a Muslim majority. Some commentators, eager to alleviate the psychological damage, are speculating about a supposedly already organized Croatian Air Force, contending that disabling the Zeljava base has even “eliminated the danger to the capital.” Local Serbs, however, say that at least one runway should have been left behind (it could always be destroyed if necessary), because the Plitvice Lakes are 20 km away, and they have to live from something once all this is over with. They also say that the armed forces have never before been concerned about their future; last fall, they staged a mortar attack on the zone around the base in order to force Croats out of the town of Vaganac, where there was some sort of radio beam, and they destroyed the town.

In the meantime, the Dubrava military airfield near Zivinica (Tuzla) was also destroyed last week. If this is the trend, then it raises the question of what will happen to the Zemunik airfield near Zadar (regardless of the fact that it was promised to UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force]), Udbina, and Banja Luka. Something, it appears, has happened in relations between the armed forces and the newly established Serbian authorities in the contested territories. Mutual mistrust is evident, and Gen. Ratko Mladic, the newly appointed commander of the Territorial Defense Force of the Serbian Republic of B-H (about whom it has not been said whether he has terminated active military service in the VJ) will have to get down to some serious diplomacy. He has already announced the introduction of order to the armed formations (and it was high time), while rumor has it that the newly appointed head of the Security Organ of the VJ, Gen. Boskovic, also traveled through B-H last week. Coincidentally or not, the famous “Opera” affair has just been revived (VREME No. 76): A wanted circular went out for the two main tenors (Radenko and Slavko), even though a military court acquitted them and halted the investigation at the end of April. Specifically, the “Opera” affair has a “borderland” angle as well, which Col. Slobodan Rakocevic (the one from the movies) tried to clarify in a letter to a Belgrade daily (they refused to publish it). He says that in agreements between the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense], the JRV [Yugoslav Air Force] and PVO [Air Defense], the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and “the most responsible factors in the country” it was decided within the context of “Opera” to set “economic activities” in motion for the sake of aiding Krajina. With the halt to the “Opera” operation, Col. Rakocevic says, “Krajina was left without independent television, without independent radio, without an airline, without a program for a duty-free zone, without communication links with other parts of the country, without the significant credit lines that should be in force these days (at the end of March) in particular..., without medicine, without goods for sale....”

Two Armed Forces

In an interview last Wednesday, Gen. Bozidar Stevanovic, the commander of the RV [Air Force] and PVO, said that the army must be transformed into two parts: the first part for Serbian B-H, and the second part for the SR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia. “A sense of confusion is being felt in the units in B-H, anger among some of the people, mutual mistrust, up to the point where there could be clashes, and thus an essential violation of the principles of sole seniority and subordination,” says Gen. Stevanovic. “All of this is a consequence of the feeling that they have been betrayed.... In the units in Serbia and Montenegro, the dominant feeling is one of a certain humiliation because of everything that is happening right now, and thus a loss of confidence in part of the officers' corps.” He also notes that the issues of the armed forces will not be settled through the departure of 40 or more generals, because

"the combat power of any armed forces, or rather their strength, is always determined by the midlevel officers' corps." Gen. Stevanovic mentioned—for the first time since the beginning of the war—a long-term strategic line of thinking: "ensuring the conditions for firmly holding onto the Serbian lands in this part, we hope, of the future Yugoslavia" (B-H and Krajina).

"The-future-Yugoslavia-we-hope" as a long-term strategic-political concept ironically takes us back to the beginning of the century, which clearly fits in with the trend of general regression in our history. Such elements are reminiscent of April 1903; a ruler who had painted himself into a corner; an anti-European attitude; a crisis on the southern borders; dissatisfied armed forces in which young officers take the initiative and even—what irony!—object to the ruler's wife, who is an activist in a political party hated by the armed forces. Obvious as well is the similarity between the guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the century ("Black Hand") and the tactics of infiltrating and arming Serbs outside Serbia during the past two wars. The analogies are disturbing, even if they do not necessarily mean very much. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that Serbia has returned, territorially and politically, to the beginning of the century, and that its fundamental strategic-political assumptions and state interests should be redefined as soon as possible. A careful rereading of Slobodan Jovanovic, and then the military works of Duke Putnik, Stepanovic, Misic, and Bojic, could enlighten our minds, which are dizzy with chauvinistic intoxication.

The Kosovo issue has apparently been revived lately; without any real reason—the latest alternative elections by the Albanians are no reason—world public opinion is concentrating on the southern province. One gets the impression that the crisis is artificial; as if someone were determined to turn Slobodan Milosevic's attention to the fact that Kosovo exists as well—where all of this began, incidentally. Nervousness has reached a point where the elite 63d paratrooper brigade has been sent in from Nis.

In this overall context, Maj. Gen. Dr. Vuk Obradovic decided to "lay down his uniform"; he submitted his resignation and asked to be relieved from active military service. This was announced two weeks ago, with the promise that he gave angry parents in the SSNO: If your children do not return from Bosnia by 19 May, I will resign. The withdrawal from Bosnia was not under his control, nor was it his responsibility; why did he promise to resign? Somehow, the resignation came on none other than 21 May, which is Air Force Day, so that military wits declared it to be a greeting card addressed to the comrades in the "blue helmets." More serious political analysts note the ambitions and experience of Gen. Obradovic and the vacant seats of two ministers of defense—the SR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. One source that wished to remain anonymous bets that Gen. Obradovic will replace Gen. Negovanovic: "It is not foolish to become a federal minister," according to the explanation. Vuk, however, is changing his clothes—everyone agrees—but clearly not his disposition; certain

pseudo-opposition parties are already sending melodramatic and tasteless best wishes; at the palace, the dominant mood is one of tension and nervousness, since two ministerial posts are vacant (retired Gen. Marko Negovanovic is regarded as finished). And while Mr. Djoko Stojicic strolls along the street of Serbian rulers, between the palace and parliament, expecting, like some Nusic character, someone to chance upon him and appoint him minister of culture, the demobilized Gen. Dr. Vuk Obradovic does not appear, nor is he "available" for comments. And that is how it must be.

Federal

Parties Complain of Election Irregularities

LD0706094692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1045 GMT 5 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Jun (TANJUG)—Neither the federal nor the republican electoral commission has so far received any objections regarding the federal elections. However, a complaint by the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] has been mentioned.

According to constitutional law, the electoral commission is duty-bound to look into all officially registered complaints and to reply. The final decision, however, will be made by either the republican or federal Supreme Court.

However, many complaints about the irregularity and validity of the first elections in the new federal state have been voiced by almost every political party except the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro.

Although the SRS won 33 seats in the new parliament, its leader Vojislav Seselj estimates that his party was deprived of several hundred thousand votes and that of the 450,000 invalidated ballots, four-fifths would have favored the radicals. Seselj claims that, deliberately or not, confusion was created so that instead of ticking off his party the voters ticked off his name.

The People's Party, which won no seats in the new parliament, has more reason to be dissatisfied. Its leader Milan Paroski said from the very outset and the registration of candidates that the elections were irregular.

Complaints are also being made by parties who boycotted the elections. They say that it seems as if there were no elections, and feel the call for an election boycott was heeded. According to them, the elections cannot be granted full legitimacy since, as they claim, 60 percent of citizens will not be represented in the Federal Assembly.

The Democratic Party is proving this with the claim that the SPS won only 24.32 percent of the vote in Serbia and the SRS 17 percent while "800,000 voters disappeared from the electoral register."

Milenko Radic, secretary general of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, demands that the elections be annulled because of, as he says, numerous irregularities that question the elections' legitimacy. He cites as the most serious irregularity the disappearance of 682,053 names from the electoral register.

Radic says in an official proposal filed with the Serbian Constitutional Court that between 29 April and 4 June, different accounts of how many people were registered to vote were given on three separate occasions, and that 1 million excess ballots were printed.

Serbia

Government Calls For Dialogue With Albanians

LD0906115292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0957 GMT 9 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Jun (TANJUG)—The Serbian Government again has invited representatives of the political parties and movements of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija to a dialogue, the republican Ministry for Information announced today. Its statement says that this meeting, dedicated to present issues and problems in the province, will take place in Belgrade on 11 June under the presidency of President Radoman Bozovic.

The invitation has been sent to the representatives of all Albanian parties and movements. It states that the republic's Constitution and international legal and political documents referring to the rights of national minorities will set the basis for these talks. The invitation quotes, among other things, CSCE documents; reports by experts on national minorities presented in 1991 in Geneva; the document of the Moscow conference on national, ethnic, religious, and language minorities; and the draft document of the sixth session of the European Conference on Protection of Minorities.

Similar talks with representatives of the Albanian national minority, as it is known, should have taken place on 9 May in Pristina, but none of the political organizations rallying Albanians showed up.

In Kosovo and Metohija there is a large number of the political parties that are active in rallying members of the Albanian minority only, including the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [Demokratski Savez Kosova, DSK], the Parliamentarian Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Alliance of Independent Intellectuals, the Forum for Protection of Albanians' Human Rights, as well as the independent trade unions.

Government Urges End To Fighting in Bosnia

LD0806183592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1728 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The Republic of Serbia Government today issued a statement stressing

that it receives with deepest indignation reports about the latest brutal and senseless attacks on civilian and other buildings in Sarajevo.

The statement says:

Following all resolute condemnations of armed conflicts in Sarajevo and tireless efforts to end the shelling of towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government and the public of the Republic of Serbia are very surprised that such senseless acts are continuing.

It seems that people and forces not wanting to see peace established have taken the fate of Sarajevo into their own hands.

The government again stresses that all those making decisions about the current destruction of Sarajevo and taking part in these activities, regardless of which side they belong to, bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences that could stem from this.

Condemning most energetically this destruction and completely distancing itself from its agents, the government again calls on the Serb leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina to immediately and unconditionally end all Serbian military activities, and let the international community decide about the other side's responsibility for the continuing military activities against Serb positions, and for the violence in Sarajevo, the Serbian Government stresses in today's statement.

Depos Council to Demand Milosevic Resignation

LD0806205492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2025 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The Council of the Serbian Democratic Movement [Depos] met this evening and decided to address Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic with a demand to resign. TANJUG has learned from circles close to the Depos Council.

The Council intends to propose that Slobodan Milosevic open the way for the formation of an interim government to which he would transfer his powers. Otherwise, TANJUG has learned, the Council plans to organize mass demonstrations together with political parties, trade unions, and student organizations.

It has also been learned from unofficial sources that the Council has decided to set up a foreign policy committee consisting of a number of experts from the ranks of Depos members from the university and other relevant institutions. The committee should look into ways of improving Serbia's image abroad and establishing firm ties with organizations and clubs of Serbians abroad.

The Depos will inform the public tomorrow about this evening's decisions.

Draskovic Warns Turkey on Bosnian Interference

*LD0706184892 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1712 GMT 7 Jun 92*

[Text] Ankara, June 7 (TANJUG)—Leader of the biggest opposition party in Serbia Vuk Draskovic called on Turkey not to interfere in Bosnia, assessing that "Turkey's support of the Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina will cause the war to continue."

"If this (Turkish) support continues, it will be difficult to [words indistinct] Draskovic said in an interview which was published in the Istanbul daily MILLIYET.

Turkish officials have proposed on several occasions that the international community intervene militarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina, offering Turkish units for this action. Draskovic urges a confederation as a solution to the war-torn former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Turkish daily said that Draskovic heads the "Democratic Opposition" and that he had announced massive demonstrations for late June, which will continue until their objective is reached without violence—the ousting of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Milosevic was elected with a large majority vote at the presidential elections in Serbia in December 1990. Draskovic also ran for republican president, but came third after Dr. [name indistinct], the leader of the also opposition Radical Party of Serbia.

Economic Sanctions Slow Down Privatization

*LD0806165592 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1551 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Text] Belgrade, June 8 (TANJUG)—International economic sanctions will "slow down, if not completely halt" the privatization of economy in Serbia, the Republican Development Fund said last Monday.

The U.N. Security Council resolution has imposed a total economic and political blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its republics Serbia and Montenegro.

"Foreign partners who had intended to invest capital in Serbia's economy are now waiting for the blockade to be lifted before making a definite decision", the fund said.

Foreign investments in the Yugoslav economy were legalized at the beginning of 1989 by a federal law. The end of 1991, 2,196 agreements on foreign investments, worth round 1.8 billion German marks, were registered in Serbia.

The fund assessed that the embargo will have a particularly hard effect on firms which have already completed ownership transformation.

Since the beginning of the year the fund mediated in the ownership transformation and restructuring of 14 large firms in Serbia.

In 1992 the state invested around 11 billion dinars (55 million German marks) in the transformation of these social firms into public and mixed enterprises, the fund said.

U.S. Stand on Sanctions, Talks Viewed

*AU0806213992 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 8 Jun 92*

[Ratko Dmitrovic commentary]

[Text] Nine days have gone by since the historic vote in the UN Security Council that introduced sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro of an unprecedented scope. Just a few days ago, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted all the demands made in Resolution 757. There are no longer any soldiers or citizens of Yugoslavia on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this has not stopped the war. This leads to the additional question of whether the sanctions were adopted in order to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia or with the aim of destroying the political system in Serbia, if need be, by provoking a civil war in which only Serbs would fight.

The existing system, Serbia, and the leadership can be reproached for many things, but it is not possible to blame this system for the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia. There is simply no justification for this. The secessionists are to blame for the war, which was not so long ago openly admitted by Mr. James Baker. If this is true, and it is, then how should one interpret the insistence of the United States on punishing Serbia and bringing it to its knees? Quite simply.

A formula for the upcoming Russian experiment is being devised at the Serbs' expense. And moreover, George Bush's election campaign is not going according to plan. His popularity is diminishing, particularly since the brutal stifling of black unrest. He and his administration have now assessed that they would be helped by flexing their muscles again, but abroad this time, and by strengthening their position as the so-called world's policeman. This time this would happen in the Balkans, where the situation is at its most tumultuous, and at the Serbs' expense because they are the only ones who are not agreeing to their destiny being decided by others.

Herein lies the explanation for the claims by Mr. Bush that Serbia dangerously undermines the national security of the United States, even though before the beginning of the war at least 95 percent of Americans perhaps did not even know that Serbia existed at all.

The danger of a civil war marked by ideology breaking out in Serbia is not probable at least not at the moment, despite the fact that a number of newspapers and individuals in Belgrade are actually encouraging this variant while spreading defeatism, hopelessness, and panic.

The demands for Serbia's president to resign can be viewed in this context. The head of the Republic of Serbia is the president who was elected by the Serbs and

all citizens of Serbia for the first time in their history at secret elections and among several candidates. After all, what would change if Milosevic were to resign?

Does anyone think that Serbs would accept a president who would have taken this post forcibly and in a Bolshevik manner or would have come with an American aircraft carrier? A president who would have to forget that more than 3 million Serbs live outside Serbia on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and accept the practice of the fate of the Serbian people being decided in Bonn, Washington, or Vienna instead of in Belgrade or wherever they live. Any possible attempt to forcibly bring down the government and the president of Serbia would return this state to the past, crush the principle of legality, and open the door to civil war. Such a thing would introduce the revolution formula into Serbian political practice, a revolution that would be activated on the streets according to the assessment and desires of certain political circles.

This would give the so-called great powers the right, whenever they considered this useful for their own interests, to send a telegram to the Serbs with the message: Change your president and government or we will introduce sanctions.

Serbia neither wants to nor can go against the whole world. It only wants what the world recognizes for others. Serbia is asking for a space for the truth. It is asking that the United States and European Community believe Butrus Ghali, the head of the United Nations, if not the Serbs, and his report on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia and Montenegro have met all the demands of the United Nations, but the war continues to rage in Bosnia. This only means one thing: The sanctions were aimed at the wrong side. Actually encouraged by the sanctions against Serbia, the Republic of Croatia continues to bring artillery and personnel into Bosnia-Herzegovina or bombard Serbian regions from Croatian territory, like the town of Trebinje.

Europe and the United States, as well as their media correspondents, generally keep quiet about this. Alija Izetbegovic says from Sarajevo that he is not even thinking about continuing the negotiations on Bosnia. When it comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war there, there is a very interesting detail. Europe and the United States have so far not taken into consideration one single proposal or one single initiative by the Serbian side, while at the same time meeting all the demands of the Muslim and Croatian coalition. This practice has been shown to be unproductive. It has fanned and continues to fan the flames of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is therefore high time to take a different tack and for the world to finally begin to respect Serbian stands.

Committee for Freedom of Radio, TV Established

LD0806153892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1126 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—The newly founded "Committee for the Freedom of Serbian Radio and Television" will demand that public supervision be extended to the work of the media, specifically television, where the free flow of information is being hampered.

The committee chairman, actor Ljuba Tadic, made these remarks at a news conference in Belgrade today. He assessed that democracy in Serbia is mostly endangered by "autocratic authorities" which, through the ruling party, is politically controlling public information media. The Committee for the Freedom of Serbian Radio and Television intends to campaign for the freedom of the public information media and in this way halt the manipulation of radio and television by the current regime. [passage omitted]

Political Struggle for Media Control Viewed

92BA0990B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 92 pp 30-33

[Article by Slobodan Antonic of the Institute for Political Studies: "Hostages of TV Journal: The Media and Changes in the Party Orientation of Belgradians, 1990-92"]

[Text] Belgrade—For nearly two years now, the fundamental point of political confrontation between the government and the opposition in Serbia has been the "war for the media." A political clash of this type and depth is practically without parallel in modern political history, and this is why Serbia in the early 1990's is a worthwhile subject of analysis in terms of political science and communication studies.

The main point of contention is the persistent effort by the ruling party (or to be more precise, its leadership core) to maintain complete control over the main news media—especially Serbian Radio and Television [RTV] and the POLITIKA Publishing House.

In order for us to understand this effort, we must look at the strength of their media influence. In mid-October 1990, and thus at the height of the election campaign, Second Journal TVB [Belgrade Television] was watched by 2.5 million people in the territory of Serbia without its provinces, which is more than 50 percent of the estimated population of Serbia, while at the same time of year in 1991—and thus at the height of the war in Croatia—that figure had grown to as many as three million, or 60 percent of the Serbian population age 10 and older. If we add to this some 800,000 viewers in Vojvodina, then we can estimate that the Second Television Journal was watched by no less than 3.5 million viewers in the territory of Serbia at the end of 1991.

The significance of this figure finds even greater expression if we add to it the fact established by the same survey, that nearly 30 percent of the viewers absolutely believe the information that they get from TV Belgrade, that they never even think to question its truth; 45.6 percent question it sometimes, while 12.1 percent of the viewers think that "fairly often things are not exactly as they say." As far as Second TV Journal itself is concerned, as many as 33.7 percent express absolute trust, 48 percent relative trust, and 13 percent mistrust. The level of trust in television is also attested to by the fact that as many as 65 percent of viewers do not feel even a slight need to confirm any information that they have heard or seen on Second Journal in other public media; 18 percent feel that they should do it, but do not; while 12 percent do in fact confirm it. Thus, we have confirmation here as well of the rule established on the basis of numerous studies in the United States and Europe, that "confidence in television dominates over the other two media in a quantitative ratio of approximately two or even three to one."

Viewership

It is obvious that it would be hard for the print media to significantly rectify the things that are seen and heard in Serbia on Journal. Empirical studies by the Institute of Social Sciences indicate that 30 percent of adult citizens in Serbia (excluding Kosmet)—even at the height of the 1990 election campaign for the first multiparty elections—never read the daily press, while 26 percent read it occasionally and 44 percent read it regularly. On the other hand, the circulation—and thus the influence—of newspapers that bear the mark "independent" is very limited, and in steady decline because of the general economic situation: The daily BORBA was not printing more than 45,000 copies at the end of April 1992, while the weekly VREME was printing 30,000 copies, and even if the readership coefficient is three or four, this still represents a modest figure compared to the television audience of three million.

As far as independent television is concerned, its range and influence continues to be local in nature. Because of the restricted nature of the broadcast network, NTV [Independent Television] Studio B is seen primarily in Belgrade and the vicinity, whereby—according to a survey commissioned by Studio B itself and carried out in May 1991 in the territory of the 10 Belgrade opstinas—the total viewership for NTV Studio B and First Program RTB [Belgrade Radio and Television] is approximately equal. Especially important to our analysis is information on the approximate distribution of viewership in the territory of Belgrade, especially for political news broadcasts: The news and journals of TVB I are watched by 85 percent of the Belgradians surveyed, and those of NTV Studio B are watched by 95 percent, while the viewership for broadcasts on current politics is identical: 86 percent. According to an RTB survey from October of the same year, however, the number of viewers of the central news broadcast by NTV Studio B, "Days and Weeks," does not exceed 100,000 people.

Although both figures must be taken with a grain of salt, because of different methodologies and possible bias, it is a fact that the media influence of NTV Studio B is clearly 10 times less than the influence of state television.

Thus, it is clear that whoever controls TV Journal and other news broadcasts by Serbian RTV can critically influence the shaping of public opinion. And many analyses show that the ruling party has figured out how to take advantage of this fact. According to one study, for example, in the last week before the election in Serbia, the most mentioned persons on TV Journal and in two radio news programs—and thus outside the time set aside for campaigning!—were in fact representatives of the ruling SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]: S. Milosevic (133 times over the course of 37 minutes), B. Jovic (46 times in three minutes), R. Bozovic (43 times in seven minutes), and S. Radmilovic (30 times in seven minutes)—and all, of course, in a positive context!

Similarly, since only Belgradians can compare official television to information from a rival institution, their overall view of the political leanings of TVB I and NTV Studio B is certainly adequately objective to confirm for us the assessment about the significant level of bias on the news programs of official television. According to a survey by ARGUMENT, 76 percent of respondents think that TVB I is biased towards the government, while 50.3 percent of them contend that NTV Studio B is biased towards the opposition (the percentage of people who think the opposite is negligible!). However, the assessment of NTV Studio B as leaning towards the opposition is at first glance in contradiction with the assessment if these same respondents, to the effect that—unlike RTB—NTV Studio B "broadcasts original information" (78 percent), "provides timely and unmanipulated information" (78 percent), and "provides information from various sources" (85 percent; these percentages are 24, 11, and 48 for TVB I), while 76 percent of the respondents feel that TVB I "provides biased commentary on information," and thus accuse it of "upholding a feeling of loyalty" (52 percent) and "contributing to the preservation of the status quo" (78 percent). However, despite this confusion (since when does objective reporting mean friendliness towards the opposition?), the certain feeling of the viewers is that Serbian RTV is one-sided and biased towards the government.

Readership

Since the structure of those who regularly read daily newspapers indicates the clear preponderance of newspapers from the POLITIKA house (of the cited percentage of regular readers—44 percent—30 percent read POLITIKA and POLITIKA EKSPRES, while 10 percent read NOVOSTI), which are, according to the general assessment, often rather biased towards the ruling party, the SPS is actually capable of controlling nine-tenths of the media in Serbia. For example, according to an analysis of the contents of the 10 March issue of POLITIKA, and thus immediately after the well-known

March events, "all eight pages (reviewing the March events—A.S.) are dominated by information in which the events are presented exclusively as a 'destructive campaign' carried out by 'forces of chaos and madness.' Of the 51 published articles, 49 supported the ruling party and condemned the opposition, while only two were neutral, and a day later the complete contents of all the articles were devoted to condemning the events that occurred in Belgrade on 9 March."

All in all, the described image of the field of information clearly shows us the influence of the main media and the opportunity enjoyed by information magnates and their political patrons to shape Serbian political public opinion, as well as the justness of the stubborn effort by the opposition to ensure more equitable access to the key public media.

We have already emphasized that in terms of information, Belgradians are a rather privileged group in relation to the rest of the Serbian population. First of all, in Belgrade information gotten from official television can easily be compared to information from the rival independent television; it is in Belgrade that the main independent and opposition newspapers are printed; Belgrade is the center of the political, economic, and cultural elite, within the context of which information is traded back and forth, after which it filters out to society; Belgrade is the political headquarters of the main opposition parties, and it is here that they launch and carry out, in front of the Belgradians' eyes, all their actions, etc. All in all, Belgrade should be a setting in which the dominance of the main official media is significantly limited, thus offering the opposition a chance to fight for the good will of the electorate on a more equitable basis.

Indeed, a comparison of the preferences of the electorate in Belgrade with that of, say, southern Serbia clearly shows a greater preference for the opposition by the clearly better-informed Belgradians:

How They Would Vote in March 1992 (in percent)

	Belgrade	Southern Serbia
Socialist Party of Serbia	15	51
Serbian Renewal Movement	11	5
Democratic Party	15	9
Serbian Radical Party	17	11
Other parties	13	6
Undecided, would not vote	29	18

Survey by the Institute for Political Studies (IPS)

However, the reason that the devotion of the citizens of southern Serbia to the ruling party is greater, or that Belgradians are more critical of the SPS, is not necessarily the fact that the latter are better-informed. First of all, there is the rule that more economically developed and urbanized areas are significantly more politically tolerant and moderate, and that even in post-socialist

systems they give incomparably fewer votes to communist (crypto-communist or ex-communist) parties in relation to underdeveloped areas. Second, even during the December 1990 elections, when the pluralization of the Belgrade media had just begun (NTV Studio B began continuous broadcasts on 16 November 1990, and it covered only the area of the central Belgrade opstina), Belgrade was much more oriented towards the opposition than southern Serbia was, where SPS candidates secured victories even in the first round.

Thus, the real picture can be obtained only by comparing the change in party orientation of Belgradians themselves from the introduction of political pluralism in early 1990 to the present day.

As the table shows, a continuous decline in the popularity of the ruling party is discernable: Between April 1990 and today, it has lost a full 22 percent of the electorate. However, this decline has not automatically meant a proportional increase in the popularity of the opposition parties.

Party Orientation of Belgradians (in percent)

	April 1990	December 1990	March 1991	March 1992
	(IPS survey)	(Elections)	(IPS survey)	
Socialist Party of Serbia	37	34	29	15
Serbian Renewal Movement	7	15	17	11
Democratic Party	4	11	22	15
Serbian Radical Party	—	—	—	17
Other parties	26	17	14	13
Undecided, would not/did not vote	27	23	19	29

The Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic Party, taken together, have not captured a single percentage of the electorate between the election and today (they have simply swapped places), so that they have not retained the sympathies of the Belgradians that they won during the well-known March 1991 events. The small parties are continuing to lose voters, although an enormous breakthrough has been achieved by the newly formed Serbian Radical Party, which has become the strongest party in Belgrade. Finally, the number of people who are undecided or do not want to vote, after dropping to its lowest level immediately after the March events, has increased drastically, and in early 1992 it achieved its highest level yet.

Torn

All this is an indication that the Belgrade electorate—although it has abandoned the SPS to a considerable

measure—still remains outside the range of the opposition. They are or have become sympathizers of Seselj's party, which many—and not without reason—are calling a crypto-communist, or "socialist backup party," or they have opted for a neutral or abstaining position.

Thus, despite the SPS's catastrophic economic and political results, which the electorate is surely noticing (in the survey in question from March 1992, half of the citizens of Serbia consider the Serbian authorities' economic, foreign, social, and fiscal policy completely unsuccessful, while 57 percent give a negative assessment to the Serbian government) and despite the fact that Belgradians are much-better-informed about all the positions and actions of the opposition than the other citizens of Serbia, they would still not give a majority of their votes to the opposition parties that are the most vehement critics of the regime.

If we compare this position with our control group of voters from southern Serbia, who would—despite an identical perception of the culprit for the current political and economic catastrophe—still vote for the ruling party, we will see that the possibility of getting information from other sources (and not only from the media under the control of the ruling party) among Belgradians results only in more significant abandonment of the SPS, but not in greater adherence to the opposition bloc.

We have already emphasized that Serbian public opinion is in a state that resembles schizophrenia, since the citizens are torn between the propaganda stereotypes that have been implanted in their conscience through persistent repetition, and their everyday experience, which provides them with evidence of a completely opposite character. Such an assessment is confirmed in this case as well. The citizens are confronted with the drastic failures of one policy, or rather one party and person, but through effective propaganda an almost-reflexive hostility towards the many competing parties and their leaders has been implanted in their conscience. Thus, they react either by aligning themselves with the party that they imagine as the opposition—but which the main media do not vilify like the other opposition parties—or they withdraw, confused and disappointed, into neutrality or abstinence.

Hence the attitude of Belgradians towards parties: Still under the strong influence of official propaganda, but partly aware of actual events as well as information from other sources, they demonstrate a significantly greater tendency towards neutrality, abstinence, and alignment with a pseudo-opposition party than the clearly less-informed citizens of southern Serbia.

Main Struggle

What conclusions and prognoses emerge from all this?

First, the media strength of television's Journal is so great that anyone who secures political control over it also secures primary influence over the shaping of political public opinion in Serbia. In other words, the current Serbian authorities, who are accused of monopolizing the media, can freely renounce direct control over the other major media, retaining critical influence over the editorial policy of Second TV Journal, and that will not have any major consequences on the political orientation of public opinion.

Second, there is no form of media pluralization, such as the kind encountered in, say, Belgrade—regardless of how serious economic and political conditions are—that is a sufficient precondition for public opinion to automatically turn against the ruling party. Through persistent control over the most influential media, it is possible to amortize the dissatisfaction of the citizens in such a way that votes do not flow off to the main rival parties, but rather are redirected into allied or attached parties, or are neutralized.

Third, if the ruling political elite does not lose its self-confidence, or rather if it not afflicted by Paret's insufficiency of residue (the loss of ideals and conviction among a political elite from the time of the struggle for power, a weakened ability to recruit new, competent members and inefficiency in excluding incompetent ones, a loss of self-confidence and the will for power, etc.), and gradually releases control of the main media on its own, then it could stay in power for a long time to come. But given the virulence of the political struggles surrounding the insignificant Second Program of Radio Belgrade, it is hard to foresee such a loss of self-confidence any time soon.

And fourth, the main political struggle in Serbia will be waged in the coming period around influence over the television presentation of information, whereby the final outcome will depend on the system's overall self-reproductive ability: If the system does not fail completely based on some other point, then in terms of the media as well it will continue to ensure the dominant position of the ruling elite; if the system does fall apart, then there are two options—either the fall of the media monopoly will allow democratic forces to be elected by the necessary majority of the electorate, or the so-called backup party will exploit the chaotic situation and, wresting free of the regime's control (or at least guaranteeing political equality), shape the entire system according to its concepts of politics and democracy.

Montenegro

Police Break Ring Smuggling Arms to Sandzak
LD0506221792 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2034 GMT 5 Jun 92

[Text] Herzeg Novi, June 5 (TANJUG)—The Montenegro police has broken a ring of arms smugglers. The

weapons were smuggled mostly from the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia into Sandzak and Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija], regions in the Yugoslav Republics of Montenegro and Serbia populated with Muslims and ethnic Albanians.

Infantry weapons, ammunition, hand grenades and mines arrived in Boka Kotorska, coastal Montenegro, from the naval port of Lora near Split and from the Adriatic island of Vis, from where the Yugoslav Army withdrew and where the Armed Forces of Croatia are now located.

Ten smugglers have been arrested and two are on the run, the Montenegrin police told a press conference in the Montenegrin coastal town of Herzeg Novi on Friday.

Parties Merge to Form Social Democratic Party

LD0806154592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1339 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Excerpt] Podgorica, 8 Jun (TANJUG)—A new Montenegrin Social Democratic Party [Socijal demokratska Partija Crne Gore] has been formed. The party consists of the Alliance of Reformists of the Montenegrin Littoral [Savez Reformista Crnogorskog Primorja], the Social Democratic Party [Socijal Demokratska Stranka] and municipal organizations of the Alliance of Reformist Forces [Savez Reformskih Snaga] from the central and northern parts of Montenegro. [passage omitted]

Macedonia

Presidential Office Denies Report on Kosovo Visit

AU0906084092 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jun 92

[Boris Djordjioski report]

[Text] The office of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov is denying that there is any truth to the news from Pristina that Macedonia will be the first state to recognize the Republic of Kosovo. The brief denial also says that the Macedonian Government does not have a minister called Aleksandar Donevski.

What happened is that the Albanian-language paper BUJKU which, publishing the statement by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, stated that Ibrahim Rugova, leader of this Alliance, received Macedonian Minister Donevski in Pristina two days ago. As BUJKU states, he congratulated Rugova for being elected president of the Republic of Kosovo on behalf of the Macedonian president. Moreover, the paper claims that Rugova and this non-existent Macedonian minister stressed the need for promoting contacts and closer cooperation between Kosovo and Macedonia. Donevski also allegedly handed invitation to Rugova to visit Macedonia.

BUJKU published this report on congratulations to Rugova from Macedonia as an exclusive report on the front page together with a (?letter) by Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock. Skopje claims that neither congratulations were sent to Rugova, nor that it knows any minister called Aleksandar Donevski.